Jehovah's Witnesses lead an extremely hectic life. Every Jehovah's Witness congregation has five weekly "meetings" held three times per week. Tyically, a one-hour meeting is held on Monday or Tuesday night, which is termed the "Congregation Book Study". "Book studies" is a more appropriate term, since a congregation is divided up into multiple small groups which meet both at the local "Kingdom Hall" and in members' homes so as to encourage an intimate atmosphere where everyone will feel free to participate. [SEE "REDMOND v. GAF" BELOW.] Then, on either Wednesday or Thursday night, there are two consecutive 45-minute meetings held only at the local Kingdom Hall, during which both male and female JWs are taught how to perform the WatchTower Society's various recruiting methods. On Sundays, morning or afternoon, there are two consecutive meetings, totaling 90 minutes, held only at the local Kingdom Hall.

Jehovah's Witnesses are also expected to spend a half day each and every week in "field service", which is their term for doing door-to-door recruiting. Employed JWs typically go out in field service on weekends. Almost always this is an organized congregational activity, which is preceded by a 15-20 minute meeting, generally on Saturday mornings and Sunday afternoons. Most congregations also hold such meetings on Tuesday through Friday mornings, and occasionally weekday afternoons, and even some evenings during summer months. JWs will meet at the Kingdom Hall (and sometimes at the "book study" locations in larger congregations) to make arrangements for performing field service. There is always the 15-20 minute "meeting" held to briefly discuss a "daily text" from the Bible. These meetings are almost always conducted by an Elder, or when unavailable, a Ministerial Servant (deacon). Generally the conductor will perform a "demonstration" how to present the "suggested offer" of the month. The conductor will also assign drivers, and who makes up each "car group". The conductor also makes certain that each car group will "work" a specific "territory", which has been mapped out by the congregation. Every element of this JW activity, like all JW activities, is precisely "controlled", so that the individual JW never forgets who is in charge of everything the JW does.

Jehovah's Witnesses also have three conventions which they attend each year. Typically, a JW family must travel to these, unless they just so happen to live in the city where such are held. Congregations are divided into groups of approximately 20, which together are called a "Circuit". Each year, the Circuit has a one-day "assembly", held on either a Saturday or Sunday, which is called their "Special Assembly Day". The Circuit also conducts a two-day weekend "Assembly" called their "Circuit Assembly". These two Circuit events are held one in the fall-winter, and one in the winter-spring. Summers are reserved for the main annual "WatchTower Convention", which is termed the "District Convention". "Districts" are groupings of 8-12 circuits. These are three-day events held from Friday through Sunday. If a JW family must travel very far for the District Convention, an employee may need to take that Thursday off in order to make preparations and travel.

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Assuming, as the district court did, that Bush established a prima facie case of discrimination based on a failure to accommodate religious beliefs, we conclude that summary judgment was proper because Regis offered a reasonable accommodation.

The phrase "reasonable accommodation" is not defined and turns on the facts and circumstances of the case. ... The Supreme Court has stated that compliance with Title VII does not require an employer to give an employee a choice among several accommodations; nor is the employer required to demonstrate that alternative accommodations proposed by the employee constitute undue hardship. ...

Here, Regis offered Bush a reasonable accommodation. When it required her to cover shifts every other Sunday, it started the shift after her religious services had concluded. And as soon as the services changed times, Regis gave Bush Sundays off to accommodate the services. In addition, Regis permitted Bush to swap shifts to allow her to attend religious conventions. ...

Bush argues that the Sunday shift prevented her from doing field service with her family, which constituted a bona fide religious belief. The record, however, indicates that field service was not required to be performed on Sundays; rather, that was the day Bush and her family wished to perform field service. An employee has a duty to make a good faith attempt to accommodate her religious needs through means offered by the employer. ... In this case, it does not appear that Bush made any such effort.

 

... ...

 

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment on this [retaliation] claim because Bush failed to establish that she suffered an adverse action. None of the instances Bush identified rise to the level of an adverse action because none would have discouraged a reasonable employee from making the discrimination charge. In fact, according to the evidence presented, none of these instances deterred Bush from filing her complaint.

Even if Bush established a prima facie case, Regis proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, which Bush has not argued are a pretext for discrimination. ...
 

"We state initially that we have no question concerning the sincerity of the petitioner's religious convictions arising from his affiliation with the Jehovah's Witnesses faith. We accept as a fact his conviction that he is exhorted to study the Bible and to aid others in a fuller understanding of the truths found therein. However, we do not believe that this is the sole and complete answer to the issue presented. Perhaps the most recent leading case in this regard is Sherbert vs. Verner, 374 U.S. 398. At Page 406, the court expresses the constitutional limitation as follows:

'... to condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's unwillingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.'

"This case involved the unwillingness of a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church to work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith, as a result of which she was discharged. On applying for unemployment benefits, she was denied due to her unavailability for work on Saturday. In holding that the denial was unconstitutional, the court, at Page 409, said:

'Nor do we, by our decision today, declare the existence of a constitutional right to unemployment benefits on the part of all persons whose religious convictions are the cause of their unemployment. This is not a case in which an employee's religious convictions serve to make him a nonproductive member of society.'

"We do not mean to infer that such is the situation here, but we do believe that the court is saying that not all unemployment caused by an individual's religious convictions is protected constitutionally in the allowance of benefits. In the first place, the petitioner's unemployment was not caused by his religious convictions. His then employer had fully acceded to his religious needs. He quit in order to pursue his self-employment endeavor, and only when his contract terminated did he apply for benefits. Still, we are considering his religious convictions as affecting his entitlement to unemployment benefits. The authorities of which we are aware have held that the individual is protected in the observance of his Sabbath, and perhaps also in the observance of certain days considered holy in his faith. But none of the cases, to our knowledge, have gone so far as to protect the individual in the attendance of functions of the church during days other than as noted above. The petitioner admits that it is not a tenet or precept of his faith that study of the Bible must be conducted in concert on Tuesday and Thursday evenings. This is an arrangement made by the particular group with which the petitioner is affiliated and motivated for purposes of convenience. As such, it is our conclusion that it is not constitutionally protected within the authorities of which we are aware. The petitioner's restriction on his availability for work on Tuesday and Thursday evenings consequently serves to render him 'unavailable' for suitable work within the intent and meaning of RCW 50.20.010(3). However, as noted above, this is not the basis for our finding in the instant case that the petitioner has not satisfied the statutory eligibility requirements."

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EEOC v. AT&T was a 2007 Arkansas federal court decision that involved two Jehovah's Witness Employees, named Glenn Owen and Jose Gonzalez. The two Jehovah's Witness Employees, who just so happen to be brothers-in-law, were employed as customer service technicians at AT&T's Jonesboro, Arkansas location. Owen had worked for AT&T for 5+ years, and Gonzalez had worked for AT&T for 8+ years .

