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MIKOLAJ LIZUREK v. MOLMIC FURNITURE PTY LTD was a 2011 Australia Workers Compensation case in which a Jehovah's Witness Employee at a furniture manufacturing company injured his back in 2004, but continued his employment until 2009 by performing restricted duties. We include this Aussie case here because in this case the state had surveilled the injured Jehovah's Witness Employee and had videotaped the JW Employee performing door-to-door literature distribution, and had attempted to use that video as proof that the JW Employee was exaggerating his injury, pain, and suffering. Demonstrating to current Jehovah's Witness Employees that they should not allow the possibility of filmed surveillance stop them from going door-to-door during their personal time, this Aussie Judge ruled in the JW Employee's favor, stating in part:

The plaintiff was challenged on the basis that he was able to walk considerable distances as set out in the film shown to him. The plaintiff admitted that the film showed him handing out pamphlets for his religious organisation, Jehovah's Witnesses. The activity shown on the film was not inconsistent with what the plaintiff had to say about his abilities in terms of walking or general activity. The images depicted on the film did not, in my view, contradict anything that the plaintiff said in his evidence or affidavits. I accept the evidence given by the plaintiff in this case about his limitations and the consequences of pain and suffering for him.


SAVIEL G. COLON ET AL v. BOSTON PUBLIC HEALTH COMMISSION ET AL is an ongoing 2022-23 Massachusetts federal civil court case in which multiple Mass residents are seeking MILLIONS in compensation because of the City of Boston's requirement to show proof of vaccination for entry into various public buildings, facilities, and events, which made Saviel Colon (and his fellow plaintiffs) "unable to go to restaurants, museums, and zoos with his family." Pending.

SAVIEL COLON v. CITY OF BOSTON is an ongoing 2022-23 Massachusetts state civil court case in which Saviel Colon is seeking $2 MILLION because the City fired him from his job as a Police Officer after rejecting Saviel Colon's request for a religious exemption from Covid-19 vaccinations and the weekly testing alternative. The Jehovah's Witness Minister was hired in December 2019, but after rejecting his exemption request, the City placed Colon on unpaid indefinite leave in October 2021, and then fired him in October 2022.

Saviel Colon raised his WatchTower religion and his alleged religious beliefs against vaccinations in his complaint without mentioning that the WatchTower Society unofficially, behind-the-scenes advocated accepting Covid vaccinations. Colon charged the city with intentional misrepresentation and deceit, tortious interference with a business relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress, bad faith, and even simple assault -- the last because "the actions of the Defendant placed the Plaintiff in fear and apprehension of imminent bodily harm."

In addition to the $2 MILLION that Colon is seeking, Saviel Colon also says he is entitled to additional damages for "emotional distress, embarrassment, humiliation, anxiety, sleeplessness, and emotional trauma" as well as costs and attorney's fees, as well as lost retirement benefits because his firing came before he was fully vested. Pending.


DARRAN GIBBONS v. C & M PLANT HIRE was a 2018-2020 Australia employment religious discrimination court decision which demonstrates that WatchTower Cult beliefs and practices have the same negative effects on many of the Cult's Jehovah's Witness members regardless of in which country or continent they reside. Following are edited excerpts from that lengthy, detailed decision. Interested readers should google and read the entire opinion.

C & M was engaged in the installation of pipes and cables for Australia's new National Broadband Network. Aiken was one of the company's owners and was responsible for managing daily construction operations. Darran Gibbons, a Jehovah's Witness "whose faith guided his actions", was hired as a "trades assistant" on April 23, 2018, and was fired by Aiken 50 days later on June 12, 2018. Gibbons filed this complaint on August 16, 2018.

As to Aiken's evidence, the Court found Aiken to be honest. Some convincing aspects of his evidence were as follows. When asked about how people fitted in to what was suggested to be a tough industry, Aiken responded, "They fit into any industry. If you follow instructions, you do what you're told to do. You get trained properly. You fit in." Aiken readily acknowledged that jokes, bad language and crude language were prevalent in the construction industry. ...

