"Crouch contends on appeal that the Southern Baptist Hospital of New Orleans, Louisiana, to which institution he was ordered to work by the Local Board, was an unsuitable place of employment, inasmuch as it is owned and controlled by a competing religious sect, and that the order of the Board to report to that institution was illegal because it attempted to force him to aid another religious group and deprived him of his right to free exercise of his chosen religion in violation of the First Amendment.

"The only evidence relied upon by appellant in support of his contention is the charter of Southern Baptist Hospital. The charter shows that the hospital is a wholly owned and controlled subsidiary of the Southern Baptist Convention, and as stipulated by counsel, the Convention is composed of member Baptist churches and is a religious organization. Appellant argues that ownership, supervision and control by the Convention is tantamount to a conclusion that the hospital is a religious organization, and that employment therein of persons of his status aids a competing religion, prohibited by the Constitution ... .

... ...

"The District Court found, and we agree, that a showing of mere ownership and control of the hospital by the Baptist Convention was insufficient to establish that the work performed by the hospital was of a religious nature. The Government proved that the work of the hospital, a non-profit corporation, is to care for the sick and afflicted. The record is devoid of any evidence that the institution is [religious] in its operation. There is nothing in the record from which it may be inferred that the hospital staff members, employees or patients must be of the Baptist faith, nor is there any showing that the Baptist religion is practiced in the hospital or that religious worship is imposed on its patients or employees."

"[Berrier's] First Amendment claim is based upon his allegation that working at the Methodist Home would be aiding another religious denomination, which would contravene the belief of his faith (Jehovah's Witness) that aiding any other religious denomination is to worship a false God.

 

...

 

"The evidence established that the Methodist Home was a nonprofit organization having as its primary purpose and objective the care of the aged. Though preference for admission was accorded Western North Carolina members of the Methodist faith, the Home accepted aged persons of various denominations, and non-Methodist employees outnumbered Methodists. ...

 

...

 

"Since care for the aged obviously contributes to the maintenance of the national public health, interest and welfare and since the Methodist Home provides care for the aged of various denominations, we reject Berrier's claim that the Home is not an appropriate institution in which he should be required to perform civilian work in lieu of induction.

 

...

 

" Berrier's constitutional attack upon his work assignment closely parallels that considered by the court in UNITED STATES  v. CROUCH wherein a Jehovah's Witness assigned to work at the Southern Baptist Hospital of New Orleans claimed that such assignment was in violation of the First Amendment guarantee of his religious freedom because it attempted to force him to aid another religious group which was directly contrary to the religious teachings and beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses. The evidence in [CROUCH] established that the hospital was owned and controlled by Baptist churches and that the hospital was a nonprofit institution engaged in the charitable activity of caring for the sick and afflicted. There was no evidence that patients or employees must be Baptists, that the Baptist religion was practiced in the hospital or that the Baptist faith was imposed upon either the patients or employees. ... the court held that the showing of ownership and control of the hospital by the Baptist Convention was insufficient to establish that the work performed by the hospital was of a religious nature and, therefore, the fact that the hospital was operated by a denomination of a faith different from that of the registrant did not constitute an invalid restraint on his free exercise of religion.

 

"As in Crouch, ... the evidence in the instant case showed that the Methodist Home accepts members of other denominations as patients and that employees are not restricted to the Methodist faith. As in Crouch, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Methodist faith is practiced at the hospital or in any manner imposed upon patients or employees of the Home. Thus, Berrier's claim that his First Amendment religious freedom rights would be violated by his assignment to work at the Methodist Home must fail."

"... defendant has attached to his brief a certified copy of the articles of incorporation of Bellin Memorial Hospital, which discloses that it is owned and operated by the Methodist Church. The articles disclose the manner in which the directors are to be elected, a majority of whom shall be members of that church. The purpose of the corporation is stated in the articles, 'To establish, conduct and maintain a hospital, School of Nursing, and other hospital schools and issue diplomas to such as shall have completed the course of study and training prescribed by each school, which said business is to be carried on within the State of Wisconsin and especially within the County of Brown in said state.'