In January 2005, the two JW brothers-in-law requested time off on a Friday in July 2005, so that they could attend the annual three-day weekend WatchTower Convention. Although AT&T had "accomodated" Owen's and Gonzalez's requests in years past, AT&T declined Owen's and Gonzalez's requests in 2005. Owen and Gonzalez attended the WatchTower Convention anyway. On returning to work, both employees were initially suspended, and then fired a couple weeks later. In the 2007 ruling, in which ATT&T's motion for summary judgement was denied, the USDC explained the conflict:

"In keeping with its 2004 agreement with the Communication Workers of America Union, the Center implemented a procedure for employees to schedule vacation time. In October or November of each year, management circulated a vacation schedule for the following year. The employees indicated on the master schedule the days or weeks that they planned to take as vacation. The employees were allowed to choose their vacation days in order of seniority. After the master schedule was complete, an employee could still ask for other days off by submitting a vacation request form. According to AT&T, during the summer months, only one technician per day could take off. If a request were made for a day that no other employee was scheduled to be off, then that request would be granted, but if a request were made for a day in which another employee was scheduled to be off, according to AT&T, the request would not be granted, though the employee requesting that day could wait to see if the senior employee who had already scheduled a vacation day changed his mind about taking that day.

"As part of practicing their faith, Owen and Gonzalez attend a yearly Jehovah’s Witness convention. The dates for the convention are announced early in the year, so they are always announced after the master vacation schedule has been circulated at the Jonesboro Installation and Repair Center. Thus, Owen and Gonzalez had to make a vacation request if they wanted that time off. The 2005 convention was scheduled for July 15-17 (Friday through Sunday). The only day of concern in this case is Friday, July 15, when both men were scheduled to work. They were not scheduled to work that Saturday. Customer service technicians do not work on Sundays.

"For purposes of the summary judgment motion, AT&T concedes that before July 2005 Owen and Gonzalez submitted multiple written and verbal requests to Jacob Garrett, the manager of the Jonesboro Center, for vacation time on July 15. The men approached Garrett about the Jehovah’s Witness convention and its importance on July 7 as well. Garrett said that he would let them know about it closer to July 15.

"The decision had still not been made on July 14. Gonzalez spoke with Garrett that day about the matter by telephone approximately three times. Garrett and Phillip Farley, the area manager to whom Garrett reported, were working together that day and discussed the request made by Owen and Gonzalez. Garrett also discussed the request with Marty Benz. Benz was the manager of the Walnut Ridge, Paragould, and Blytheville Centers, but he worked out of the Jonesboro office. Benz and Garrett discussed ways the situation could be handled, such as getting the employees who were scheduled for vacation time to switch with Owen and Gonzalez, or requesting help from computer service technicians from other centers, as they sometimes would do in circumstances of a heavy workload. After reviewing the workload information and considering other factors, Garrett told Owen and Gonzalez on the afternoon of July 14 that 'the forecast doesn’t look good', and he would 'try to do what [he could] if the load permits'. Later that afternoon or evening, Garrett informed them that the workload would not allow them to take the day off. Because Garrett suspected they might not show up the next day, he gave each man a directive to come to work or face serious consequences. Each responded that he would not be at work. Farley contacted the local union president, who called the men to reiterate that they would face serious consequences for missing work.

"Owen and Gonzalez missed work on July 15. Farley and Garrett suspended the men after an investigatory meeting. Farley recommended to the director of Installment and Repair that the two men should be terminated. The director followed his recommendation."

Owen and Gonzalez filed a religious discrimination claim with EEOC, which after investigation issued a letter of determination finding probable cause that both men had been denied a reasonable accommodation because of their religious beliefs. The EEOC then filed this federal lawsuit on behalf of the two JWs.

AT&T argued that the situation in 2005 was different from previous years, and that when Owen and Gonzalez disregarded the directive to be at work on Friday, July 15, they caused an undue hardship on AT&T, because other employees were required to work overtime, and AT&T was forced to pay premium wages for that work. AT&T also argued that the absence of Owen and Gonzalez caused it to be unable to meet the service needs of all of its customers that day.

In October 2007, a federal jury ignored AT&T's defense, and Glenn Owen and Jose Gonzalez were awarded the total sum of $756,000.00. The jury awarded Gonzalez $136,000.00 in lost wages and benefits and $230,000.00 in additional damages. Owen was awarded $160,000.00 in lost wages and benefits and $230,000.00 in additional damages. EEOC and the two Jehovah's Witnesses were elated with the largest ever religious discrimination judgement in Arkansas history. AT&T vowed to appeal. No further info.

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"... In its reply brief, defendant argues that this is not a failure-to-accommodate case because plaintiff admits 'she was never forced to work in violation of her religious beliefs and was never disciplined for missing work for religious observation'. ... Nonetheless, the court believes this case belongs in the failure-to-accommodate category because, as noted below, plaintiff alleges she was discharged for repeatedly complaining about accommodation problems.

 

"In the present case, defendant concedes that plaintiff has sincere religious beliefs which potentially conflict with employment requirements and that defendant was aware of the conflict. Specifically, plaintiff must attend church services or meetings on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m., and also on Sundays until 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff disclosed this information on her employment application as well as during her pre-hire interview with the store manager. These elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case are conceded. Defendant does not contend that the requested accommodation would cause defendant undue hardship.

 

"Rather, the dispute in this matter concerns the reasons for plaintiff’s discharge. This is not only an element of plaintiff’s prima facie case, but also the ultimate issue. While defendant argues that it discharged plaintiff for a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, plaintiff has produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that her accommodation requests and/or her complaints to management regarding the failure to accommodate were a motivating factor in defendant’s decision to discharge her. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that her immediate supervisor, Brian Kelly, repeatedly scheduled her to work during the above-referenced times. Sometimes plaintiff went over Kelly’s head and succeeded in having her scheduled changed. Other times these efforts were not successful. On other occasions Kelly scheduled plaintiff to close one night and open the next morning, including New Year’s Eve and New Year’s Day, with the explanation that such scheduling was the result of plaintiff’s scheduling 'restrictions'. Plaintiff also testified that Kelly’s treatment of her worsened when she complained to higher level management about the scheduling problems. Kelly allegedly assigned plaintiff unusually difficult tasks and forbade other employees to assist her.

 

"Defendant’s stated reason for discharging plaintiff is that she violated defendant’s ethics policy which prohibits employees from, among other things, '[e]ngaging in personal, financial, or business relationships with suppliers or customers'. ... According to Kelly, on March 27, 2004, plaintiff 'had just completed the how to clinic in aisle 4. She was excited and said she had 7 people participate. Then she stated she "got a job out of it."' ... Kelly viewed this is a violation of the prohibition against 'outside employment + solicitation', ... and reported the incident. The store manager, Jim Geers, interviewed plaintiff, verified that she had made the statement, and discharged her on this basis after consulting with the area human resources manager. ...

