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EMPLOYMENT ISSUES UNIQUE TO JEHOVAH'S WITNESS EMPLOYEES


 

JEHOVAH'S WITNESS EMPLOYEES

AND

MISCELLANEOUS MEDICAL, HEALTH, AND DISABILITY ISSUES
 

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STATE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS v. EDWARDS was a 1998-2000 case before Missouri's Administrative Hearing Commission. The State Board of Chiropractic Examiners filed a complaint on May 26, 1998, seeking the Commission’s determination that Gary F. Edwards' license to practice chiropractic be subject to discipline as a result of Edwards’ treatment of a patient named Duane Troyer. The Board’s allegations included incompetency, gross negligence, misconduct, and practicing medicine.

Gary F. Edwards, was a Jehovah's Witness Chiropractor, who did business in Independence, Missouri, as Edwards Back & Neck Care Center. This case arose out of Gary Edwards' treatment of a Mennonite farmer, named Duane Troyer, starting in April 1990. Apparently, this Jehovah's Witness Chiropractor had developed a relationship of trust with many members of Missouri's Mennonite and Amish communities.  Duane Troyer's parents and a grandmother had been patients of Edwards, and they referred Duane to Edwards. In October 1996, The Kansas City Star published an article which explained why many Mennonites and Amish sought out Gary Edwards:

"Medical science has produced many wondrous machines, but none was more alluring to the region's Mennonite or Amish communities than the one in Gary Edwards' Independence chiropractic office. Typically, the patient was ushered into an examining room where the chiropractor talked over any symptoms and then switched on what patients say he called "the Interro" or "the nutrition machine." Several independent accounts produce the same description: a computer screen and keyboard attached by wire to a stubby pencil-shaped probe.

But the machine wasn't used on just anybody. "If a doctor or anybody but the Mennonite families asked about it," said Michelle Moore, who worked briefly for Edwards as a file clerk, "I was to say that it didn't exist." It was a special machine, she said, for special people.

Edwards would touch the probe to points on a patient's hand, acupuncture-style, Amish patients said. Supposedly the Interro detected the body's electrical impulses. The computer software, in theory, measured those impulses to see how well various organs in the body worked. The diagnosis was instant. And completely worthless. The Interro does not work. It can treat nothing. It can make no valid diagnosis."

[Readers interested in the use of "quack" medical devices by Jehovah's Witnesses at WatchTower Society world headquarters, should click HERE.]

Duane Troyer was a hemophiliac who had contracted AIDS from contaminated blood in 1984.  When Troyer learned that he was HIV positive, in April 1989, Duane was engaged to be married to fellow Mennonite, Regina Hershberger.  Duane and Regina Troyer were married on September 15, 1989. During the period of preparation for their Mennonite wedding, their religious leaders conducted an anointing ceremony, and prayed for Duane to be healed. Although the couple believed that God could heal Duane, they followed all precautions as recommended by Duane’s medical doctor. Duane and Regina understood that they must use a condom and contraceptive foam during sex, in order to guard against transmitting the virus to Regina, and that they must take precautions with regard to Duane’s blood, and that they would NOT be able to have children.

Duane and Regina Troyer first visited Gary Edwards on April 3, 1990.  Duane informed Edwards that he was HIV positive and wanted to know if there was anything that Edwards could do to help him. During that first visit, Edwards did not conduct any physical examination or chiropractic evaluation of Duane, other than the following. Although Edwards had never treated an HIV patient before, Edwards explained the use of his "Interro machine", which was a version of an Electro-Accupuncture According to Voll (EAV) machine, named after Reinhard Voll, the man who pioneered the use of such techniques.  Edwards attached a probe to Duane’s fingers and toes.  The probe was connected to a computer, which measured the electrical energy levels of certain body organ systems. Edwards' version of the Interro was an advanced model that not only diagnosed a patient's problems, but also assisted in the preparation of a homeopathic remedy. Edwards placed a bottle on top of the Interro while operating the machine. The bottle contained distilled water and gin. According to EAV theory, the machine places an electrical charge in the water, and the alcohol is necessary to hold the charge. The charge is meant to correct an electrical imbalance in the body. Edwards gave the bottle to Duane and told him to place 10 drops under his tongue three times per day, after slapping the bottle on the palm of his hand. Based on the Interro's readings, the computer printed a list of suggested vitamin, mineral, and herb supplements, which Edwards also gave to Troyer. Edwards represented to Duane and Regina that the object of his treatment was to bring the body’s systems into balance, and allegedly, that his treatment could eradicate the HIV from Duane’s body, which Edwards later denied saying.

On May 1, 1990, Duane again visited Edwards’ office.  Edwards again used the Interro, which indicated improvement, to formulate additional drops and suggest additional supplements. Duane visited Edwards’ office again on August 7, 1990.  His condition was better than at the previous visit.  Duane reported stiffness in his neck and back.  Edwards performed a chiropractic adjustment on Duane, used the Interro machine, and gave Duane more drops and supplements. Edwards allegedly stated that he would be able to eradicate the HIV.  Regina allegedly asked if she and Duane could have children when Duane’s body eradicated the HIV, and if Edwards and his wife would have children if they were in Duane and Regina’s position.  Edwards allegedly replied that he would proceed to have children if he were in their position because Duane’s body had gotten rid of the virus and it was not transmittable to anyone, which Edwards later denied saying.

Duane visited Edwards’ office on September 25, 1990.  Duane and Regina were moving to Montana at that time. Edwards used the Interro, which indicated that Troyer's body’s systems were close to balance, but gave Duane more drops and more supplements. On November 12, 1990, Duane visited Edwards’ office while he was in Missouri for a short visit to tend his farm.  Edwards drew blood for an HIV test and sent it to a lab.  Duane returned to Montana. The test showed that Duane remained HIV positive.

Edwards called and reported the test results to Regina Troyer on November 20, 1990, because Duane was en route back to Montana at the time with Regina's parents.  Allegedly, Edwards told Regina that the HIV test was negative, and that the HIV could not be transmitted to her. When Duane and Regina's parents arrived in Montana, Regina told them about her conversation with Edwards. Elizabeth Hershberger was skeptical that Duane's HIV had been eradicated. She called Edwards when she returned home to Missouri the first week of December. Edwards allegedly told Elizabeth Hershberger that he was absolutely certain that Duane's HIV had been eradicated, and that Duane could not transmit HIV to Regina, and that if Duane and Regina had a child, the child would be healthy. Allegedly, Edwards also placed a call to Duane’s parents’ home on November 21, 1990. Duane and Regina never had unprotected sexual relations prior to November 20, 1990. However, based on Edwards’ telephone calls, the couple believed that it was no longer necessary to practice safe sex.

On August 29, 1991, Duane visited Edwards’ office. Edwards used the Interro, which indicated that Troyer's body was nearly in balance, but gave more drops and more supplements. Edwards allegedly stated that the HIV was eradicated. Edwards indicated that Duane should return in 12 months.

Regina Troyer’s mother, Elizabeth Hershberger, made two telephone calls to Edwards’ office on November 2, 1991.  Elizabeth had learned that Regina was pregnant and wanted to find out if Regina would be OK. Edwards made an 11-minute collect call to the Hershberger residence on November 5, 1991. Allegedly, Edwards assured Hershberger that there was no risk to Regina. In her Christmas letter in 1991, Elizabeth announced that Regina was pregnant and that the couple's "homeopathic doctor" said there was no risk from HIV.

Regina Troyer gave birth to a daughter on May 20, 1992. Duane and Regina had moved back to Missouri by that time. Both Regina and the baby tested HIV positive. After the birth of his daughter, Duane’s health rapidly deteriorated.  At the urging of his parents and grandmother, Duane again visited Edwards’ office on July 31, 1992.  Edwards drew blood and took a hair sample, and sent them to a lab for analysis.  Edwards also did an chiropractic adjustment and diathermy, and gave Duane a supplement. Regina later alleged that she overheard Edwards tell Duane that his illness and symptoms had nothing to do with AIDS.