 

"... defendant argues that work in Bellin Memorial Hospital would be principally for the benefit of the members of the church or for increasing its membership. There was no proof that such would be the case and we think the asserted basis for such argument is little more than a figment of the imagination. It is a matter of common knowledge that the purpose of hospitals generally is the 'maintenance of the national health,' and they are engaged 'in carrying out a program for the improvement of the public health or welfare' of those whom they serve, and this irrespective of all other considerations. The burden of proof would be heavy upon one who asserts any exception to this general purpose. Moreover, it must not be overlooked that defendant's refusal to report for work was not because of the religious affiliation of Bellin Memorial Hospital. He refused to report to other hospitals which had no religious connections, and finally took the position that he would not report for civilian work under any circumstances.

"We are in accord with the decision of [CROUCH] based on a factual situation so similar to that here that the opinion reads as though it might have been written for this case. There, Crouch, a Jehovah's Witness, was convicted of refusing to comply with an order of the Board to report for work in the Southern Baptist Hospital of New Orleans. As in the instant case, he not only refused to comply with the order but unconditionally refused to perform any kind of civilian work under the Act. The main contention on appeal was that the hospital to which he was ordered to work was owned and controlled by a competing religious sect, and that the order of the Board to report to that institution was illegal because it attempted to force him to aid another religious group and deprived him of his right to the free exercise of his chosen religion. ...

... ...

"No case is cited which supports defendant's argument that the Board's order constitutes involuntary servitude contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment. His contention on this point is based upon the Board's order which requires him 'as a Jehovah's Witness, to work in a religiously controlled institution whose religion was not accepted by the appellant's religion.' As this court has done before, we reject this contention.  ..."

"... Congress created an exemption for religious organizations, stating that Title VII shall not apply 'to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.' In other words, a 'religious' organization is permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion. ... The 'religious exemption' is clearly at issue because the Complaint alleges that Light of Life refused to hire Jackson because of his religion."

"... the Court concludes that Light of Life qualifies for the religious exemption as a matter of law: (1) Light of Life is a non-profit corporation; (2) Light of Life’s Articles of Incorporation contain a clear statement of religious purpose. Light of Life has also published Mission Statements, a Doctrinal Statement, a Statement of Faith and Core Values that are heavily laced with religious references; (3) Light of Life holds itself out to the public as a religious entity, apparently even including its telephone greeting; (4) there is no evidence of record to determine whether or not a specific church is intimately involved in day-to-day operations; (5) Light of Life receives an unspecified amount of financial support from churches. Light of Life’s Statement of Faith 'affirms and identifies' an affiliation with the ECFA, although the record does not explain whether the ECFA is a church. The Doctrinal Statement identifies with Protestant and Evangelical churches; and (6) Light of Life conducts two religious services each day.

 

"The evidence that Light of Life is structured and holds itself out as a religious organization is simply overwhelming. The corporate acts of creating and adopting a Statement of Faith and a Doctrinal Statement should be dispositive evidence that an entity is 'religious'. Moreover, the numerous explicit religious references in the Articles of Incorporation, Mission Statement and Core Values are independently dispositive. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what more an organization could reasonably do to proclaim its religious purpose.

"Plaintiff does not contest any of these facts, but instead contends that his specific job did not require participation in these religious activities. For the reasons set forth above, this is not the proper legal test. Even assuming, arguendo, that the facts contained in the newspaper article and EEOC Determination Letter submitted by Plaintiff were true, and giving Plaintiff every reasonable inference therefrom, Light of Life would still be entitled to summary judgment. Similarly, even if the discovery sought by Plaintiff were permitted2 and revealed that Light of Life had extensive real estate holdings, engaged in numerous business-related activities and received little or no church funding, the legal analysis would not change. As the Supreme Court and Third Circuit have instructed, secular activities will not destroy an organization’s religious character and the religious exemption applies to all of its employees. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Defendant is a religious organization and Light of Life is entitled to the 'religious exemption' ... as a matter of law.