When questioned about aggression in the workplace, Aiken pointed to a raised voice, pointing and shouting as being indicia of aggression. The following exchange during cross-examination occurred. "So talking generally, does that behaviour occur amongst other employees within the organisation?---That there has been one or two instances of other employees, we discuss it, we work it out like we tried to do with [GIBBONS]. But unfortunately, it was just time after time after time with [GIBBONS], and he wasn't following instructions. It makes him a danger on-site. ...

Aiken said that he spoke to [GIBBONS] about his toilet breaks and especially arranged for [GIBBONS] to take his own car to every site so as to avoid a situation where [GIBBONS] was required to take a work vehicle away from the site, so he could go to the toilet, when such vehicle was needed to be used on site. Sometimes two or three times a day? He would take the van to go to the toilet. ... But [GIBBONS] would take it away for an hour at a time. You know, you can go to the toilet, but there's usually a servo 10 minutes up the road. Go to the toilet and come back. But when you're taking the vehicle away with all the tools in it, the boys couldn't work, so Darran brought that to my attention. We worked out that, "Okay. You can't do that anymore, so take your car to site." So we took his car to every site after that, and he left any time he wanted." ...

Go slowly, Mr Aiken. ... "The last one would have been on the 11th, was the day before he came in and was abusive to me in the morning, was he was complaining that we were trying to instruct him how to put together the pipe, because what he was doing was completely wrong. Andrew tried to explain to him how to do it, then another employee tried to explain to him how to do it, but [GIBBONS] just didn't understand what he was doing was wrong. And he wouldn't take any directions for that. He started shouting at all the boys, he started becoming aggressive to everyone. He was complaining about "You never listen to me. You do this. You do that." If that's what you want to call a complaint, I call it just being aggressive and abusive. And then he got asked to leave site. ...

Well, when you say hitch, are you talking about a knot or are you talking about a bolt?---The hitch. So the ball and the hitch of the trailer was onto the ball. So when it goes down there's a clip on the side and whoever put it on hadn't obviously secured that properly and put it down so it locks on but Darran then drove off and he braked, for whatever reason, and the trailer jumped up and smashed into the back of the truck. Now, it's the driver's responsibility to check all stowed loads and secure the load, no matter what it is. It doesn't matter if it's a truck, anything, a car. That's the law. And Darran didn't do that. ... Darran and I had a chat about that and we had a talk to see -- look, man, why did you not do this. Darran got very agitated. He didn't get angry that time. He didn't do that now but [GIBBONS] did get very agitated and didn't like the thought that he had done something else wrong but that was, you know, that started to raise a flag for me and that was when I started to make the decision that he wasn't a right fit for the business." ...

Darran's performance during his employment made me feel that he was unsuitable for manual civil construction work because he had to be told how to do tasks even though they had previously been taught to him. ... Darran also had poor attitude when he was told what to do and gave me the impression that he felt like an expert once he has completed a task and did not need guidance from other employees. ... It is my opinion that Darran did not show any initiative during his employment which is important for the team to be able to work together well given the nature of the construction industry. As an example, for our trenching work to lay down conduits, employees are expected to unload equipment, get tools ready, and clean up debris and waste after the work is finalised. On numerous occasions, I had to specifically tell Darran to perform these tasks as he would be standing around doing nothing. ...