On August 12, 1992, Duane was admitted to Audrain Medical Center in Mexico, Missouri, and was diagnosed with pneumonia and AIDS. At Duane’s request, the hospital released him to go home on August 15, 1992. Later in August 1992, Duane was taken to the hospital in Brookfield, and was then transferred to Columbia.  Doctors diagnosed meningitis and a possible tumor in his brain, which were complications of AIDS. Because no treatment would be effective, the doctors sent Duane home to die. Duane Troyer died on September 5, 1992. Regina Troyer and her daughter were still alive as of late 1999, and were receiving medical treatment for their HIV conditions.

Quite interestingly, Duane Troyer's Mennonite father, David Troyer, who had been, and possibly still was, a patient of Gary Edwards, testified in 1999 to his recollection of events back in 1990-1. David Troyer stated that he accompanied Duane and Regina on visits to Edwards' office “a couple of times.”   David Troyer stated that he never heard Edwards state that he could cure HIV, and that Edwards stated that “he couldn’t cure anybody, but he could make their life more pleasant.”

The Commission made findings of fact that Gary Edwards represented that:  (1) Edwards' treatment could cure HIV/AIDS, (2) Duane Troyer had been cured, and, (3) Duane Troyer's later symptoms had nothing to do with AIDS.

With regard to the Board's charge of "incompetency", the Commission ruled, in part: "By attempting to cure HIV/AIDS, representing that Duane was cured, and failing to recognize that chiropractic was an inadequate and ineffective means for treatment of HIV/AIDS, Edwards demonstrated incompetence."

With regard to the Board's charge of "misconduct", the Commission ruled, in part: "By representing that he could cure HIV/AIDS and that the condition was cured, Edwards committed misconduct."    

With regard to the Board's charge of "gross negligence", the Commission ruled, in part: "Because we have concluded that Edwards acted with wrongful intent rather than with mere recklessness, he is not subject to discipline for gross negligence."

With regard to the Board's charge of "fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonesty", the Commission ruled, in part: "Edwards made false statements in order to make Duane and Regina pay him for the Interro treatments and drops.  Further, he did not tell Duane and Regina that the brown bottles contained nothing but gin and water.  Therefore, he is subject to discipline for fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonesty."

With regard to the Board's charge of "practicing medicine", the Commission ruled, in part:  "... Edwards went beyond providing nutrition by prescribing or administering a medicine and attempting to practice medicine ... ."

In February 2000, Missouri's Administrative Hearing Commission ruled that Gary Edwards could be disciplined by Missouri's State Board of Chiropractic Examiners.  In May 2000, the Board revoked Edwards' license to practice chiropractic, with imposition of revocation stayed pending Edwards' successful completion of a two-year suspension and a subsequent five-year probationary period.

However, in April 2002, on appeal from Gary Edwards, the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled that the Board's fact-finding body had erred by not allowing Edwards to have access to certain evidence during the discovery process, and reversed the Commission's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. DECISION. The Board subsequently withdrew its complaint against Edwards when Missouri's Supreme Court refused to hear their appeal on the reverse and remand.

***

EDWARDS v. GERSTEIN ET AL. Thereafter, Edwards filed a new lawsuit alleging that members of the Missouri Board of Chiropractic Examiners acted with gross negligence during the board's disciplinary proceedings against him, and alleging that a board employee engaged in malicious prosecution during her investigation of claims against Edwards. After venue in the case was moved from Jackson County to Cole County, the circuit court ultimately dismissed Edwards' suit, finding the board members were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and that the board employee was immune from suit under the official immunity and public duty doctrines. Edwards appealed, but lost at the Court of Appeals level in December 2006. However, in October 2007, Missouri's Supreme Court reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on Edwards' charge of "gross negligence", from which the court ruled that the Commission members and employee were not immune (did not mean they were -- just that the charge could be heard). Outcome of any 2008 proceedings unknown.

***

TARR ET AL v. EDWARDS was a 1999 Missouri civil court case. Incomplete details. In May 1999, three females filed a civil lawsuit against the Jehovah's Witness Chiropractor, Gary F. Edwards, alleging inappropriate sexual behavior. Sandra Tarr, a former employee, claimed that Edwards sexually harassed her by touching her, hugging her, kissing her, and rubbing up against her body.  Leslie Tuttle and Michelle Brown, both patients of Gary Edwards, alleged that objectionable behavior occurred while they were being treated at Edward's Independence, Missouri chiropractic office. Edwards denied the allegations. Outcome of this civil lawsuit is unknown. Unknown if criminal charges were pursued.

 

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PARKER v. VERIZON was a 2007 Pennsylvania federal court decision. In 2007, a Jehovah's Witness Employee, named Raymond Parker, sued his employer, Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc., alleging employment discrimination, in that Verizon discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), by terminating him for exercising his rights under the ADA and the FMLA. Raymond Parker, and his wife, Caulette Parker, also brought a state law claim of "trespass" against Verizon employee Kimberly Onesko, and her husband, George Onesko, for allegedly entering upon Parker’ property unlawfully and without consent in September 2006.
 
Ray Parker was hired as a call center employee in November 2003. In August 2004, Parker was diagnosed with Sarcoidosis, an autoimmune disease that causes inflammation of the lungs, and he was also diagnosed with Pulmonary Fibrosis (formation of scar tissue in the lungs). Parker began his first (of three) short-term disability leaves. In December 2004, Parker returned to the same job at the same number of hours and the same rate of pay. A few days after returning from his first leave, plaintiff began his second short-term disability leave. Prior to plaintiff’s return to work in February 2005, Parker’s primary care physician sent a letter to Verizon recommending that: (1) Parker be permitted to work a shorter work week and work day; (2) that Parker be assigned work that did not involve talking on the telephone; (3) that Parker’s commute be shortened by assignment to a location closer to his home; and (4) that Parker initially work three days per week with one day off in between each day.
 
In an effort to accommodate Parker, Verizon transferred Parker to a "non-talking" position at the same location, with reduced hours per day. In Spring 2005, Parker requested a transfer to a less physically demanding job, despite the fact that he later testified that the off-line position was not physically demanding. In May 2005, Parker learned that positions in the Greensburg office (location to which he wanted transferred) would be available for those with restrictions that still allowed customer contact, but no sales. Parker’s primary care physician thereafter changed Parker’s restrictions to allow customer contact with no sales. However, Parker did not receive a transfer. In December 2005, Parker began his third leave of absence and returned to work in February 2006, with restrictions of "no talking" on the telephone, and "no customer contact". Parker and other employees were later transferred to Verizon’s Washington, Pennsylvania facility, which was closer to plaintiff’s home, for no reasons having to do with Parker.
 
Beginning in July-August 2006, the Parkers decided to purchase a ranch style modular home, because Parker was allegedly having difficulty climbing stairs in the former residence. While the home was being built, the Parkers resided with their aunt, approximately three blocks from the “construction site”, where the new residence was being built. On September 14, 2006, Ray Parker called off work at approximately 7:45 a.m. by leaving a message for a Verizon Absence Administrator stating that he was taking an FMLA day, because "he wasn’t feeling well".  Parker then went to the construction site of the new home. Caulette Parker also took off a half-day of work that same day. On the morning of September 14, 2006, the husband of Ray Parker's manager called his wife at Verizon and told her that he had seen Parker unloading shingles from a van at the construction site. Parker's manager then called an Absence Administrator and told her about what her husband had seen. It was decided that Absence Administrator Kimberly Onesko should perform a home visit.
 