 

"There is an independent, alternative basis for the Court’s conclusion. Defendant contends that the newspaper article and EEOC Determination Letter submitted by Plaintiff do not create genuine issues of material fact, and thus cannot be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment. The Court agrees. A newspaper article is inadmissible hearsay and thus, cannot be considered in ruling on summary judgment. ... EEOC determination letters are admissible, but cannot defeat summary judgment. ... As explained above, the EEOC Determination Letter in this case applied the wrong legal standard. [FOOTNOTE: 'A review of the EEOC’s determination reveals that the investigator applied the wrong legal test. The Determination Letter considered whether participation in religious activities was a qualification for the specific job Jackson held, rather than applying the principle enunciated in Little and Curay-Cramer, i.e., that the religious exemption applies to all employees of religious organizations. The EEOC Determination Letter did not even reach the question of whether Light of Life is a 'religious' organization.] Plaintiff has not submitted any other evidence in opposition to the motion. Thus, in addition to the substantive reasons set forth above, the Court will grant the motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to introduce evidence sufficient to create any genuine issue of material fact."

**************

WILSON v. GEORGETOWN COUNTY was a 1990-4 South Carolina court case. In September 1990, a Jehovah's Witness, named David Wilson Jr., 41, was called for jury duty in Georgetown County. During voir dire, Wilson informed the presiding judge that due to his religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness, he could not sit on a jury and sit in judgment of others. The trial judge declined to excuse Wilson, but informed Wilson that he would find alternate work for Wilson to do. Subsequently, the trial judge met privately with Wilson. The trial judge asked Wilson if he would be willing to serve in some other capacity. Wilson responded affirmatively.

The following morning, Wilson reported to the Clerk of Court to begin his alternate service which consisted of janitorial work. While washing the outside court windows, Wilson slipped and fell from a ladder. As a result, he suffered an injury to his back.

Wilson filed a claim with the Workers' Compensation Commission for temporary total benefits. Georgetown County denied coverage because Wilson was not considered an employee, since he was serving as a juror at the time of the accident. The single commissioner found that the Commission had jurisdiction to hear the matter and Wilson was a County employee performing alternate service. The Full Commission reversed the single commissioner, ruling that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. The circuit court reversed the Full Commission and ruled that Wilson was an employee and therefore the Commission had jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled in Wilson's favor.

**************          **************

The Watch Tower Society has generally discouraged Jehovah's Witnesses from working at any job that requires them to carry a gun or other weapon which the JW might be forced to use to kill or injure a fellow human. To help enforce this teaching, JWs who choose to violate this Watchtower "suggestion" are prohibited from having certain privileges, such as being an Elder (minister), Ministerial Servant (deacon), Pioneer (fulltime door knocker), etc.

ALLEN-CURRY v. TEXAS DEPT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE was a 2002 Texas court case which awarded $544,000.00 to a Riverside, Texas, Jehovah's Witness named Vicki Allen-Curry.  Allen-Curry's supervisor, Warden Richard Watkins, was in the habit of opening and closing monthly staff meetings with prayer.  Allen-Curry refused to be present during such prayers.  When she was suspended for five days and put on probation due to such refusal, Allen-Curry retired prematurely in 1998, after working for TDCJ for 18 years. In June 2002, a Texas jury decided that Allen-Curry's resignation was "forced", and awarded her $500.000.00 for wrongful termination and back pay, plus $44,000 in attorney fees.

******************

CARR v. REDONDO BEACH POLICE DEPT ET AL was a 2000-1 California federal "civil rights" court decision. On June 30, 2000, an African-American Jehovah's Witness, named Firpo W. Carr, then 46, who reportedly was a civilian employee of the Los Angeles Police Department, was stopped while driving his automobile in a Redondo Beach shopping mall parking lot by a Redondo Beach Police officer, who was investigating a credit card fraud that had just been committed in one of the mall's retail stores. Firpo Carr's auto was the same color as was the suspect's auto.

In December 2000, Firpo W. Carr filed a $5,000,000.00 federal lawsuit against that police officer, the Chief of Police, and the City of Redondo Beach, in which Carr alleged that the Redondo Beach Police Department engaged in "racial discriminatory acts", including "racial profiling". Firpo Carr reportedly also sought out much public attention to his case. In press conferences, community meetings, and talk radio programs, Carr said the motivation for the stop was "DWB" ("Driving while Black"), and was not based on any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

In June 2001, the USDC dismissed the Chief of Police and the City of Redondo Beach from the lawsuit. In July 2001, the USDC dismissed the individual police officer, thereby ending the case. The judge labeled Carr's allegations as "unfounded".