 

"A reasonable jury might reject this explanation because Geers did not ask plaintiff what happened at the how-to clinic or whether she actually solicited or obtained work from a customer. Geers testified that the ethics policy prohibits employees from 'soliciting work or receiving work while you were on the clock doing side work'. ... He also testified that he understood, from Kelly’s statement and the interview with plaintiff, that 'a customer came up to her afterwards, asked if she did painting and would she do some work for them'. ... A jury could find that Geers had no basis for believing that plaintiff had solicited work from the customer. Geers also acknowledged that he never asked plaintiff is she had actually received any work. ... In fact, plaintiff has testified that she never received any business from a customer, and that the particular customer at the how-to clinic never called her. ... Plaintiff also testified that her meeting with Geers lasted just one or two minutes, and that he was not interested in listening to her explanation regarding her 'I got a job.' comment. ... During this meeting, plaintiff says that she also asked Geers for permission to take off three days in June 2004 (approximately three months hence) in order to attend a religious convention, and that he denied this request although he had granted such permission previously during her pre-hire interview. ...

"Defendant’s explanation for discharging plaintiff is further weakened by the fact that defendant’s human resources manager, Mary Frankland, testified that an employee may post his/her business card on a bulletin board and tell customers, who inquire if the employee is available for hire, that 'I have posted something on the board, you should go over there'. ... According to plaintiff’s testimony, she did nothing more than this at the how-to clinic.

 

"In addition to rejecting defendant’s explanation, a reasonable jury might conclude that defendant was actually motivated, in whole or in part, by plaintiff’s complaints regarding her supervisor’s failure to accommodate her requests for time off. While there is no 'smoking gun' in this case, there is evidence suggesting that Kelly was annoyed with plaintiff’s complaints. Plaintiff testified that Kelly once 'introduced me to a new vendor as the thorn in his side'.

 

"When Kelly heard plaintiff make the comment at the how-to clinic, another employee heard Kelly respond by saying, 'Good'. ... Kelly did not ask plaintiff what she meant by this comment, but he immediately reported the comment to the store’s human resources manager because he wanted plaintiff to be disciplined. ... Kelly also indicated that he was not 'comfortable' with complaints plaintiff had made about him to this human resources manager.

 

"The material facts are sufficiently disputed such that the matter must be resolved by a jury. If the jury finds liability, it will be for the jury to assess damages. The court will not invade the jury’s province by cutting off plaintiff’s damages on the theory that she falsified her employment application. Defendant may submit evidence on this issue to the jury and request an appropriate instruction."

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JACKSON v. USPS was a 2005-7 Illinois federal court decision which involved a Jehovah's Witness named Jessie Mae Jackson. Jessie Jackson, a mailhandler for the United States Postal Service, brought suit against the Postmaster General, claiming that she was fired because she was a Jehovah's Witness. In 2006, the USDC granted summary judgment to the Postmaster General because Jackson had waited too long after she was fired to file a discrimination complaint with the Postal Service's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office, and her delay could not be excused.  In 2007, the USCA affirmed.

Jessie Mae Jackson worked as a "casual" (non-career) employee at the Chicago Bulk Mail Center starting in 1997 until she was fired for poor performance on December 31, 2004.  About February 1, 2005, Jackson sent a written complaint to the U.S. Department of Labor, which advised her to complain to the Postal Service in Washington, D.C.  Jackson alleged that she promptly did so, but received no response.  Jackson says she called USPS in May 2005 and eventually was directed to file a complaint with USPS's district office. Jackson contacted a USPS EEO counselor for the first time on May 9, 2005.

On July 6, 2005, Jackson filed a formal complaint alleging that her supervisors had discriminated against her based on her religion by denying her request to attend a Jehovah's Witness convention in 2004. Jackson alleged that her supervisor denied her request, and told her she would be fired if she attended the convention. Jackson further alleged that her supervisor and supervisor's supervisor then started to treat her poorly. Jackson further contended that four months later her supervisor had her sign papers that she believed to be routine "safety sheets," but that she later discovered was a "false [performance] evaluation", which was used to terminate her. USPS dismissed Jackson's complaint because she exceeded, by almost three months, the 45-day time limit for initiating contact with an EEO counselor.

Jackson then brought suit in federal court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Jackson alleged that while employed with USPS that she was never informed of her "EEO rights". Jackson claimed that her supervisor during her first three years on the job advised her that she "had no rights" as a casual employee, and that her seven subsequent supervisors never advised her of her rights. She also stated that she believed that anti-discrimination notices on EEO posters in her workplace applied only to regular, not casual, employees.  Jackson contended that she did not learn of her right to complain of discrimination until after her discharge when the Illinois Department of Employment Security gave her written materials about discrimination.

The USDC granted USPS's motion for summary judgment, determining that Jackson's claim was barred because she did not timely contact an EEO officer. The court rejected Jackson's argument that her untimeliness was excused by the doctrine of equitable estoppel because Jackson could not establish that USPS took steps to prevent her from timely filing. Nor could Jackson avail herself of equitable tolling because she failed to exercise due diligence in pursuing her claim.

On appeal, Jackson's sole argument was that the USDC erred because there was a material issue of fact concerning whether USPS actively misled her into believing that she, as a casual employee, was not entitled to file a discrimination claim. Her only support for this argument was the assertions in her affidavit that her former supervisor told her she "had no rights" as a casual employee and that neither her subsequent supervisors nor the EEO posters in her workplace dispelled this misinformation. The USCA stated:

"The district court correctly concluded that Jackson's affidavit alone was insufficient to invoke equitable estoppel to excuse her untimely filing. Although Jackson contends that a prior supervisor told her that she had no right to complain of discrimination, her only evidence of this is her own self-serving and unsupported affidavit, which is insufficient to overcome summary judgment. ... In any event, her purported lack of awareness of her right to file a discrimination complaint is significantly undermined by her attendance at two training sessions, in 1997 and 1999, at which she received written documentation of the Postal Service's EEO policy and the procedure for filing a complaint. Jackson's argument is further weakened by the fact that the posters displayed in her workplace explicitly stated that EEO policies apply to 'any' postal employee and that employees must contact a counselor at the EEO office in Bedford Park within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory act or personnel action. In light of the many official statements from the Postal Service that were presented to her, the district court properly concluded that Jackson did not show she was actively misled about the applicability of the Postal Service's EEO policies to her as a casual employee.

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REDMOND v. GAF CORP was a 1974-8 federal lawsuit involving an African-American Jehovah's Witness named Rodges Redmond. Redmond originally filed a racial discrimination complaint with EEOC, and a federal lawsuit, in July 1974. After he was fired in August, he amended his complaint and federal lawsuit to include religious discrimination. There is something that really "stinks" about this case. GAF and the USDC may very well have been the victims of a Watchtower conspiracy.