On 17 May 2018 at the Fig Tree Pocket worksite, Darran informed me and Andrew in the morning that he wanted to go to the toilet right after work had commenced. I recommended that Darran should try and use the toilet before work because all employees need to be able to start at the same time in order to avoid bottlenecks in the work. I told him that it might take some time to get into the rhythm of using the toilet before work. It is my opinion that Darran had to use the toilet a lot and I would consider them excessive. ... After the discussions with Darran, he left the site to go to the toilet after getting authorisation from Chris. ... I left the site shortly as well in order to meet a Downer supervisor for a job site approximately 2km away from the Fig Tree Pocket worksite. I saw Darran driving past and assumed that he was heading to the toilet. I subsequently learned that he was going home as he had enough of work and was not coming back. I received a call from Brendan informing me that Darran had driven off with his bag. Brendan managed to speak to Darran and talking him into coming back and staying at work. After Darran returned to work, he advised that he was not quite with it due to a recent death in the family. I therefore requested that he take 2 days off in order to help him recover from his loss. I was understandably frustrated with Darran because he had taken a work vehicle containing tools and the property of another employee, however I did not suggest that Darran should be sacked. ...

"I recall an incident where Darran was 'spotting' for me whilst I was operating plant equipment This is an important measure of workplace health and safety to ensure that no worker is injured. At some point, Darren had wandered off to take a personal call whilst he was spotting for me. I noticed that Darran had wandered off and therefore made a decision to stop working given that it is a serious breach of workplace health safety if I continued to operate plant equipment without a spotter. After waiting for an extended period of time for Darran to return, I asked a junior employee (in terms of age) to ask Darran to finish his call as soon as possible and to return. I explained to the junior employee that I could not resume work without Darran being present and that Darran was delaying the work. When the junior employee spoke to Darren, Darran immediately abused the junior employee using all manner of expletives and yelling that the junior employee 'could not tell him what to do' and further stated that 'you are just a fucking junior, you are at least 15 years younger than me, fuck off.". ...

What time of the day was this? We were there pretty well most of the day, off the top of my head. We were there pretty well all day because there was quite an extensive site. So there were works completed in that vicinity over a number of days. But on this specific day, we had to do this one connection going in under the house. And we had driveways on this and driveways on that side, so it there was a tree there. It was quite a restricted site. I had asked Darran to work that day as the spotter for the machine. I should also mention my role is to basically operate the excavator. So I'm on the machine, operating the excavator. Darran was asked to be the spotter, which involves watching carefully the bucket going through the ground to avoid existing services, etcetera, etcetera. So that's what he was asked to do, but that's not what he did. For reasons unknown, he decided he was going to make up this fabrication of fittings and pipe and that's the genesis of the argument. The fact that Darran didn't follow instructions. ...

In my view, Darran had an arrogant attitude and believed that he was always better than other employees, and constantly challenged instructions and directions in a demeaning and undermining way. Whenever I personally gave instructions to him, he regularly questioned me stating 'why am I doing this' and 'why wasn't another employee doing this"? ... Darran gave me an impression that be thought himself as being better than other employees, even in circumstances where the other employees had much more experience. Darran was constantly going off and doing tasks at his own whim, which is frustrating for me as a supervisor given that I have to co-ordinate the tasks performed by employees so that we can complete work in a timely manner.

The primary way I tried to manage Darran's attitude was to be as clear and concise in my directions and requirements for the work each day. We have a pre-start 'toolbox meeting' each day and I use this opportunity to outline tasks and hazards and how I would like the tasks to be carried out. I also ask for any comments and suggestions from the employees invite them to put their views forward to me.

Given that I always outlined the tasks for each day, I do not consider it plausible that Darran did not know the expectations of [C&M] in terms of his duties and performance requirements. For the majority of the time I worked with Darran, all of the discussions I had regarding work performance were done in a group environment and I did not single out Darran or identify an individual. As mentioned previously in my affidavit, I also avoided private one to one interactions with Darran as much as possible.

It appeared to me that Darran resented my authority as his supervisor and saw himself as somehow superior to me which was bizarre. It is my opinion that be took every opportunity to undermine me, question me in a negative manner or simply disregard the instructions I gave him. Effectively, I consider that Darran's conduct was insubordination.