***

CARR v. REDONDO BEACH POLICE DEPT ET AL was a 2008 California federal appellate court decision. Given that this USCA opinion is dated April 2008, it appears that Firpo W. Carr filed this second "losing" federal lawsuit against the City of Redondo Beach, the Chief of Police, and one or more individual police officers, sometime in 2007, or 2006. This was an appeal by Firpo Carr after the USDC summarily dismissed his lawsuit. The USCA affirmed the dismissal.

Per this opinion, which does not date the incident, it appears tha Carr was again stopped by Redondo Beach Police officers -- this time in a residential neighborhood -- who were investigating a female citizen's report that someone was burglarizing the home of a neighbor. One can't help but wonder whether at the time Carr was doing door-to-door JW recruiting?

The USCA stated, in part:

"... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Carr, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to any of Carr’s claims. ... The stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was based on reasonable suspicion supported by the articulable facts provided by a citizen who reported that she thought that a man matching Carr’s description was burglarizing her neighbor. ... Nor was the length of the stop, approximately 20-25 minutes, constitutionally infirm, as it was limited to the time necessary to investigate the report and to determine that no crime had been committed.

"Given the nature of the crime suspected, and the report from the neighbor of large, full pockets, it was reasonable for one officer to draw his gun (which he did not point at Carr) and for another to conduct a pat down search of Carr’s person to determine if he had a weapon. ... The amount of force used to carry out the pat down was objectively reasonable. ...

"There is also no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Carr’s claim under Monell ... (1978), because there was no constitutional violation. Carr’s state law tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery, and false imprisonment fail for the same reason. Though Carr turned out to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing, there is no evidence of any unconstitutional motive or conduct by the police, just a reasonable investigation of the neighbor’s call."

For those readers, Jehovah's Witnesses or otherwise, who do not recognize the name Firpo W. Carr, Carr is probably the best-known Jehovah's Witness in the state of California. Carr has authored a number of books on topics related to the JWs, and his photo has even appeared in the WATCHTOWER magazine. Carr has also been labeled in media reports as "the spiritual advisor" of various members of the Michael Jackson family.

******************

KELLY v. MUNICIPAL COURTS OF MARION COUNTY was a 1996 Indiana federal lawsuit involving an African-American Jehovah's Witness named David Kelly. Kelly worked as a Bailiff in the Indianapolis courtroom of Judge Wendell Mayer. Mayer discharged Kelly, ostensibly for poor job performance as well as for inappropriate conduct, including proselytizing and reading the Bible in public areas of the courthouse. In response, Kelly brought suit, claiming that he was harassed and ultimately fired due to his race, religious beliefs, and refusal to contribute to and work for the Republican Party. After dismissing some of Kelly's claims as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and granting summary judgment against Kelly on most of the others, the district court conducted a jury trial on Kelly's claim that he was fired due to his political beliefs. The district court granted Mayer's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court affirmed.

This decision contains some info which all employers should find highly informative: When Mayer initially interviewed Kelly in August 1989, he informed Mayer that he had once studied with the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religious doctrine prohibited members from voting or participating in the political system. However, Kelly stated that he wasn't sure about the Jehovah's Witnesses and intended on remaining a Republican at that time. By January 1990, Kelly informed the Chief Bailiff that he was no longer going to contribute 2 percent of his salary to the Republican Party, because to do so would violate the religious dictates of the Jehovah's Witnesses. In April-May 1990, Kelly further informed the Chief Bailiff that, in keeping with his religious beliefs, he did not intend to work at the polls for the Republican Party during the May primary. Kelly kept a Bible on his desk, which was located in an area of the office that was open to the public, and read such in the public reception area during slow periods. He also read the Bible to prisoners while they were waiting in the holding cells. Mayer instructed Kelly to refrain from reading the Bible or proselytizing in public areas because he believed that such activities could suggest that the court was promoting religion and would thus be a violation of the Judicial Code of Ethics, to which Mayer and his staff were bound.