Redmond's employment troubles centered around GAF's infrequent request that Redmond work on Saturdays. Redmond had been employed by GAF since 1952, and he had been a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses religion since 1958. Redmond was appointed to be in charge of a Bible study class by the Elders of the church in 1959. That "meeting" was held on Tuesday evenings until January 1974, when it was changed by the Elders to Saturday morning. Thereafter, Redmond refused to work on Saturdays. In July 1974, Redmond took vacation time to attend a Watchtower Convention during GAF's annual inventory. When Redmond returned to work, he was suspended one day. Redmond explained that all the absences in question were due to his religious obligations as a Jehovah's Witness, and that he would not work overtime on Saturday. Redmond was then fired.

What "stinks" about the lawsuit is the following. During the USDC trial, an Elder who served as the Bible Study Overseer from Redmond's congregation, named Herring, testified that the "leader" for the Bible study class is recommended by the Elders of his congregation, and when the appointment is approved by the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society headquarters in New York, the person holds that position for life. That is flat out "perjury". "Book Study Conductors" (not "Bible study leaders") and "book study locations" were/are changed with some frequency for any number of reasons. One very frequent reason is to accomodate the work schedules of the various conductors. Non-JWs should also understand that each JW Congregation holds multiple "book studies" depending on size of the congregation. The very purpose of the "book study" is to break down the congregation into very small initimate groups so that everyone is encouraged to participate in that particular meeting. Herring also testified that the decision to change the meeting from Tuesday to Saturday was made by the Body of Elders and that it was not within the power of Redmond, or even himself, as Bible Study Overseer, to change the time the class met. That testimony is not merely perjurious; it is simply ridiculous. Probably 99% of all "Congregation Book Studies" held in the United States during the 1970s were held on either Monday or Tuesday night. Frankly, this entire case sounds like the Elders of this JW congregation and Redmond conspired to move the day/time of Redmond's "book study" to conflict with GAF's overtime requirements. The Watch Tower Society may have even been involved, since it is well known that when the Watch Tower Society wants to fight a particular issue, they will "forum shop" by waiting and picking the federal court and/or circuit that they think will rule in their favor. For those employers who believe that Jehovah's Witnesses would never lie in court, I suggest that you read the book The Theocratic War Doctrine: Why Jehovah's Witnesses Lie In Court. Essentially, "the theocratic war doctrine" says that the "Jehovah's Witnesses" is the only "true religion" on earth, and as such, Jehovah's Witnesses are in a "theocratic war" with everyone else on earth, who are, by default, on Satan's side in the universal war between GOD and Satan. Once this "JWs versus Everyone Else" mindset is established, there is added the idea that "lying to one's enemies" is an acceptable part of that warfare. Thus, Jehovah's Witnesses are taught that they do not have to tell the truth to anyone they can rationalize is someone who is not "entitled" to be told the truth.

Redmond's second amended complaint alleged the following violations of Title VII by GAF: "(a) failure to promote plaintiff because of his race; (b) compensation of plaintiff at a lower rate than other employees because of his race; (c) harassment of plaintiff in retaliation for filing discrimination charges with the [EEOC]; and (d) termination of plaintiff either in retaliation for bringing EEOC charges or because of his inability to work overtime on Saturdays, even though his religious practices prevented him from doing so." The USDC dismissed all charges except religious discrimination, but ruled that GAF had failed to show any effort to reasonably accommodate Redmond's religious practices, or that an accommodation effort would have caused GAF any inconvenience. The USDC concluded that GAF had violated Title VII in that "said discharge discriminated against the plaintiff in the exercise of his religion and his religious practices and activities." On appeal, the 7th Circuit affirmed, stating:

"There is no dispute that Redmond was sincere in his religious belief, having been an active participating member of the church for over 16 years. The evidence establishes that he was appointed to be a lifetime leader of the Bible study class, and had done so for many years prior to this case. The evidence showed that the time of the meeting was arranged by the elders, and that following the meeting the group, of which Redmond was the leader, did field missionary work. Redmond testified that he felt his participation in the Saturday activities was at the dictate of his elders and that they were a 'religious obligation.' We conclude that the practices in question are within the protection offered by § 2000e(j) to "all aspects of religious observance and practice". ... According to § 2000e(j) once the plaintiff here had established that his practice, which prevented him working Saturday overtime, was "religious" and that nonetheless it had been used as the basis for discharging him, the burden shifted to the employer to 'demonstrate that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.' The court below found that plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of religious discrimination. The court further found that the defendant made 'no effort to accommodate plaintiff,' nor had it introduced any evidence 'showing or tending to show any inconvenience' which would have prevented it from accommodating plaintiff's religious practices."

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In 2004, CDFEH v. GEMINI ALUMINUM CORP was decided in favor of a California Jehovah's Witness named Lester Young. Young's employer wrongfully discriminated against him by failing to make an "accomodation" so that Young could attend a District Convention. Young first requested time off from his supervisor, who was responsible for taking the request to management, and who was also a member of the management committee that would consider the request. The supervisor submitted a written request for Young, but the committee denied the request for failure to include the reason. The supervisor resubmitted the request, this time stating the reason was to attend a religious convention. The request was again denied. Young spoke with his supervisor about his religious beliefs and explained why it was necessary for him to get time off. Young said his local congregation encouraged all of their members to attend the convention and it was his responsibility to be there. Time off was still denied, but Young took off Friday to attend the convention. Young had not been scheduled to work on Saturday. When Young returned to work, he was given a 10 day suspension for failing to show up for work on Friday and Saturday, despite the fact he had not been scheduled to work on Saturday. Young protested the suspension, telling his supervisor that he thought it was unfair because he felt obligated to attend the convention for his religion and that other employees had received lesser suspensions for more absences. Young filed a complaint with the Labor Board, and was fired the same day.

Young filed a complaint with California's Department of Fair Employment and Housing, which ruled that Gemini had discriminated against Young. Gemini filed suit in Los Angeles County Superior Court, which directed the Commission to vacate its decision. CDFEH appealed, and the Appellate Court reversed.

Under California's FEHA, an employee establishes a prima facie case of religious discrimination if the employee sincerely holds a religious belief, the employer is aware of that belief, and the belief conflicts with an employment requirement. Significantly, Gemini argued that Young did not testify that he was required to attend the convention. The court stated that under California law an employer is required to accommodate not just a religious belief, but also a religious observance, if it is reasonably possible to do without undue hardship. FEHA does not merely obligate an employer to accommodate only those religious practices that are required by the tenets of the employee's religion. The full decision contain much more useful information, and should be read by every California employer.