Onesko drove by the construction site sometime past the noon hour, but she did not see Parker. Onesko then drove to her home to get a camera, where she asked her husband, who was not a Verizon employee, to accompany her on the home visit. The Oneskos returned to the construction site, which was marked with "No Trespassing" signs, and observed Parker inside the garage. After conferring with Verizon Labor Relations Manager Cindy Marinari, Onesko decided to approach Parker. At approximately 5:30 PM,Onesko walked onto the driveway to the Parkers’ garage door, which was open. Onesko later prepared notes of her home visit, which stated in part:
"I approached the open garage door area - heard an electric saw being used in the basement area. I called out Ray’s name, remaining outside the garage. Ray entered the garage from the basement area. Ray was perspiring and wiping his hands on a rag. At this point the saw stopped running. I told Ray I was aware he had reported off sick using his FMLA certification this morning, and asked him to explain how his absence for his precertified illness related to his performance of construction work on his new home. Ray said he had been sick that morning. At this point his wife entered the garage area from the street. She added that he had diarrhea in the morning. I told Ray that since he was no longer ill, he would be expected to report to work for the remainder of his tour. Verizon’s expectation is that when you are too ill to work, you should remain at home, but once you are well, you would report to work. Ray asked what he should do and I advised him it was his decision but that he could choose to report to his work location for the balance of his tour. I also advised Ray that at this point he would not be paid for today’s absence, and an investigation will ensue. Ray asked what would happen - I told him this would be investigated under the Code of Conduct. His wife said that he would be contacting the union; she also said Verizon, and me in particular, had been rude to her husband, as well as his doctor’s office. She explained this was in reference to a conversation in the past between me and a nurse at his dr. office concerning the wording of his medical restriction. At that point I told Ray that I had nothing further to add today, and I departed."
Mr. Onesko did not get out of the van during the conversation between Onesko and Parker. Neither were ever asked to leave the premises. Parker also alleged that he observed Mr. Onesko on his property with a camera earlier that same day. Parker denied that he performed any work on his new house on September 14, 2006.
 
On September 15, 2006, Parker was suspended from his employment at Verizon. On September 26, 2006, Parker was discharged from Verizon on the basis that he misrepresented his health condition in violation of Verizon’s Code of Business Conduct.
 
In addition to the above events, Parker also alleged that a Verizon manager yelled at him in front of his co-workers when she learned that he had restrictions that prevented him from working on the telephone, in February 2006, and she allegedly tried to force him to resign. Parker also testified that he was denied a scheduled pay raise, and that he was forced to file a grievance in order to receive his pay raise. Parker also alleged that Onesko had sent an email to other decision-makers at Verizon, stating that, “I really hate to send him to the Washington office, because he lives in Bentleyville.” (shorter commute for Parker).
 
In November 2007, the USDC granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the ADA and FMLA claims, and the remaining state law "trespassing" claim was dismissed without prejudice. The USDC stated in part:
 
"Plaintiff has presented no evidence to create a material issue of fact that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination. An adverse employment decision includes an employer’s failure to accommodate, reasonably, the employee’s disability. ... An employer also has a duty to engage, in good faith, in the 'interactive process', with the employee. ... the evidence presented demonstrates that based upon the letter from plaintiff’s treating physician, ... Verizon made several accommodations to plaintiff’s schedule and manner of work. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show that defendant failed to engage in 'the interactive process'. In fact, the evidence of the accommodations afforded to plaintiff supports the contrary.
 
... ...
 
"As to the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas standard, the burden then shifts to Verizon to produce evidence that the plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. ... Given the fact that plaintiff claimed FMLA benefits on the day the investigation ensued and the investigation allegedly revealed that plaintiff was actually working on his new home, the Court finds that Verizon easily met its burden to demonstrate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination - - that is, for violating Verizon’s Code of Business Conduct by 'misrepresent[ing] [his] health status'.
 
... ...
 
"Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his participation in the protected activity (using his FMLA leave) and his termination. In fact, as stated above, there is no dispute that defendant had been accommodating plaintiff’s alleged disabilities for approximately two years prior to his termination. Verizon’s stated reason for plaintiff’s termination was misrepresentation of his health status and plaintiff has failed to point to any credible evidence that exercise of his FMLA rights had any casual connection whatsoever to his discharge. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim for retaliation must fail.
 
... ...
 
"... this Court does not find that Verizon in any way interfered with plaintiff’s exercise of his benefits under the FMLA. To the contrary, the Court finds that Verizon was more than reasonable in its accommodation of plaintiff’s conditions. Plaintiff’s claim for FMLA interference necessarily fails."
 
 
 
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EDWARDS v. CREOKS MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES was a 2007 Oklahoma federal court decision In August 2005, a Jehovah's Witness, named Dorothy L. Edwards filed a federal lawsuit gainst her former employer, Creoks Mental Health Services, Inc. Dorothy Edwards alleged that CMHS discriminated against her on the basis of her WatchTower religion, and disability, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Edwards also alleged that CMHS fostered a hostile work environment and retaliated against her after she filed for unemployment benefits. In addition to her federal claims, Edwards also alleged that CMHS was liable for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract.
 
CMHS is a non-profit corporation that provides mental health services to low-income individuals throughout Northeastern Oklahoma. In April 2004, Edwards entered into a contract with Creoks entitled, "Subcontractor Agreement", which stated that Edwards would provide individual rehabilitation or case management services as an "independent contractor".  Edwards had an advanced degree and had performed some prior work in rehabilitation services. The dates and time of services were to be determined based on client need. The "Subcontractor Agreement" further stated that the "services will be delivered and documented in conformance with Creoks policies, procedures, and protocols." Edwards also signed a document entitled "Verification of Creoks Personnel Policies". CMHS also had in place a dispute resolution/grievance procedure. According to this policy, if an employee had a grievance, including alleged discrimination based on religion or disability, the employee should present a written request for formal review by the employee’s supervisor. Edwards never filed a written complaint pursuant to this policy.
 
Edwards performed individual rehabilitation services at CMHS's clients’ homes. Edwards wrote her own treatment plans and had control over the methods used to provide the services. She submitted her treatment plans to the CEO for approval. While she was supposed to seek such approval only in the beginning of her employment to "get the swing of things", Edwards claimed that she continued seeking his approval beyond the first few weeks with CMHS. CMHS provided Edwards with paperwork and supplies, but she conducted her treatment work at clients’ homes, and completed paperwork at her own home.
 
Edwards did not disclose to CMHS that she suffers from a "generalized anxiety disorder". According to Edwards, "There was no need to [tell management about my disability]. I needed no accommodations. I – I have – I can do my job, and I can do it well. I have problems within myself, and I have problems when I’m being pressured or whatever."  Edwards did disclosed such to another CMHS employee, named Audrey Milton. According to Edwards, Milton then supposedly told other undisclosed CMHS employees that Edwards could not perform her job responsibilities because of her anxiety disorder. Milton supposedly also asked Edwards if she was schizophrenic, and supposedly told Edwards that she thought Edwards had a learning disability.
 
Edwards also claimed that an "undisclosed person", who Edwards refers to as her "slanderer", called CMHS and made negative comments about her. Edwards does not have any evidence that anyone made such a call; however, she "believes within my heart and soul some – the information got to [Creoks’ employees] some kind of way".  According to Edwards, the other Creoks’ employees turned against her after they heard these allegedly slanderous comments. She argues that, due to the comments by this "slanderer", other CMHS employees stopped assigning clients to Edwards. Edwards later testified, "[The LPCs] didn’t choose for me to work with them anymore after hearing all the gossip and the slander that was called in by my slanderers to Creoks."  Prior to her termination, Edwards filed a complaint to the licensure board on the ground that the LPCs decision to take her off of their treatment plans was "unprofessional".
 
Edwards complained that some of her co-employees made disparaging comments about her. Edwards also claimed that "a big issue was made over the fact that I was a Jehovah’s Witness."  Milton supposedly told Edwards that she was shocked that Edwards was a Jehovah’s Witness. Edwards later testified, "I feel it was discriminative [sic] when they even talked about [my religion] negatively".
CMHS claimed that Edwards struggled to perform her duties in accordance with CMHS policies and procedures. In particular, CMHS claimed that Edwards impermissibly taught religion to her clients. Edwards had one client who "was terrified of going to hell, because of the religious teachings she had". Edwards met with CMHS's client and supposedly wrote a treatment plan which involved the client learning what the Bible had to say about "hellfire". Edwards responded that teaching the clinet how to go to the Bible and form her own opinions about what was true and what was false about "hellfire" did not constitute religious "witnessing".  In addition to holding a "Bible study" with CMHS's client, Edwards also took the client with her to meetings at the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses.  Edwards claimed that, at the time, she did not know it was improper to take a client to a religious meeting.
 