MINER v. CITY OF GLENS FALLS was a 1992 New York federal case involving a Jehovah's Witness named Donald Miner. Miner was employed by the Glens Falls Police Department in 1966. In 1979, Miner converted to the Jehovah's Witnesses. ***In 1983, Miner formed the conviction that he could not work in any capacity that might require him to take the life of another human being or to carry or use a firearm. Miner was reassigned to a managerial position where he was not required to carry or use a weapon.*** In December 1985, the Board Of Public Safety passed a resolution requiring that all police personnel carry firearms at all times while on duty. At no time, however, did Chief Duggan order Miner to carry a firearm. After Resolution 50 was adopted, Duggan permitted Miner to remain with the police force through June of 1986 to enable him to complete 20 years of service and thereby increase his pension. However, Miner was eventually fired in August 1986 due to his refusal to carry a weapon. Miner promptly filed an unemployment insurance claim. Benefits were granted upon a finding by the New York State Department of Labor that he was involuntarily discharged under non-disqualifying circumstances. Miner also commenced an action in New York State Supreme Court, which he subsequently discontinued in order to pursue a federal lawsuit. The federal district court awarded Miner roughly $200,000, which was affirmed by this appellate court.

***

***In the July 15, 1983 issue of the WATCHTOWER magazine, Jehovah's Witnesses were put on official notice that pistol-packing Jehovah's Witnesses would no longer be tolerated. Until then, it had been an unwritten rule, but there must have been so many violating the rule that it was necessary to make it black-n-white. An excerpt:

"During these 'last days,' many employees are expected to carry a firearm. Bank or security guards, watchmen and policemen may even be required to do so to hold employment. But what of the Christian, who is obligated to 'provide for those who are his own'? ... His Bible-trained viewpoint would be different from that of worldly persons, who feel free to carry such weapons and to use them as they see fit in any dangerous situation that may arise. ... He will want to avoid bloodguilt, having in mind Jehovah's viewpoint on the sanctity of blood. ... A mature Christian should try to find unarmed employment. Some Witnesses by talking with their employer have been successful in changing to a job that does not require carrying a weapon. As the world becomes increasingly violent we can no longer regard as exemplary a brother who continues in armed employment. He could be allowed six months to make a change. If he does not make a change, he would not be in a position to hold special privileges of service and responsibility in the congregation."

 

******************

In May 1988, a 37 year-old Jehovah's Witness, named Cpl. Howard S. Levitt, who was a veteran Philadelphia area police officer, committed suicide inside his assigned police van, which was sitting in a district headquarters' parking lot. Steve Levitt first doused the inside of the van with gasoline, ignited such, and then shot himself in the head with his service pistol. Another officer who was also arriving for the start of the AM shift pulled Levitt from the burning van, but Levitt was dead from the gunshot.

******************

WADE v. PASCO COUNTY was a 1997-8 Florida federal lawsuit involving a Jehovah's Witness named Wade Hampton Jr. Hampton had worked in the Pasco County corrections system for 16 years in positions that did not require him either to "use" or carry a gun. For some unknown reason, Hampton was re-assigned to a position transporting prisoners. He was told he would have a to carry gun. Hampton refused the job, telling his supervisors the job would place him in greater likelihood of using deadly force. Again, for some unknown reason, the only available position which Pasco County could offer as an "accomodation" was a clerical position at one-half the pay rate. The USDC dismissed the lawsuit, but Hampton vowed to appeal. Result unknown. I'm not sure of all the facts in this case, but I get the feeling that Hampton had previously held positions which required him to carry a gun, but were positions which Hampton felt there was little chance that he would ever have to use such. Since transporting prisoners is a position in which the chance of having to use force is very high, the issue became "likelihood of use", not an issue of "carrying".

******************

The September 1983 issue of EBONY magazine featured a picture of the Chief-Of-Police of Opa-Locka, Florida, on its cover, and in the article "Man of God and Gun", the Chief's career and accomplishments in law enforcement were praised. The article focused on the fact that the Chief had been licensed as an AME Minister in 1980, plus the article noted how the two professions meshed to enable the Chief to further help the community.

Also mentioned in the EBONY article was one of the department's three commanders, Cmt. Dorna Love, who was Florida's only female African-American to hold the position of Patrol Commander. Dorna Love started working for the department around 1975, and she also had been the department's first female detective.