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MATOS v. PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES was/is a 2005 New Jersey federal lawsuit filed by a Jehovah's Witness named Leslie Matos. PNC hired Matos as a part-time bank teller in October 1998. Matos informed the Bank of her anti-holidays Jehovah's Witnesses beliefs soon thereafter when the entire branch, including Matos' teller station, was decorated for Halloween. Matos moved all the decorations at her station to another teller's station. Matos also was frequently required to work late on Friday evenings, which often made her late for religious meetings. Matos' first significant conflict with PNC occurred in July 1999 when she asked her manager for two days off of work so that she could attend the Jehovah's Witness convention. Because Matos was a part-time employee and had no vacation days, she requested the days off without pay. After initially denying the request, the manager permitted Matos to take time off, but required that she take the entire week off, instead of only two days. By taking the full week off without pay, Matos was able to attend the assembly. Problems with getting time off to attend the annual District Convention did not occur again until 2002. Matos initially approached PNC in January about her need to take two days off for the assembly in July. However, the Bank issued vacation time in order of seniority, and the desired days were not available. Matos did not make an issue of such at that time, because she believed she would be able in use other time-off options in July. However, when Matos asked for time off in July, the branch manager refused her request. When Matos informed her supervisor that she would be attending the Convention regardless, she was told she would be fired if she did so. Rather than waiting to be fired, Matos resigned.

Thereafter, Matos filed this federal lawsuit alleging religious discrimination. Specifically, Matos alleged that PNC's refusal to approve her absence was a failure to accommodate her religious beliefs as required by Title VII. Matos also alleges disparate treatment, constructive discharge, a hostile work environment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In October 2005, the USDC summarily dismissed Matos' last two claims, but the balance of her case went forward. Outcome is unknown, but if PNC did not settled, they likely lost at trial.

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HAIG v. EVERETT was an extremely interesting 1983 Arkansas unemployment compensation case involving a Jehovah's Witness named Donald Haig. Haig was a devout member of the Jehovah's Witnesses. After Haig converted to the Jehovah's Witnesses, he began attending several religious conventions each year, which he claimed were an integral part of his faith. Although it created scheduling problems, Haig's employer, St. Edwards Mercy Hospital, readily cooperated in allowing him to switch shifts or take accrued vacation time in order to attend these religious conventions. In August, 1982, a religious convention for members of the Jehovah's Witnesses was scheduled. Haig gave notice to his employer, but the work schedules had already been prepared and Haig was scheduled to work on the day the convention was to be held. When this scheduling conflict arose, Haig was allowed to switch shifts with a co-worker, but the co-worker later had a personal conflict arise and he was unable to work the Saturday shift. Haig attempted to arrange for a substitute, but the only other available co-worker was too inexperienced and was unacceptable to the employer. The testimony is undisputed that the Saturday shift required fewer workers than the weekday shifts, but that two workers were still necessary. Since no acceptable substitute was available, the employer informed Haig that he would be required to work, and, if he attended the convention leaving no one to work his shift, then he would be fired. The JW Employee notified his employer that he intended to be present at the scheduled convention, and he tendered his resignation. Haig filed for unemployment benefits, which were denied by the Board of Review on a finding that he voluntarily quit his last work without good cause connected with the work.

This appellate decision affirmed the denial, stating: "After a review of the record, we are satisfied that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's decision denying benefits to the appellant on a finding that he voluntarily quit his last work. We find the Sherbert and Thomas decisions distinguishable from the facts presented in the case at bar. Here, the appellant's desire to attend the religious convention was not a 'cardinal principle of' or 'conduct mandated by' his religion. Thus, he was not required to choose between his employment and the sacrifice of a constitutionally protected right. Since the appellant's desire to attend the convention was personally motivated and his non-attendance was not violative of the foundation of his religion, we affirm the Board's denial of unemployment compensation benefits."

This court's reasoning was incorrect. The cited precedents make it clear that an employee's personal beliefs are controlling; even if such are more restrictive than that required by his denomination. Instead, this court should have ruled in the hospital's favor based on precedents pertaining to "accomodation". In this instance, the hospital clearly had made reasonable attempts to accomodate Haig's schedule, and his eventual absence created an "undue hardship" for his employer.

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STEPHEN v. MAXIMUM SECURITY & INVESTIGATIONS, INC. was a 1996-2000 New York federal court case which involved a Jehovah's Witness named Jean Stephen. In 1996, Stephen was hired on May 30 and fired on August 6. Stephen, who had been unemployed for one year prior to this job, and who remained unemployed for two years thereafter, was terminated after only 9 weeks due to a pattern of tardiness and absences, including three days allegedly to attend a Jehovah's Witness District Convention. Stephen initially filed a complaint of discrimination with the New York State Division of Human Rights. However, the Division made a finding of "No Probable Cause" as to Stephen's claim of religious discrimination. In 1999, Stephen filed a federal lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging he was terminated because of his Jehovah's Witness religion, including failure to "accomodate" such. The USDC summarily dismissed Stephen's lawsuit in December 2000. The Court noted that prior to the Convention in question that Stephen had already incurred one unacceptable tardy and one unacceptable absence. Stephen also failed to follow proper procedure to get off work for the three day Convention, plus he was absent the day before and the day after such. The Court also noted that Maximum employed a number of other Jehovah's Witnesses without allegations of discrimination, including Stephen's own supervisor.

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ENGSTROM v. KINNEY SYSTEM, INC. was an extremely interesting 1994-7 New York state court case involving a Jehovah's Witness named Marilyn Engstrom. It appears that Engstrom simply made up her own "supposed Watchtower rule" so that she did not have to do something she did not want to do. Engstrom had worked since 1976 as a cashier at a New York parking garage. Since at least 1990, her shift began at 11:00 am and ended at 7:00 pm. In August 1993, Kinney introduced a new cashier's uniform, identical to that of the parking attendants, consisting of a white shirt, black pants and a black bow tie. The uniform was intended to convey a professional and recognizable image to the public. In September 1993, a Manager noticed that Engstrom was not wearing her bow tie. He instructed her that, pursuant to the company's policy, she was required to wear it. Engstrom responded that wearing a bow tie would violate her religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness, and she would not wear it. (At this point, non-JW readers should know that there is no such JW rule, nor is there any rule even close that might be mistakenly interpreted as such.) The Manager sent plaintiff home for violating the dress-code policy. Later that day, he consulted with higher managers, and it was decided that Engstrom would be "accommodated" and allowed to wear a substitute for the bow tie, such as a scarf, ribbon or sash. Meanwhile, Engstrom complained to her union representative about the bow tie requirement. Both Engstrom and the union representative were informed of the "accommodation". Nonetheless, Engstrom returned to work on September 27, 1993 wearing the bow tie. She raised no further objection and did not avail herself of the accommodation.