In November 2004, CMHS's CEO met with Edwards to discuss her alleged infractions of policies and procedures. A written memorandum was given Edwards which set forth specific directives that Edwards was to follow without exception:

(1) You are never to initiate or discuss issues relating to religion with clients.
(2) You are never to transport a client anywhere for any reason, no exception.
(3) You are only to do services of individual rehab with Medicaid clients.
(4) You are not to do any case management services at all – indefinitely.
(5) No other services but individual rehab Medicaid will be paid to you.
(6) You are not to do any services at the Sapulpa office at all.
(7) You are not to have any contact with [CLIENT] at all.
(8) You are to turn in Medicaid goals/objectives for individual rehab to clinical coordinator for approval before providing any services. Not doing so will prevent you from being paid until they have been approved.
(9) All Medicaid clients that you see must already have a mental health assessment and treatment plan done by a therapist first.
(10) You are never allowed to remove a chart from the office.
(11) You may look through open Medicaid charts to find clients who need individual rehab to build up your client load.
 
 
In February 2005, Edwards filed a claim for "unemployment compensation", because after some LPCs had taken her off of their treatment plans, she had only three or four clients. On March 14, 2005, CMHS terminated its "Subcontractor Agreement" with Edwards. Edwards was told that she was terminated because "she violated Creoks policies; had too many issues with her co-workers; and caused Creoks to lose money"
 
Thereafter, Edwards filed a claim for unpaid wages with the Oklahoma Department of Labor, which was ultimately settled (outcome unknown). Edwards' claim for "unemployment compensation" was also approved under Oklahoma UC law.
 
Edwards also filed a employment discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in which Edwards alleged, " ... I have been discriminated against because of my religion  ... . I also believe I have been discriminated against because of my Disability, ... . I further believe that I have been retaliated against for having filed an unemployment claim with the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission".  EEOC dismissed Edwards' claims, but Edwards still filed this federal lawsuit.
 
The USDC ruled that CMHS was entitled to summary judgment on all of Edward’s claims, stating in part:
 
"Defendant terminated plaintiff because of her inability to follow Creoks’ policies, her conflicts with co-employees, and because she was causing Creoks to lose money. None of these proffered reasons are related to plaintiff’s religion. Plaintiff submitted no evidence from which a reasonable person could infer that defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiff were mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. Plaintiff’s primary evidence of religious discrimination is that her co-employee, Milton, said that she was 'shocked' that plaintiff was a Jehovah’s Witness. This isolated comment about plaintiff’s religion does not raise an inference of religious discrimination. On the contrary, Milton’s statement occurred in a private phone conversation between plaintiff and Milton outside of work hours. ... Given this context, a reasonable trier of fact could not interpret Milton’s comment to raise an inference of religious discrimination on the part of defendant.
 
"Further, the fact that plaintiff was reprimanded for teaching religion to clients does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the alleged religious discrimination. Plaintiff agrees that it was inappropriate to teach religion to clients; she merely maintains that her teaching a client how to read and study the Bible did not constitute religious "witnessing". This disagreement about what constitutes impermissible religious teaching is not relevant to the religious discrimination inquiry. Plaintiff cannot point to any other evidence of religious discrimination. ... plaintiff’s allegation of religious discrimination rests on her own conclusory statements, which are unsupported by facts in the summary judgment record. Mere conjecture and subjective beliefs about an employer’s motive do not create a genuine issue of material fact.
 
... ...
 
"... plaintiff’s alleged disability is a generalized anxiety disorder. Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that this impairment substantially limits any major life activity On the contrary, she maintains that she was capable of performing her work adequately, but had problems dealing with pressure. While plaintiff cannot manage high levels of stress, she has not shown that she is 'significantly restricted' in performing a major life activity ... .
 
... ..
 
"With respect to the statement made by Milton, the Court also finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the alleged defamation. Even assuming arguendo that Milton’s statements that plaintiff had a learning disability or was schizophrenic were false and defamatory in nature, there is no evidence that these statements were published. To the extent that Milton made such statements to other Creoks employees, such communication is not evidence of publication. 'Communication inside a corporation, between its officers, employees, and agents, is never publication for the purposes of actions for defamation'. ... ."
 
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CRAWFORD v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY was a 2006 New York federal court decision. In 2004, a Jehovah's Witness, named Doris D. Crawford, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against her former employer, New York Life Insurance Company, including supervisory personnel. Doris Crawford was first employed by New York Life in November 2000, on a temporary basis, as a secretary in the Office of General Counsel. Crawford's employment became fulltime in February 2001. Crawford's lawsuit alleged discrimination violations under both Title VII (religious and gender) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
 
At some point early in her employment, "overtime" and Crawford's WatchTower religion evidently became an issue, because Crawford sought and was granted an "accomodation" to get off work every Tuesday and Thursday exactly at 5:00 PM, so that she could attend her regular weekly "meetings" at her Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses.
 
Doris Crawford also suffered from irritable bowel syndrome, which Crawford alleged caused her to feel embarrassed and socially isolated, because her work area smelled bad from her flatus. With regard to such, the USDC opinion relates:
 
"Crawford testified that while she worked at New York Life, she had "[d]iarrhea ... throughout the day in early stage, besides that I had the rashes, I had headaches, I had palpitations, I had breathlessness, I had panic . . . . If I was at work, I was in the bathroom a lot."  She testified regarding how IBS impacted her ability to work at New York Life as "detain[ing me] in the bathroom, it would limit where I was, but ... I could do what I needed to do. It would just take me longer to do things and I just wasn’t as available." ... She also testified that while at New York Life, "it was stressful to be around people[.]" ...
 
"Crawford testified that her symptoms have improved over time, including diarrhea once a month, constipation three times a month, [stomach cramps] one to two days per week, with daily flatulence. ... When asked how IBS affects her now on a daily basis, Crawford testified:
'It’s more mental and emotional . ... The constant awareness of it and being in the presence of others. So more of a social isolation, I guess. So that I have to carry certain things to feel at least that I am not as offensive to be around. Carrying personal sprays and things of that nature and I use them frequently . ... There are places or people that I tend not to want to be around because if it’s somebody new, I tend to not want to be in that environment. And I have to limit pretty much my time socially.'

"... Crawford takes no medicine and follows no special diet or other regimen to control her IBS. ...
 
"During her employment at New York Life, Crawford brought to the attention of LaDonna Carr ... , her supervisor, a number of grievances. In March 2001, Crawford complained that she was earning $500 less per annum than what the employment packet indicated she would earn. ... She also complained to Carr regarding the treatment of her by employees and supervisors at New York Life. She first complained about 'gossip' that co-employees spread about her using electronic mail. ...  She said that two other secretaries, 'Janet', and 'Anesta', talked about her using the pronoun 'he' to disguise their intentions. ... When she asked technical support for an electronic mail account to communicate with the attorneys she supported, the technical support employee “was very smug,” and responded '[y]ou will get it when I give it to you.' ... On another occasion, a male employee walked past her, looked at her, and made a comment to another male employee about 'bra size', and laughed. ... Plaintiff also overheard the same employee state about female Jehovah’s Witness members who live in his neighborhood that they 'let themselves go', to a group with other people in the lunchroom. ... In another instance, she suggested celebrating New York Life’s hiring her with co-workers with 'bubbly', and she overheard a coworker state that 'this place is going to the dogs.' ... She also complained that her coworker 'Anesta' commented that she (Anesta) 'looked good in her clothes and referring to her weight and size', from which Plaintiff inferred that Anesta was insinuating 'that my clothes were tight and I needed to lose weight'. ...
 