However, Dorna Love resigned from her law enforcement career in November 1984, at the age of 32. Why? Because Dorna Love was a Jehovah's Witness, and the WatchTower Society had recently tightened its teachings regarding members who were employed on positions that required them to carry a weapon. Ironically, the WatchTower Society, which prohibits females from holding any position of authority in the organization, and "supposedly" prohibits females from "teaching" males, directed its updated rules toward males in that those who continued in such employment were prohibited from holding positions of authority. Maybe Dorna Love should have thought her decision over much more slowly and carefully.

******************

Interestingly, in November 1993, an African-American Jehovah's Witness, named Harvey Davis, was appointed to what had historically been considered one of the most "highly political" appointments in the City of Springfield, Illinois -- the CHIEF OF POLICE. The appointment was heralded in the November 15, 1993, issue of JET magazine. Harvey Davis served as Police Chief until his retirement in May 1995. In June 2003, the Illinois Times referred to the administration of Harvey Davis as "scandal-plagued" due to the JW being "blamed for the disappearance of money, drugs and guns from SPD's evidence room".

Rickey B. Davis, brother of Harvey Davis, who was a patrolman in 1993, was promoted to "Sergeant" in 1994. His affiliation with the JWs, if any, is unknown. His racial discrimination lawsuit against the Springfield Police Department provides additional info.

******************

Note this obituary published in June 2005: "Xxxxxx ... was a life-long resident of the area. He was of the Jehovah's Witness faith. Xxxxx was a deputy for the Wwww County Sheriffs Dept. ... Funeral services were held ... Rrr Sssssss officiating. (Rrr Sssssss just so happens to be a prominent representative of the Watch Tower Society. He would not be permitted to officiate at this funeral unless this JW Deputy Sheriff was "in good standing".)

Note this obituary published in October 2006: "Xxxxxx ... was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses Kingdom Hall, ... . She loved guns and received her concealed weapons permit last year. ... A memorial service will be held ... with Xxxx Xxxx from the Hamilton Kingdom Hall officiating."

Note this obituary published in February 2007:  "Funeral services for Agustin Piedra, Jr., 23, of Buffalo, Texas, ... worked as a prison guard for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. He was a member of Jehovah Witness."

This Connecticut Post article features a Jehovah's Witness named Laura Azevedo, who works as a detention officer for the Bridgeport, Connecticut Police Dept. The article actually brags how the various skills developed as a JW makes Laura Azevedo a superior "cop", as noted by the title of the article: "Multilingual cop serves community well".

These "exceptions to the rule" demonstrate that Employers should keep two things in mind. Although JWs are strongly encouraged to not work in law enforcement, a few isolated incidents of Jehovah's Witnesses doing just that may exist. In ruling about JW beliefs in such cases, most courts will look at the individual's interpretations of denominational beliefs, not the denomination's, to determine whether a belief or practice is sincere.

LAWSON v. STATE OF WASHINGTON is a recent 2002 federal lawsuit filed by a Jehovah's Witness named Gregory Lawson. Although this decision contains a lengthy discussion, it does not answer the most obvious questions: Why in the world would a Jehovah's Witness apply to enter a State Trooper Training Academy in the first place? Would Lawson have been willing to carry a firearm after he graduated?

Lawson had twice applied to the Academy, and not once in the detailed personal questioniare did he ever mention having personal briefs that might conflict with performing the duties of a state trooper, much less conflict with duties and obligations of the training program. During his first two days at the Academy, Lawson saluted the American Flag during the twice daily flag raising and lowering ceremonies without objection.

However, during the second evening, Lawson approached his advisor and stated that he was being forced to resign because of a conflict between his personal religious beliefs and the requirements of the Academy. Specifically, Lawson stated that he could not salute the flag, nor could he swear the Oath required of state troopers, despite having stated that he could do so in his two previous applications. Per the facts summarized in the opinion, the Academy personnel made very little effort to discourage Lawson's quitting, and made practically no efforts at "accomodation".

After leaving the program, Lawson filed religious discrimination charges with the state's Human Rights Commission and the EEOC. Thereafter, Lawson filed this federal lawsuit. The district court summarily dismissed Lawson's case and this appellate court affirmed.

JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND THE FIRE DEPARTMENT

My research has turned up multiple media articles reporting on many Jehovah's Witnesses who work for Fire Departments across the United States. In fact, over the past 3-4 or so years, there have been 3 JWs who died while fighting fires, or while training to do so. Given the small percentage of JWs in the overall population, deaths of 3 JWs would seem to indicate that a disproportionately large number of Jehovah's Witnesses are seeking employment as firemen.

This is almost logical. Since the potential quality and quantity of conflicts for Jehovah's Witnesses are simply too great in the military and law enforcement occupations, seeking a career as a fireman would seem to be the next best alternative for individuals "cut from that kind of cloth".

YOUNG v. DETROIT FIRE DEPT ET AL and MICHIGAN v. YOUNG were two 1996-2000 Michigan court cases. An African-American Jehovah's Witness, named Ardra Young, was a City of Detroit firefighter, who alleged that the Detroit Fire Department and one or more of his white supervisors had discriminated against him because of his race. The outcome of Ardra Young's employment discrimination lawsuit is unknown, because, before it could be settled or litigated, Ardra Young murdered his wife and teenage son.

In February 1997, Ardra Young arranged a late night meeting with his estranged JW Wife and JW Son at a Detroit municipal park. Young shot both his wife and his son  in the back of their heads, and then fled to the home of his girlfriend in Illinois. Young returned to Detroit the next day, and without even asking to see his son, who was still alive on life-support, Young ordered doctors at Grace Hospital to turn off the life-support systems -- supposedly due to his WatchTower beliefs.

After Young's alibi did not stand up to scrutiny, Young eventually confessed to police. Despite such, Young pled "not guilty" at trial. Young's defense team put on a vigorous defense. However, Young was found guilty, and sentenced to concurrent life terms. Young's defense team vigorously pursued appeals, possibly due to Young's pending employment discrimination lawsuit and the large settlement or judgment that Young's attorneys were anticipating from such.

Amusingly, Young's attorneys unsuccessfully requested a new trial based on "newly discovered evidence", which included a letter which had been mailed to the Detroit Fire Department, which had been signed, "White Fire Fighters Association", which claimed that they actually had killed Young's wife and son -- not Ardra Young. Between 2000 and 2005, Ardra Young started filing his own habeas corpus actions in federal court. All have been denied thus far.

******************

On January 2, 2004, a Jehovah's Witness, named Judy Strege, 54, who was employed at the Gilbert Arizona Fire Department as a receptionist, sent an email to Chandler Arizona Mayor Boyd Dunn from her town office and containing her town phone number. It read, in part, "I appreciate your taking time to listen to me and take the Awake and Watchtower magazines from me. ... Please feel free to contact me if you would like questions answered about Jehovah's Witnesses, their ministry in the community or their beliefs." Mayor Dunn said he took no offense, but the religious e-mail he got from Judy Strege violated the City of Gilbert's email policy, which says the town’s system should be used only “to facilitate official business ... and is not a private communication medium.”

Apparently, Strege, who was a Chandler resident, had been out "witnessing" on New Years Day, and had approached Mayor Dunn with a solicitation for him to accept from her copies of the WatchTower and Awake magazines while the Mayor was doing a television interview in a parking lot (presumably outside City Hall). Gilbert Personnel Director Ann Moeding-Evans declined to publicly discuss the email, but stating, "It is a sensitive issue".

******************

During the year 2000, the Florida news media repeatedly reported on the saga of a Jehovah's Witness Firefighter, named Barac Wimberly, who was eventually fired from the Pinellas Park Fire Department due to alleged poor job performance. Wimberly filed a religious discrimination claim with EEOC prior to his dismissal, but I don't know whether such was ever followed by a lawsuit in either state or federal court after Wimberly's termination. The charges and counter-charges are numerous, so I would recommend reading all the linked newspaper articles.

Some of the Department's allegations included: In 1999, Wimberly received a written reprimand for sleeping through a fire alarm, because Wimberly was wearing earplugs to drown out fellow firefighters' snoring. Soon after, he was reprimanded in writing and suspended for half of a 24-hour shift for leaving medical waste, such as needles and bandages, a blood pressure cuff, and other equipment, in someone's home after a medical call. Not long after, he slept through another alarm. Fire officials gave him a three-day suspension without pay that Wimberly appealed and had two days' pay restored. There are many more negatives in the linked newspaper articles.