In January 1994, the work schedule of six of the nine garage employees was altered to better reflect the times the garage was most busy. Engstrom's hours were changed to 12:30 pm to 8:30 PM. Engstrom did not report to work on January 24th or January 25th, informing her supervisor by phone that she could not work under the new schedule, and that she was ill and had gone to a doctor. On January 26th, plaintiff again failed to report to work, so the employer wrote to her union representative, stating that Engstrom was considered to have abandoned her position. A Step I grievance hearing was scheduled for February 2, 1994, and rescheduled for February 9th. Engstrom failed to appear on either date. On February 9, 1994, Engstrom's attorney wrote to the employer accusing them of religious discrimination by suspending plaintiff for following her religious conviction, and by changing her work schedule in retaliation for her complaint. Engstrom's attorney further alleged that the shift change was one the employer knew would place tremendous burdens on Engstrom because of her commute." By letter dated March 10, 1994, the employer's attorney extended an offer for Engstrom to return to work, still requiring Engstrom to work the later hours. However, the letter requested information regarding the nature and time of certain religious meetings allegedly attended by Engstrom two evenings a week "to continue discussion of a reasonable accommodation." Engstrom rejected the offer, and filed a lawsuit on April 8, 1994. "The complaint included five causes of action alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Executive Law § 290 et seq.; violation of plaintiff's constitutional free speech rights; violations of the Labor Law by failing to pay plaintiff her last weeks' wages and by deducting one dollar per hour from her salary; and intentional infliction of emotional distress."

Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment on its wage deduction and emotional distress causes of action. The IAS court denied both motions, finding numerous disputes of fact between the parties. On appeal, the state appellate dismissed all of Engstrom's lawsuit.

Although the appellate court did not know that the "bow tie" incident was a scam, note this comment regarding Engstrom's pleadings: "While plaintiff does not allege that the bow tie requirement was based on any discriminatory motive, she does allege that she was the subject of religious discrimination by being singled out for enforcement of the dress code policy. However, plaintiff's accusations are vague, conclusory and bereft of supporting evidence." There was good reason Engstrom's "accusations are vague, conclusory and bereft of supporting evidence". The appellate court also picked up on the "missed meetings" excuse: "... plaintiff's attorney initially objected to the shift changes on the ground of commuting inconveniences, not religious reasons ... ." The court also noted that Engstrom had failed to cooperate in any of the employer's attempts to "accomodate" Engstrom's alleged religious beliefs.

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JOHNSON v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD was a 1976 Pennsylvania unemployment compensation case involving a Jehovah's Witness named Ronald Johnson. Johnson was employed by Sears, Roebuck and Company as a part-time stock clerk on September 9, 1974. Johnson claimed that when employed he told his employer he could not work on Tuesday or Thursday evenings, but this assertion was denied by the employer. On November 18, 1974, Johnson was requested to work on Tuesday and Thursday evenings. Johnson refused this assignment for the asserted reason that he had to attend important meetings at those times. Johnson admits that he never told his employer of the nature of those meetings. By reason of Mr. Johnson's refusal to work on Tuesday and Thursday evenings the employer gave him the choice of resigning or being discharged, and he chose the former alternative. It is unquestioned that Mr. Johnson's quitting was not voluntary. The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review concluded on this state of facts that Mr. Johnson was discharged for wilful misconduct and that he was, therefore, ineligible for unemployment compensation. Johnson has appealed. Without providing any explanation for his failure to describe to his employer the nature of the important meetings requiring his presence on Tuesday and Thursday evenings, Johnson now contends, as he did when he first applied for unemployment compensation and in his testimony at the referee's hearing, that his Tuesday and Thursday evening engagements were religious meetings conducted by Jehovah's Witnesses, of which religious body he is a member. His employer's representative testified at the referee's hearing that if Mr. Johnson had disclosed the reason for his unwillingness to work on Tuesday and Thursday evenings later disclosed to the Unemployment Compensation authorities, "other arrangements could have been made." Result of appeal unknown.

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DUPONT v. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION was a 1986 Oregon state court unemployment compensation case involving a Jehovah's Witness named Diana Dupont. Dupont was employed at a laundry service for just over one year, when she approached the owner and requested two days leave to attend a Jehovah's Witnesses District convention. The owner initially indicated that time off would not be a problem. However, two days prior to the convention, the employer told the JW Employee that she could not have the time off because the inability to arrange a replacement would leave the employer shorthanded. Dupont indicated that she would attend the Convention anyway, so the employer formally warned Dupont that her absence on those days would be considered termination of her employment. The JW Employee attended the District Convention, and later applied for unemployment benefits. The Board denied benefits based on the fact that the Watch Tower Society does not absolutely require attendance, and there are no published sanctions for non-attendance. That decision was eventually reversed on appeal, where it was ruled the JW Employee left employment due to a sincere religious belief. Denial of unemployment benefits for engaging in bona fide religious conduct constitutes a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. The Oregon appellate court ruled that Dupont was entitled to prevail under the federal First Amendment, because she "voluntarily left her employment for a sincere, religiously motivated action. ... she considered attendance at the convention a religious obligation and part of her commitment to her Creator and that she believed that the convention was a time to advance and make more firm her belief in God and the teachings of her church. Thus, she was put to a choice between fidelity to her religious belief or cessation of work. The coercive impact on her exercise of religion is ... impermissible under the First Amendment ... . ... The fact that attending the convention was not required by her church or that other church members did not attend is irrelevant to the federal analysis."

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DEPT OF HRS v. VENTURI-CLYDE was a 1977 personnel hearing involving a Florida Jehovah's Witness employed at a state-operated residential facility for the profound and severely retarded. The JW Employee requested two days annual leave to attend a Jehovah's Witness Circuit Assembly. By making inquiry of other employees as to exchanging days with the JW Employee and instructing the JW Employee to do the same, the employer attempted to accommodate the JW Employee's request, but was unsuccessful. The JW Employee took off the two days anyway, plus failed to call in. After returning to work, the JW Employee was docked the two day's pay, and was suspended for three days without pay. The JW Employee appealed the suspension. The Hearing found that the employer's attempt to make an "accomodation" was "reasonable", though such failed. The Hearing found that the suspension was not due to the JW Employee attendance at the religious convention, but due to the Employee's history of tardiness and absences. On numerous occasions during her employment, the JW Employee had been orally counseled by her supervisor regarding excessive absences and tardiness. In April 1975, and January 1976, respondent received written reprimands from her supervisor for an unauthorized absence and habitual tardiness. On both occasions, she was warned that the next such offense would warrant suspension. The suspension was affirmed.

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At the hearing(s), Green argued that Woodman's decision to place her on a "restricted hours" salary schedule constituted discrimination against her because of her religion. However, the decision was not because of Green's religion but because of her unavailability for work on certain hours and certain days. Any employee who was unable to work certain days for whatever reason, relating to religious observance or not, would be placed on the lower salary schedule. A policy, that employes who will not make themselves available for work assignments at particular times will be paid less than employes who will make themselves available, is completely neutral in terms of religion and does not constitute discrimination because of religious creed. The Commission pointed out that the very existence of variable salary schedules, providing for and allowing the employment of persons who could selectively restrict their availability as they chose, in fact made it possible for persons such as Green to maintain employment while still engaging in all of the religious observances required by their faith.