"Crawford also informed Carr about her IBS, and complained about comments and gestures made by co-workers regarding Plaintiff’s IBS symptoms. During her tenure at New York Life, co-workers publicly commented on smells emanating from Plaintiff’s area due to IBS-caused flatus. One co-worker would hold her nose and say 'it stinks' as she walked past Plaintiff’s area ... ; others would make similar comments, and a maintenance employee told her that her work area was moved close to the restroom 'because you stink'. She also stated that employees would use other bathrooms because of the smells she produced because of IBS. (Id. at 199.) Plaintiff acknowledged that the area smelled of flatus because 'I had gas 24/7'. ... ."
 
New York Life's sick policy allowed only seven daily absences per year. Beginning in April 2001, Crawford had numerous doctors appointments that led her to take time away from the office. In May/June 2001, a supervisor warned Crawford that continued time away from work during work hours could result in dismissal. On July 23, 2001, Crawford failed to call ahead of time before reporting late to work. On August 13, 2001, Crawford was provided a written 'final warning' informing her that she was over the acceptable number of absences, and that further absences would result in her dismissal. On September 5, 2001, Crawford again arrived late without previously informing the employer. On September 14, 17, and 18, 2001, Crawford again took sick leave because 'instead of things improving, people were acting the same . ... it was still a hostile work environment under the circumstances'. Crawford was terminated on September 18, 2001 for absences and latenesses in violation of New York Life’s absence policy.
 
In November 2001, Crawford filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights. In February 2004, Crawford received a Right to Sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and she thereafter filed this federal lawsuit. Her complaint alleged violations of Title VII and the ADA, and included as defendants both New York Life and individual supervisors.  In October 2004, Crawford’s complaint as to the individual supervisors was dismissed, since individual employees are not "employers" under Title VII and the ADA. The USDC also found that Crawford’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts regarding her IBS to conclude that she suffered a "substantial impairment" on a "major life activity" that would permit suit under the ADA.  Crawford was granted "leave to amend", which she did in November 2004. The amended complaint alleged workplace harassment, retaliation, and discrimination based on her gender and IBS in violation of Title VII and the ADA. In granting NYLIC's motion for summary judgment on the remaining Title VII and ADA claims, the USDC stated in part:
 
"... [Crawford's] IBS-related symptoms do not 'substantially limit' any major life activity. ADA regulations define major life activities as including such functions 'as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working'. ... This is a non-exhaustive list, and Plaintiff’s claimed impairments, i.e. that IBS has limited her ability to interact with others, to eliminate waste, and to work ... have been previously held by the Second Circuit to constitute major life activities. ...
 
"However, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient competent evidence that IBS has substantially limited these activities. ADA regulations counsel that in deciding whether a condition substantially limits a major life activity, a court should consider '(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment'. The first factor, the nature and severity of the impairment, weighs against a finding of a substantial limitation. In her deposition testimony, Plaintiff stated that IBS detained her in the bathroom frequently and caused her work area to smell of flatus. Plaintiff did not testify that IBS caused problems controlling the elimination of waste, beyond needing frequent trips to the bathroom. Because Plaintiff’s work area adjoined the restroom, it is uncontested that she had access to a bathroom, and Plaintiff does not allege that her IBS ever caused extreme symptoms, such as requiring her to run to the bathroom without notice, or soiling herself. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s IBS symptoms did not limit her ability to control waste.
 
"Further, Plaintiff’s symptoms did not substantially limit her ability to work, as Plaintiff conceded that IBS did not prevent her from completing any work assignment or otherwise limit her life activities beyond requiring frequent trips to the bathroom. To the extent that Plaintiff claims that IBS symptoms required frequent absences to attend doctor’s appointments that resulted in her termination ..., I reject Plaintiff’s Affidavit as selfserving and contradicted by her previous deposition testimony. The credible evidence shows that the specific instances that led to Plaintiff’s termination, i.e., her absences on September 14, 17, and 18, 2001, were not caused by her need to attend medical appointments, but rather were precipitated by Plaintiff’s unhappiness at how her co-workers treated her. ... Plaintiff does not submit any evidence, such as copies of doctor’s notices, electronic mail, or other documentary evidence that might rebut her own deposition testimony. Moreover, assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has shown that her IBS symptoms resulted in her termination at New York Life, Plaintiff has not shown that these impairments would substantially limit her ability to perform any other job. An inability to perform 'a single, particular job' is not a substantial limitation upon working. While Plaintiff’s frequent trips to the bathroom limited her availability and her resentment at how co-employees treated her may have caused her anxiety, they did not substantially limit her ability to work within the meaning of the ADA.
 
"The limitations created by IBS on Plaintiff’s ability to communicate with others, while credible and significant, do not constitute a substantial limitation. The Second Circuit instructs that '[t]his standard is satisfied when the impairment severely limits the plaintiff’s ability to connect with others, i.e., to initiate contact with other people and respond to them, or to go among other people -- at the most basic level of these activities'. ... Plaintiff testified that in response to her flatus, her New York Life co-workers made remarks and gestures that embarrassed her. Plaintiff further testified that her embarrassment resulted in stress-related symptoms, including headaches, heart palpitations, breathlessness, and panic. An anxiety disorder can be considered by a court to be a disability if it substantially limits the disabled individual’s ability to communicate with others. ... However, Plaintiff testified that she was able to communicate with her superiors and coworkers effectively enough to complete her work. Furthermore, she testified that she is an extremely active Jehovah’s Witness, participating in religious activities with other adherents several times per week.  (FOOTNOTE: 'I reject Plaintiff’s subsequent self-serving statement in her Affidavit that she 'drastically' reduced her hours of religious participation because of IBS symptoms as contradicted by her credible deposition testimony that IBS has not impacted her daily religious activities.')  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s testimony demonstrates that while her flatus has caused considerable embarrassment to her and has limited her social engagements, that it has not substantially limited her ability to communicate with others. ...
 
"The second factor, duration of the impairment, also militates against the finding of a substantial limitation to a major life activity. Plaintiff first exhibited IBS symptoms in 2001, and Plaintiff concedes that her IBS-related symptoms have diminished over time, and now cause only occasional cramping, diarrhea, and constipation. While Plaintiff’s condition appears to have no cure, it also appears to be controlled.
 
"The third factor, the permanent or long-term impact of the resulting impairment, also weighs against a substantial limitation. Plaintiff’s testimony shows that while medication has not been effective, her exercise and diet regimen appear to have substantially reduced her IBS-related symptoms. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s testimony that she is not now physically limited from performing any activity supports the conclusion that IBS does not substantially limit any of Plaintiff’s major life activities. Thus, I conclude that Crawford fails to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether her IBS symptoms substantially limit a major life activity.
... ...
 
"Plaintiff claims that New York Life dismissed her because of her complaints about statements and gestures by co-workers indicating that her IBS-related symptoms created noxious odors in her workspace and in the women’s restroom. This claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to establish a causal connection between her complaints and her termination. It is uncontested that Plaintiff was late twice in July and September 2001 without previously notifying her employer that she would be late, contrary to the employer’s policy, and that her last absences in September 2001, after she received a final warning notice for latenesses, put her over the policy limit. Plaintiff’s dismissal pursuant to a clear absence policy after a final warning that future latenesses would result in her dismissal, and the absence of any evidence suggesting that her dismissal was related to her previous complaints, shows a lack of any genuine issue of fact as to whether there was a causal relationship between her complaints and her termination.
 
... ...
 
"Plaintiff’s claims that she was subjected to a hostile workplace environment because of her gender. [FOOTNOTE: 'I note that although Plaintiff claims to have been discriminated against because of her religion, Plaintiff alleges no specific instance of religious discrimination, beyond her argument that her termination was in part based on her activities as a Jehovah’s Witness. However, inasmuch as Plaintiff acknowledges that New York Life accommodated her ministry practices and offers no evidence that religion played any role whatsoever in her hostile workplace environment allegations and her dismissal, I dismiss this claim without further discussion.']  ...
 
... ...
 