Wimberly's charges of religious discrimination included: (1.) Co-workers often asked why Wimberly didn't celebrate holidays, such as Christmas. One acting supervisor allegedly asked Wimberly why he accepted a Christmas bonus if he didn't celebrate the holiday. (2.) Co-workers had joked about Jehovah's Witnesses knocking on doors -- calling them Saturday morning streetwalkers. (3.)After arguing with one firefighter/paramedic about his religion, the man asked Wimberly why Jehovah's Witnesses were coming to his door. He also told Wimberly that he disagreed with Jehovah's Witness' interpretation of the Bible. Shortly after, that co-worker allegedly began filing complaints against him that could not be substantiated. (4.) When Wimberly refused to take the Union Oath, as written, he was accused of elevating myself above everyone else, and attempting to get the oath changed. (5.) He declined to help decorate the fire truck during the winter holidays because of his religious beliefs. An acting supervisor "accused me of using my religion to get out of job duties. He told me to leave my religion at home." (6.) "I was written up for not being a team player, in part because I did not participate in the holiday activities. (7.) Wimberly concluded, "I believe if I were not a Jehovah's Witness, I would not be subjected to derogatory comments about my religion. I also believe that I am being harassed and subjected to disciplinary action because of my religious beliefs."

In response to Wimberly's charges against the Department, the Fire Chief pointed out that the Department currently already had two Jehovah's Witnesses employed, and both of those JWs held supervisory positions. In fact, the Chief pointed out that at the time that Wimberly was hired, Wimberly was the #1 applicant. All indicators had pointed to Wimberly being a rising star in the Department. However, the exact opposite occurred.

Even Wimberly acknowledged that his problems began soon after he was hired. Wimberly claimed that he was pressured into joining the Union, but Wimberly refused to join the Union because union activities would mean he would have to give up other "off-duty pursuits" -- i.e., door-to-door JW recruiting, etc. Thus, right off the bat, Wimberly fowled up the Department's 100%union participation, which made Wimberly an unpopular character.

After alleged repeated harassment and ridicule, Wimberly decided to join the Union in hopes that that would end his problems. Instead, joining the Union exacerbated Wimberly's problems. Why? Because Wimberely refused to take the Union Oath as it was written because of his WatchTower beliefs. Wimberly refused to swear his "allegiance" to the Union.

So, Wimberly asked for and received permission to swear to an "altered version" of the Union's Oath. That simply Po'ed Wimberly's co-workers that much more, and they essentially had had all of the new recruit that they wanted. The following two years appeared to evidence that fact.

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HATCHER v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA was a 1996?-2001? Pennsylvania worker's compensation case. In September 1998, a 46 year-old Philadelphia paramedic, named Marty Hatcher, died from liver disease. Hatcher claimed that his liver disease had been contracted on-the-job, and he pursued worker's comp benefits to which he believed that he was entitled.

After his death, Geneva Hatcher continued to pursue worker's comp benefits. She claimed that her husband had died of liver failure attributed to Hepatitis C. The City claimed that drinking, not Hepatitis C, caused Hatcher's cirrhosis. A judge ruled partially in Hatcher's favor, finding that the disease was job-related, but agreeing with the City that there was some question about what led to the cirrhosis.

Geneva Hatcher further claimed that Marty Hatcher was a devout Jehovah's Witness, who was not a drinker. [Hatcher may not have been a drinker, but I've known numerous "devout JWs" who drank like a fish.] As of 2000, Geneva Hatcher was continuing to pursue additional benefits. Outcome unknown.

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In 1983, Fire Captain John Hall, of Watertown, New York, was selected to receive the American Legion's "Firefighter of the Year" award for having saved the life of a female during a fire. The award was pulled when Hall refused to participate in a parade that was part of the ceremony. Specifics are unknown, but I suspect that the award ceremony was held on one of the holidays. Fire Captain John Hall gave as an excuse that his Jehovah's Witness beliefs would not permit him to ride on a fire truck in a parade. The American Legion said: Fine. No parade. No award!

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