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BOTTINI v. SADORE MANAGEMENT CORP was a long series of New York state and federal actions which involved a Jehovah's Witness named Robert Bottini. Bottini began working in 1978 as superintendent of an apartment building owned by Sadore. Bottini's compensation included a rent-free apartment. When Sadore attempted in 1982 to discharge Bottini for unsatisfactory work performance, he requested that the dispute be resolved through arbitration, as provided under his union contract. After a hearing, an arbitrator found no just cause for Bottini's discharge and tried to devise a schedule to accommodate Bottini's attending Jehovah Witnesses "meetings" during his Sunday morning work period. In 1983, Sadore was still dissatisfied with Bottini's work performance and sent him another discharge notice. Again, the parties went to arbitration. This time the arbitrator found just cause for Bottini's discharge and, in accordance with that finding, ordered Bottini to vacate his apartment in Sadore's building within 30 days. Bottini then brought a proceeding under Article 75 of New York's CPLR in State Supreme Court challenging the arbitrator's decision. When his petition was denied, appellant took no appeal. Sadore thereupon initiated a holdover proceeding in the City Court of Yonkers to evict Bottini from its apartment. This action resulted in a final order and warrant for appellant's eviction.

Just prior to his March 1983 receipt of the second notice of discharge, Bottini had filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging religious discrimination. In compliance with the requirements of Title VII he had also filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights. In April 1983, SDHR found "no probable cause" to believe that Bottini's discharge had been an act of religious discrimination. Bottini took no administrative appeal from the SDHR's finding. In August 1983, the EEOC issued a similar finding of "no probable cause". Bottini then commenced a Title VII federal action. Sadore moved for dismissal based on res judicata, which the USDC granted. However, on appeal in 1985, the USCA reversed and remanded for a trial de novo. In 1987, the USDC ruled in Sadore's favor after a full bench trial.

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PRUNELLA v. CARLSHIRE TENANTS INC was a 2000 New York federal case which is very similar to the BOTTINI case above. Angelo Prunella, a Jehovah's Witness, was employed as a cooperative building superintendent from July 1994 until May 1997, when he was fired. Prunella initially sought help through his union, which arranged arbitration. Prior to such, Prunella accepted the defendent's $11,000 offer of settlement. However, Prunella then turned around and filed a federal lawsuit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that defendants terminated his employment because of his Jehovah's Witness religious affiliation. The USDC summarily dismissed Prunella's lawsuit due to his release of all claims signed when he accepted the settlement offer.

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RUSSELL v. ACME-EVANS COMPANY was a 1994 Indiana federal lawsuit involving a Jehovah's Witness named John Russell. Russell alleged discrimination based on race (African-American) and age (60) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Russell's allegations included the assertion that he was denied a certain promotion. The employer countered that Russell's "obligations as a Jehovah's Witness" potentially interfered with his ability to perform the position, "which involves working erratic hours and shifts". Russell also complained about being transferred to one certain position. The employer provided three reasons for transferring Russell to that position: "(1) The skid wrapper position allowed Acme-Evans to supervise Russell's work more closely; (2) The job transfer and increased supervision were designed to result in a more efficient use of Russell's time; (3) Russell had numerous job performance problems in his sweeper position." The USDC summarily dismissed Russell's lawsuit.

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EEOC v. CHRYSLER was a 1986/7 Ohio federal lawsuit involving a Jehovah's Witness named Fred Karanovich. Karanovich began working for Chrysler in 1963. In 1969, Karanovich became a member of the Jehovah Witnesses. In practicing his religion, he attends the Stow Kingdom Hall on three separate days during the week. On Tuesday evening the congregation meets for a book study of various materials concerning Jehovah Witnesses. On Thursday nights the congregation again meets for a study session of some selected topic in the Bible. On Sunday morning the members of the Stow Kingdom Hall meet for a public talk or lecture on the Bible given by one of the five elders in the congregation. This talk is followed by a group discussion of the topics contained in the weekly edition of the Watchtower, a publication produced by and for the various Jehovah Witness congregations throughout the world. After this Sunday morning meeting, Karanovich prefers to perform his field service. All members of the congregation are expected to go out into the community to discuss the Jehovah Witness beliefs with non-members of his congregation. It was Karanovich's custom to perform his field service either with his family or with some other member of the congregation. The Jehovah's Witness religion does not observe any day as a sabbath, nor do the tenets of this religion prohibit any member from working or having employment on Sundays. Each member is encouraged to attend all of the meetings at Kingdom Hall but no member is required to attend. In addition, the members are encouraged to perform their field service work on any day of the week. This aspect of their ministry is to be done whenever the members are able to go into the public and can be practiced in the evenings.

Beginning in 1983, Karanovich requested that Chrysler grant him a religious accommodation which would permit him to take all Sundays off from work. Prior to this time Mr. Karanovich had routinely worked when scheduled on Sundays and had never expressed any dissatisfaction to the Chrysler management about his particular overtime work schedule. Karanovich was advised by Chrysler to submit a letter from the head of his congregation in support of the request. Thereafter, a letter was submitted by one of the elders of Stow Kingdom Hall congregation in support of Karanovich's request. After reviewing Karanovich's request, Chrysler denied the request for religious accommodation.

In May 1984, Karanovich filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC wherein he asserted that Chrysler had discriminated against him on the basis of his religious preference. Specifically, Karanovich charged that the company did accommodate members of other religious groups such as the Seventh-Day Adventists by permitting those individuals to not work on their sabbath. This matter was reviewed by the EEOC administratively; however, the EEOC was unable to conciliate the dispute with Chrysler and Karanovich. The company has granted some of its employees at Twinsburg a religious accommodation which permit the individual to not work on certain days of the week. In each of these instances a tenet of the individual's religion strictly prohibits working on a specified sabbath. None of these people are employed in the same job classification as Karanovich. A factor in the company's decision to deny Karanovich's request for religious accommodation was Chrysler's view that his desire to have all Sundays off was not based upon a sincere religious belief. The company reasoned that since Karanovich had previously worked on Sundays and that he readily admitted that his religion does not prohibit the working on Sundays, he should not be treated in a manner different than provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.

Karanovich failed to report to work on any Sunday when he was scheduled to work since August 1984. As a result of his absence on each such occasion, Chrysler operated the plant with one less electrician than planned by the production control personnel at the facility. Thus the possibility existed that this shortage of an electrician might result in production delays and additional costs. In addition, the company could not perform certain maintenance functions as planned. Karanovich was subjected to various disciplinary actions by the company. The discipline was progressive and in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. This progressive discipline resulted in Karanovich being given 79 days in layoffs without pay. On November 30, 1986, Karanovich failed to report as scheduled on a Sunday and was notified by the company that he could be terminated for absenteeism. Throughout the disciplinary proceedings, Karanovich maintained consistently that he has been unfairly denied a religious accommodation and has been discriminated against by Chrysler.