"... To the extent that Plaintiff claims that her termination was the result of gender or religious discrimination, Plaintiff expressly denied in her deposition that she was dismissed because of her gender or religion. ... ... I reject Plaintiff’s subsequent Affidavit that her termination was also motivated by religious and sexual harassment as self-serving and contradicted by her sworn and credible testimony in her deposition. ...
 
 
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HILT v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS was a 2007 Tennessee federal court decision. In 2004, Dr. Leonard T. Hilt, an African-American Jehovah's Witness Doctor, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against the Department of Veterans Affairs. Leonard Hilt was employed as a podiatrist at the VA's Tennessee Valley Healthcare System in Nashville, Tennessee, from December 1991 until his voluntary retirement in March 2006. Dr. Hilt's lawsuit contained three counts. Count I was brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and alleged unlawful discrimination on the basis of his disability, identified in his complaint to be leukemia. Count II alleged discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in the form of unlawful retaliation on the basis of Hilt's participation in EEO activities and/or his opposition to his supervisor's discriminatory practices. Count III alleged further discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment.
 
Hilt initially enjoyed a pleasant working relationship with the staff and his fellow physicians. However, both his working relationships and his personal health deteriorated over the course of his 14+ years employment. Hilt's problems apparently started sometime around 1997-8. In January 1999, Hilt's supervisor, Dr. Rudolph Cumberbatch, wrote a memo to the Chief of Staff at the VA Hospital expressing concerns about Hilt's mental and physical health, as well as his alleged "inappropriate behavior". In the memo, Cumberbatch requested that an evaluation of Hilt be conducted to determine his fitness for duty. Also, in January 1999, Hilt received his first proficiency rating from Dr. Cumberbatch, covering the period of November 1997 through November 1998, containing ratings of "low satisfactory" in two out of five categories and negative comments.
 
In May/June 1999, Hilt attended a meeting with Cumberbatch, a Dr Burns, also a VA podiatrist, and Ruth Vickens, the Administrative Officer, during which Hilt and Dr. Burns exchanged words. Hilt and Dr. Burns were at one time friends and roommates, though their relationship deteriorated after Dr. Burns came to work at the VA Hospital. Hilt later testified that  Dr. Burns asked several confrontational questions that made Hilt angry, which led Hilt to call Dr. Burns a "snake". Burns replied that Hilt ought to know a "snake", being a Jehovah's Witness. Cumberbatch then said, "Dr. Hilt, I didn't know you were a Christian."  In June 1999, as a result of that exchange, Hilt contacted his Union representative. Hilt also filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint of religious discrimination. The complaint was dismissed at the administrative level in August 1999.
 
In December 1999, Hilt received his second proficiency rating conducted by Dr. Cumberbatch, covering the period from November 12, 1998, to September 3, 1999. In this review, Dr. Cumberbatch reported that Hilt was performing at the level of "low satisfactory" in even more categories than the previous year, and gave him a "low" rating in four out of five areas.
 
In November 1999, Hilt went on medical leave and had three surgeries on the same foot due to osteomyelitis. Hilt returned from medical leave in August 2000. It is unclear whether Hilt voluntarily withdrew himself from surgical duties to allow himself to further heal, or whether Cumberbatch had restricted Hilt's from surgery in May 2000. In late August 2000, Hilt's also had his left big toe amputated.
 
In May 2000, while Hilt still was on medical leave, Cumberbatch amended the second proficiency rating to state that Hilt's "current health problems may have impacted [Hilt's] ability to perform in an operating room setting". In July 2000, Hilt lodged an administrative complaint alleging retaliation  in the form of low ratings on the second proficiency report, because of his June 1999 EEO complaint.

In October 2003, due to increasingly frequent absences for medical appointments associated with his health problems, Hilt was required to submit dates and times for all of his personal medical appointments for a three month period. Hilt additionally alleged that his supervisor sent three emails to an individual who was not his supervisor containing information about the plaintiff's medical treatment. Hilt further alleged that he was required to consult with a newly licensed podiatrist before making referrals as a form of punishing him, even though he admits that this policy applied to everyone and not just specifically to him.
 
In March 2004, Hilt filed another EEO complaint alleging reprisal for prior EEO activity, because his Section Chief required him to submit the times and dates of his personal medical appointments for a three month period, and because his Section Chief sent three emails to a nonsupervisor about his personal medical appointments, and because his Section Chief stated that he "was watching" Hilt, and because he was required to consult with an inexperienced, newly licensed podiatrist before making referrals to vascular service.
 
Sometime thereafter, Hilt filed this federal lawsuit, which was based on the charges presented in the two administrative complaints of discrimination made in July 2000 and March 2004. Hilt withdrew his claims based on the March 2004 events after the defendants filed their answer. Since the June 1999 complaint of religious discrimination was dismissed at the administrative level, it was at issue only insofar as it related to the alleged retaliation. As for Hilt's remaining claims based on the July 2000 administrative complaint, the USDC granted the VA's motion for summary judgement, stating in part:
 
"In the present case, although the plaintiff disputes the basis for the lowered evaluation scores, he fails to show that the scores had any effect whatsoever beyond bruising his ego. With respect to the alleged suspension of his surgical privileges, the plaintiff was on medical leave at the time of the allegedly retaliatory action, he lost no pay or prestige, and he voluntarily removed himself from surgical service upon his return due to health concerns.
 
... ...
 
"... Here, the plaintiff received his first lowered performance evaluation score before he filed a charge of discrimination. The plaintiff's first lowered evaluation covered the period from November 12, 1997, to November 12, 1998, and the plaintiff received this report in January 1999, well before he filed his June 1999 EEO complaint, and indeed, well before the incident giving rise to the complaint of discrimination (the June 1999 meeting) had even occurred.
 
"... The plaintiff's scores were on the decline six months prior to his complaint of discrimination. The fact that they continued to worsen following his charge of discrimination is not as clearly attributable to employer retaliation ... ...  the facts in this case show a preexisting slide in scores that began well before the charge of discrimination was made. Thus, in this case, lowered performance evaluation scores simply do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.
 
"The plaintiff also claims that he was retaliated against because of an addendum to the 1998-1999 performance evaluation expressing concerns about his fitness for surgery. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Dr. Cumberbatch used concerns about the plaintiff's personal health as a pretext to justify revocation of his surgical privileges. Even taking all of the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is simply no support for this claim in the record.
 
"The plaintiff admitted that he was on an extended period of sick leave during the time relevant to this portion of his claim, from about November 2, 1999, through August 13, 2000, due to health problems, including multiple surgeries on his foot and the amputation of his left great toe. ... The plaintiff stated in his December 2000 EEO interview that he performed his last surgery in 1999, prior to going on his extended sick leave. He further confirmed that he had voluntarily performed no surgeries in the year 2000 since returning from sick leave. ... The plaintiff stated that the reason he had not performed any surgeries was because he was recovering from his own surgeries and because he had promised Dr. Jones, the Chief of Staff, that he 'would not go into the [operating room] until the foot [was] completely closed and healed'.
 
"The alleged revocation of the plaintiff's surgical privileges occurred in May 2000 when Dr. Cumberbatch amended the plaintiff's 1998-1999 proficiency report to include his concerns about the plaintiff's health problems and their impact on the plaintiff's ability to 'perform in an operating room setting.' ... It is not entirely clear whether Dr. Cumberbatch ever effectively suspended, revoked, or otherwise put into effect any restriction on the plaintiff's surgical privileges whatsoever. During his interview with the EEO examiner in December 2000, the plaintiff discussed a letter dated November 4, 1999, in which he alleges that Dr. Cumberbatch stated that the plaintiff was prohibited from doing certain types of surgeries unless he had Dr. Burns' supervision. ... The plaintiff also stated that Dr. Jones, Dr. Cumberbatch's superior, replied to Dr. Cumberbatch's letter and told him that the plaintiff did have surgical privileges and that Dr. Cumberbatch could not impose such restrictions on the plaintiff alone without including the rest of the podiatrists on staff. ... Neither Dr. Cumberbatch's letter nor Dr. Jones' response is included anywhere in the record, though these documents may have originally been included as attachments to the plaintiff's EEO testimony.
 
"Even assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiff's surgical privileges were restricted, any such action cannot be considered an adverse action under the circumstances presented in this case. Even if Dr. Cumberbatch successfully interfered with the plaintiff's surgical privileges on November 4, 1999, or on May 19, 2000, the plaintiff was at that time on medical leave, and would not return until August 2000. Upon his return, the plaintiff admits that he actually did have surgical privileges, but that he was voluntarily keeping himself out of the surgical suite in light of his own recent surgeries and ongoing recovery and healing process. ...
 
"... The plaintiff was out on a very extended sick leave when the alleged suspension occurred. His privileges were, by his own admission, restored (or remained intact) at the time he returned to work in August 2000. The reason the plaintiff did not return to surgical duties was because of his self-imposed attempt to complete his own healing process, as a result of his recent multiple surgeries and difficult recoveries. The plaintiff suffered no actual loss of pay, prestige, or privilege, nor indeed, any other ill effects whatsoever because of any alleged restriction or revocation of his surgical privileges, because he simply was not present for such detrimental effects to accrue. When he did return to work, the plaintiff prevented himself from performing surgeries, ... Under the totality of these circumstances, the alleged revocation of the plaintiff's surgical privileges simply does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action."

 
 
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UPTON v. WATCH TOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY is an very interesting ongoing 2006 New York state court case involving a Jehovah's Witness named Brenda Upton and the Jehovah's Witnesses themselves. Upton worked as a chiropractor at the Jehovah's Witnesses main Brooklyn headquarters from 1998 until 2001. Chiropractor Upton alleges that she injured her back around 2000, and that she is entitled to worker's compensation benefits. The Watch Tower Society claims that Upton was not an employee, but merely a volunteer who is not legally entitled to any remedies typically available to employees. An administrative law Judge ruled in Upton's favor earlier this year, but the Watch Tower Society vowed to fight his decision. Results of appeal are unknown.

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In August 1994, a Houston, Texas Jehovah's Witness, named Troy Morehead, 25, died during a WatchTower "quick-build" project for the Assembly Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, in Rosenberg, Texas. Morehead fell from the roof area down onto the concrete slab -- a fall that should not have necessarily been fatal. One can only wonder whether Morehead actually died due to refusal to accept a blood transfusion made necessary by internal bleeding.

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SIMON v. SCHENECTADY NORTH CONGREGATION OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES was a 1987 New York lawsuit filed by a Jehovah's Witness named Charles Simon against his own Congregation. Simon was injured while "voluntarily" doing some carpentry work on the Kingdom Hall, which had been requested by the "Elders" of Simon's congregation. Simon's congregation refused to cover his injuries, thus resulting in this lawsuit, which Simon lost.

Word to the wise, Contractors. Don't set foot on Kingdom Hall property unless you have all the insurance you will ever need. Their General Liability insurance is handled out of Watchtower world headquarters, and you will never get a penny without first spending a dollar.


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PURVIS v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION was a 2006 Pennsylvania federal court case which involved a Jehovah's Witness named Rosilyn Purvis. In November 2002, Rosilyn Purvis filed for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income due to two or more employment related injuries. The source opinion does not elaborate on Purvis's employment, nor the incidents in which she was injured. The record simply notes that a second work related injury occurred in February 2002, and that Purvis continued working until November 2002 (when a third incident possibly occurred).
 
In 2004, an ALJ ruled that Purvis was not disabled per SSA definitions despite suffering from depression, obesity, and degenerative disc disease. The ALJ noted that Purvis was a Jehovah's Witness who regularly attended and sit through their five weekly meetings, plus she also occasionally did their required door-to-door recruiting. Purvis also lived alone and perform all necessary functions required by such. The ALJ also noted that Purvis' depression and back pain could be properly controlled if only she would properly take her prescribed medications. It was ruled that Purvis could perform certain light work and was not disabled. The USDC agreed and dismissed Purvis' lawsuit.

 

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JONES v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION ET AL was a 2006 Ohio federal court decision. In October 2004, an African-American Jehovah's Witness, named Michael Teral Jones, filed a federal lawsuit against his former employer, General Motors Corporation, and UAW Local 798. The pro se Complaint stated nine claims for relief: (1) libel, (2) slander, (3) breach of contract, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) violation of the right to privacy, (6) civil conspiracy, (7) discrimination/ retaliation for filing a claim with the EEOC, (8) tortious interference with a beneficial relationship, and (9) wrongful discharge. In 2005-6, the USDC either dismissed with prejudice or granted summary judgement for the defendants on all claims.
 
Michael T. Jones became a permanent employee of GM in 1994. Like most of the details in this case, even Jones' date of termination is unclear, but it was sometime in Summer 2004. Jones apparently was granted a number of sick leaves during his employment at the Dayton area GM plant, which Jones alleged were caused by job stress. Jones' last-date worked was June 26, 2003, and approved sick leave started on June 30, 2003. From that date forward, Jones regularly submitted statements from his physician that he was unable to work. The last such statement indicated Jones could return to work as of March 30, 2004. Although his sick leave was extended by GM to May 17, 2004, Jones never actually returned to work. A month later GM exercised its rights under the collective bargaining agreement to treat his failure to return as a "voluntary quit".  Jones asked two successive union representatives to grieve that decision, claiming he was medically unable to work, but he refused to provide either one of them with medical proof that he was unable to return. Based on his refusal and their lack of any other evidence, they refused to file the requested grievances. The USDC noted:
 
"Local 798's evidence shows that two successive union representatives who would have been in a position to file a grievance for Mr. Jones asked him for medical documentation and he refused to provide it. Mr. Jones has not responded to that evidence with any admissible evidence of his own. Most importantly, he has not offered any proof beyond his own unsworn assertion that his own doctors continued to certify that he was unable to work at any time after May, 2004. He admits that he failed to appear for several independent medical examinations that GM requested during this time period, but claims it is because they would not reschedule them to meet his personal convenience. What he does not mention in his motion papers but what is shown by his deposition is that he had moved to Florida during this time and, according to the Complaint, enrolled in flight school. How can it be that he was well enough to pass the F.A.A. flight medicine test but was physically unable to return to work at GM and can produce no medical evidence regarding this assertion?"
 
The USDC disposed of some of Jones' claims without mentioning detailed specifics which occurred at the jobsite. One exception was with regard to Jones' claim of racial discrimination, which the USDC included, in part:
 
"In his statement of facts supporting his claim of discrimination, Mr. Jones adverts to a situation where he and Lonnie Campbell received what he believes is disparate discipline for the same infraction of work rules. ... The facts about that incident as revealed by the evidence are that on October 23, 2001, Mr. Jones and another worker left work early. ... Both employees were disciplined for this infraction. ... Jones was suspended for two weeks and disqualified from working in Ms. Lum’s department. ...  Jones admitted at his deposition that he does not know but believes that Mr. Campbell received a balance of shift plus three day suspension. ... In accordance with GM’s progressive discipline, an employee’s work record is a factor in assessing the discipline that is appropriate for that employee. Two employees committing the same infraction on the same day would not necessarily receive the same discipline if one had a work record significantly different from the other. ... the case law cited above shows that in a plant where there is a progressive discipline policy, the work records of the persons being disciplined are relevant. It is not for the courts to say whether a particular amount of discipline is justified or not; inferentially, Mr. Jones admits some discipline was justified because he does not deny leaving work early. Rather, the courts are concerned with whether discipline is applied on a racially discriminatory basis. As to that question, Mr. Jones has not produced proof that he and Mr. Campbell were similarly situated.
 
"Mr. Jones also complains of a situation in which he was the victim of a racial slur by Jeff Siebert. ... The context in which this allegedly occurred is as follows: On or about December, 2000, Mr. Jones was working on the Car line. ... Mr. Jones wrote post-it notes about his supervisor, Jeff Adams. The notes said 'Jeff Adams is trying to kill me. Keeps giving me this Shao Lin Tae Kwon Do look which seems to suggest I’m going to kill you.' The notes went on in this vein, claiming that Mr. Adams was 'stalking' him, noting 'So far my arm pit odor has kept him at bay But I’m not sure how long I can hold out ...'  ...  Jones saw the notes as an attempt to get Mr. Adams to lighten up, but the Company saw this as somewhat threatening to Mr. Adams and somewhat accusatory toward Mr. Adams, in both cases improperly so. ... Jones was given a suspension and was asked to see Employee Assistance for evaluation. ...