In 1987, the USDC ruled in Chrysler's favor, stating: "Each time Mr. Karanovich is scheduled to work on a Sunday and then fails to report, the company has suffered some economic loss in productivity. In addition, the granting of a religious accommodation to one employee because of his desire to have all Sundays off, directly impacts upon the other electricians in the same job classification. Thus, the company is placed in the position of giving preference to the wishes of one employee due to his religious beliefs, over the rights of all of the other employees who desire to have the day off from work but do not share the same religious beliefs as are held by Mr. Karanovich. In making this decision, the company has followed the collective bargaining agreement which attempts to treat all employees equally, regardless of their religious beliefs. In sum, Chrysler's decision concerning Mr. Karanovich is not discriminatory. Hence, this court does not find that the Congressional purpose enunciated in Title VII of preventing religious discrimination in the workplace has been violated. ... the court further finds that even though Chrysler was not required under Title VII to circumvent the collective bargaining agreement to accommodate Mr. Karanovich, the defendant has demonstrated that it attempted to offer an accommodation to Mr. Karanovich within the limits of the UAW agreement. The record reveals that Chrysler has made religious accommodation to other Twinsburg employees who are not in the same job classification as is the charging party. In each of these instances the persons accommodated are members of religious groups which prohibit the individual from working on a specified sabbath. In Mr. Karanovich's case, the company viewed his situation to be different from the other individuals since he readily admitted that no tenet of his religion prohibited his working on Sunday. In addition, the company questioned the charging party's sincerity because, even though his church affiliation was as it is now, he had historically worked on Sunday as requested by Chrysler. In any event, the defendant did provide a manner in which Mr. Karanovich could obtain his desired result of having Sunday off from work. Under the collective bargaining agreement, Mr. Karanovich has various bidding and seniority rights which would enable him to seek other positions at the plant. Instead of utilizing the options available to him under the UAW agreement, Mr. Karanovich has staunchly maintained the position of having all Sundays off and remaining employed as an electrician. Under such circumstances the court does not find that the charging party has acted with the "bilateral cooperation" necessary for accommodation.

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IN RE DAVILA was a 1990 Nebraska state Unemployment Compensation tribunal decision which involved a Jehovah's Witness Employee who applied for and accepted a night-shift position. After being employed for one month, the Jehovah's Witness Employee requested a transfer to the day-shift so that he could attend evening meetings twice per week at his Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. The transfer request was denied, so the JW Employee quit and filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. UC Benefits were denied. Appeal also denied benefits based on the fact that JW accepted position fully knowing that he was required to work during evenings when his religious services were held, plus he continued to work at the position for a period of time.

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ROBINSON v. PILOT FREIGHT CARRIERS, INC. was a 1986 North Carolina state court lawsuit involving a Jehovah's Witness named James Robinson. This case is unique in that the local county government had passed a local law/ordinance similar to Title VII of the the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and provided a Commission to hear complaints under such. The specifics are sketchy, but it seems that Robinson's complaint was in regard to scheduling around his Jehovah's Witness "meetings" on Tuesday and Thursday nights. The local Commission issued an order of "accomodation" involving "job trading", which Pilot found unacceptable due to differences in experience and abilities of the employees. The case then went to the local trial level, where that judge ruled that the Commission's decision was wrong; ruling that the Commission's "accomodation" would impose more than "a de minimis cost" on Pilot. The NC appellate court agreed, stating: "We have examined the record in the present case and hold that Judge Strickland correctly concluded that the Commission's findings that its suggested accommodations would impose only a de minimis cost on Pilot were not supported by the evidence and were affected by error of law. The whole record before us, the same as the record before Judge Strickland, demonstrates that Pilot made great efforts to accommodate Robinson's religious practices from 1980 until May 1982, first by allowing a clerical employee to work for Robinson on Thursday nights and then by substituting Godwin and Frye for Robinson on those nights. When these alternatives failed because of economic reasons or loss of efficiency, Pilot's terminal manager and the vice president of personnel discussed possible alternatives with Robinson, but they were unable to work out a solution. The accommodations suggested by the Commission, that Robinson trade jobs on Thursdays with Frye, the terminal manager, or with Margaret Spurling, who did not have the same job duties as Robinson, were similar to the suggested accommodations specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in the Hardison decision. These accommodations would impose a more than a de minimis cost in the form of lost efficiency and are therefore not required by Chapter 6.5 of the New Hanover County Code."

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EEOC v. HACIENDA HOTEL was a lengthy 1982-9 California federal lawsuit involving a Jehovah's Witness named Maria Elena Gonzalez, who was an illegal alien. Gonzalez was a maid in the Hacienda Housekeeping Department from October 27, 1980, to September 21, 1983. "Gonzalez is a Jehovah's Witness and observes her Sabbath on Sundays. In early September, 1982, Gonzalez requested that she be given Sundays off in order to observe the Sabbath." Gonzalez's supervisor initially granted Gonzalez's request; two days later she changed her mind and told Gonzalez that she had to work Sundays or quit. Gonzalez filed a union grievance complaining of the supervisor's refusal to accommodate her religious beliefs. Gonzalez also informed the General Manager of the Hacienda Hotel of the supervisor's refusal to adjust her schedule. The GM told Gonzalez that he would speak with the supervisor regarding her request. Gonzalez's supervisor subsequently told Gonzalez that because she had complained to the GM that she would never have Sundays off, and that she should be grateful that she had a job. During September 1982, the supervisor issued four disciplinary warnings to Gonzalez and fired her on September 21, 1982. Gonzalez thereafter filed a complaint with EEOC, as did four other maids. EEOC filed a federal lawsuit alleging that Hacienda failed to accommodate Gonzalez's religious beliefs, and retaliated against Gonzalez for opposing Hacienda's discriminatory practices by firing her.

In Septmeber 1987, the USDC ruled that Gonzalez's religious discrimination and retaliation claims had been established by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court awarded backpay to Gonzalez for the period between her date of termination, September 21, 1982, and December of 1983, a period the court deemed sufficient in light of her duty to mitigate damages. In addition, the court enjoined the Hacienda from any further discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, and opposition to unlawful employment practices. On appeal to the USCA, Hacienda argued that awarding backpay to an illegal alien was "illegal", and that 15 months backpay was excessive given the demand for maids in the local area. The USCA affirmed the USDC's rulings and awards; particularly noting that Gonzalez was entitled to and had even collected unemployment compensation benefits despite her "illegal" status.

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GRIGGSBY v. CALIFORNIA was a 1968 California administrative court decision. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board affirmed the denial of UC benefits to a Jehovah's Witness, named Olie H. Griggsby, 65, of Modesto, who the Board ruled had taken himself out of the "service station" employment market by refusing to work night shift on four evenings which he had set aside to attend WatchTower meetings, or to perform WatchTower recruiting. Griggsby had apparently worked only day shifts for the year that he was employed at a Shell service station, but was bumped to night shifts by a co-worker with more seniority. The fact that Griggsby was a "Congregation Servant", or the "leader" of his congregation received no weight in the decision-making. Typically, Griggsby vowed to appeal this violation of his constitutional rights. Outcome unknown.

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