"Mr. Jones began keeping notes in a journal at this time. ... He recorded every incident at work that he thought was unfair. ... He went to see Mr. Adams’ boss, Jeff Siebert, on or about December 15, 2000. Mr. Siebert told Mr. Jones he agreed with Jeff Adams that the notes had been inappropriate. ... Mr. Jones states that, during this discussion, he saw Mr. Siebert mouth the words 'Dumb nigger' to himself when he thought Mr. Jones was not looking. ... A day or so later, in December, 2000, Mr. Jones was at his workstation when he claims he heard Mr. Siebert talking to Mr. Adams about 25-30 feet away. According to Mr. Jones, Mr. Siebert told Mr. Adams 'fire his ass, you fire that nigger’s ass.' ...
 
"Mr. Jones allegedly complained to the Union that Mr. Siebert and Mr. Adams were discriminating against him. ... Although there were many other employees in the same work area where Mr. Siebert allegedly used a racial slur, Mr. Jones states he did not ask anyone if they had heard the remark. ... When he allegedly complained to the Union, Mr. Jones did not provide the Union with the names of potentially corroborating witness. ... The next day, December 20, 2000, the Union allegedly went with Mr. Jones to the Company with Mr. Jones’ complaint. Again, according to Mr. Jones, neither Mr. Jones nor the Union identified any witnesses to this supposed remark. ... GM investigates any complaint of discrimination and makes a record of its investigation, even where it concludes that the accusation is not accurate. ... GM has no record of any such complaint by Mr. Jones. ... According to Mr. Jones, the same day as he allegedly complained of discrimination by Mr. Siebert, a Quality Manager approached Mr. Jones with an offer of transfer to C crew. ... Jones declined this offer. ... Accepting Mr. Jones’ statements as true for purposes of these Motions, the alleged racial slurs which Mr. Jones attributes to Jeff Siebert would provide evidence of discriminatory animus by Mr. Siebert, but there is no evidence that Mr. Siebert’s alleged animus played any part in any decision adversely affecting Mr. Jones. Instead, the record shows that, as soon as Mr. Jones complained about Mr. Siebert, he was immediately transferred away from him to Mr. Foreman and soon thereafter to Ms. McCauley. Thus the evidence is insufficient to show that GM subjected Mr. Jones to a racially hostile work place: it transferred him as soon as he raised the issue of racial slurs."
 
A second exception to lack of jobsite specifics was with regard to Jones' claim of retaliation, which the USDC included, in part:
"... [Jones] believes that, after he spoke to Jeff Siebert in January, 2001, complaining about Jeff Adams, GM set out on a course of retaliation against him which lasted until he went out on leave in June, 2003. In this 2 ½ year period, his longest assignment, January-September, 2002, was under Carolyn McCann, a supervisor who he admits was fair to him. His second longest assignment, from March 2001-August, 2001 was under Myra McCauley, about whom he had no complaints except that she disciplined him for loading the wrong control arms on the line, an infraction he admits he did commit. ... Discipline for that admitted infraction many months after the protected conduct by a supervisor Plaintiff admits was fair cannot properly be attributed to retaliation.
 
"By contrast, the supervisors he overtly complained about were Jeff Siebert, Brian Foreman and John Bowles. He also perceived the Trim Group 5 job in which he was placed in late 2001 to be so difficult that he went on stress leave after a few days. GM’s responses to his dissatisfaction in each case do not show an intent to force Mr. Jones into assignments he had trouble with. After he supposedly complained about Jeff Siebert, he was offered a new assignment the same day - which he refused - and transferred to Brian Foreman within a few weeks. He only worked for Mr. Foreman for about three weeks. After he insisted Mr. Foreman singled him out for discipline and then went on a month’s sick leave, he was transferred to Myra McCauley, an assignment that lasted five months, until he admittedly put the wrong control arms on the line. When he found the Trim Group 5 job stressful and went on stress leave, he was put in the door seal trim job under Carolyn McCann, who he admitted was a fair supervisor, for nine months.
 
"After he complained about working under John Bowles, Mr. Jones was reassigned to Crystal Brown, but he almost immediately ran his forklift into a stack of shocks. He was then transferred to work the headliner job, which he described as 'a really really good job, a very nice job'. ... In this job, he worked under Suzette Hamilton who, he admits, treated him fairly. This was the last job he worked. He ran his forklift into the worktable in late June, 2003 and went out on leave without working another job.
 
"This undisputed record does not support plaintiff’s claim that, after he complained to Jeff Siebert, GM began forcing Mr. Jones to work in jobs he was not suited for or under supervisors who he perceived as antagonistic to him. It shows that, rather than forcing Mr. Jones into jobs he did not like, for whatever reason, GM readily removed him from those jobs and that, when he got to jobs he was comfortable in, GM kept him in those jobs for extended periods. Moreover, the record does not show Mr. Jones’ job assignments becoming harsher or more unfavorable as time went on. The last job he was assigned to, after his first forklift accident was, in his works, 'a really, really good job, a very nice job' under a supervisor who was fair to him. The evidence, even construed most favorably to Mr. Jones, does not support a prima facie case of retaliation."
 
A third exception to lack of jobsite specifics was with regard to Jones' claims of libel, slander, and invasion of privacy, which the USDC included, in part:
"On or about August 18, 2003, Mr. Jones was sent to an Independent Medical Examiner, Dr. Mark Reynolds, for an evaluation. Dr. Reynolds' notes state that Mr. Jones reported 'passive suicidal thoughts . . . . But has no plan or intent.' ... He also recorded in his notes that Mr. Jones stated 'He further planned once to use his military training to deal with the people at General Motors whom he feels have wronged him. He reports however he is a Jehovah’s Witness and feels very guilty about these thoughts and would not act on them.' ... Dr. Reynolds’ notes in Mr. Jones’ benefits file noted 'passive suicidal and homicidal ideation without plan or intent.' ...
 
"In August, 2003, GM’s National Benefits Center notified the Company Medical Department. Labor Relations was notified that Mr. Jones should not be routinely admitted to the plant. ...  Labor Relations instructed security that Mr. Jones should not be admitted to the plant until Labor Relations was notified and approved. ...  Labor Relations did not provide a reason for this instruction. ... Mr. Jones believes that the picture of him sent to the guard shack was also distributed in the plant and that this caused his co-workers, and eventually, members of his church, to question whether he was violent. ... On or about August 26, 2003, Mr. Jones sought admission to the plant. The security guard informed him that she would need to call Labor Relations first. Mr. Jones, upon hearing this information, decided to leave without entering the plant. ... In his deposition, Plaintiff made clear that his complaints of libel, slander, and invasion of privacy are based on the fact that the information from Dr. Reynolds was transmitted to the plant with the result that he was denied entry in August, 2003, and Mr. Jones’ belief that word of this action reached his co-workers and, eventually, members of his religious community. ... The alleged invasion of privacy, similarly, is that the 'defendants gained access to personal information from the National Benefit Center Unauthorized and did share that information with unauthorized third parties and did out of pure malice and spite subject plaintiff to embarrassment, humiliation, loss of status and significant and lifelong loss and damage."

 

 

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MISCELLANEOUS JW MEDICAL, HEALTH, AND DISABILITY CASES

 CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE

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RECOMMENDED READING:

 

Jehovah's Witnesses and the Problem of Mental Illness

Blood Transfusions: A History and Evaluation of the Religious, Biblical, and Medical Objections (Jehovah's Witnesses perspective)

Blood, Medicine, and the Jehovah's Witnesses: The Hidden History of the Watchtower's Position on the Blood Issue





 

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