In order to make everyone's life a bit easier, there were many instances on site where I re-organised the work of other employees around what Darran had decided he would do for the day, just to ensure peace between everyone. Other times, I would direct Darran to perform tasks that were away from the immediate work site to ensure that he would not constantly criticise other employees. ...

... 4 June 2018 ... He come up and he said to me "I'm religious". I said "that doesn't matter" and he said to me, "I'm a Jehovah's Witness." And I said, "Mate, I don't care if you're black, white, yellow, blue, pink, purple stripes. I just need you to dig." ...

The evidence of Aiken where he said that [GIBBONS] had approached him on 4 June 2018 and said "I'm religious", is consistent with what the Court finds was [GIBBONS] having an attitude that his expressed religious [WATCHTOWER] belief warranted his being treated differently, and deferentially, by his employer, his supervisors, and his fellow employees. ...

The Court finds that the reason why the applicant did not "fit in" with others employed by C&M, consistent as it was with the evidence of Aiken, was [GIBBONS] own rigid lack of resilience, and sense of self-importance, in what was otherwise an egalitarian and fair work place.

The Court does not accept that the applicant was discriminated against in the course of his employment, either because of his religion, or for any other reason. The Court additionally finds that the applicant did not endear himself to his fellow workers, or to Nicholls, Grieco or Aiken, because of his lack of willingness to either follow instructions, or perform work in a competent and safe way. [GIBBON's] poor work performance, lack of attention to detail and unpreparedness to follow instructions meant that others had to work harder to get jobs done. That necessarily led to resentment toward the applicant by those people working with him. ...

The court does not accept that either Aiken, Grieco, Nicholls, or any other employee in a management role at C&M, either knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of any conduct on the part of any employee which constituted religious vilification, religious discrimination or verbal bullying of the applicant, as alleged by him, during the course of his employment. The Court accepts the evidence of Aiken that the applicant was treated no differently to other employees of different race, gender and religion who were employed by C&M at the same time as the applicant. The Court does not accept that the applicant was treated differently from any other employee by reason of his particular religious attribute.

The court does not accept that crude language or swear words which may have been overheard by the applicant during the course of his employment with C&M (as distasteful as they may have been) were, objectively, so contextually or culturally offensive as to constitute bullying behaviour or discrimination in the workplace. One example is the alleged suggestion made to the applicant that he should "shit before work". Though the Court accepts that that was never said to the applicant, even if it had been said, it would not constitute language discriminatory of the applicant. It was the type of unseemly yet ubiquitous language which the Court finds would commonly be directed (in workplaces such as C&M's) to any employee who regularly sought to excuse himself or herself from a site in order to attend to their personal toileting needs, irrespective of whether its use was intended to convey to the employee that they would be shirking their work responsibilities in doing so or not. Crude language or swear words were said by the applicant to be used soon after he commenced employment with C&M, yet the Court notes that that the applicant continued on in his employment, notwithstanding the alleged use of such language, without his making any contemporaneous first complaint in respect of such language, and before he allegedly made any complaint in that regard.

The Decision to Terminate the Applicant's Employment

The Fig Tree Pocket incident involving [GIBBONS] leaving the worksite in a company vehicle occurred on 16 May 2018. From that time until the date of termination of employment on 12 June 2018, there had been ongoing incidents of poor work performance on the part of the applicant. The unchallenged evidence of [coworker and supervisor] Grieco and Nicholls is testament to that. Aiken was an impressive witness. He presented very much as a practical individual who tried to get the best out of each of his employees for the benefit of both the employees and C&M. Nicholls and Grieco were each frustrated by [GIBBONS] inability to follow instructions, or competently carry out tasks. Aiken personally witnessed the applicant's poor work performance and ultimately properly concluded that he was a danger on site.

Where possible, Aiken tried to help the applicant by personally coaching him. By 12 June 2018, Aiken believed that the applicant was unsuited to the type of construction work required of him at C&M. The Court finds that the abuse directed by the applicant to Aiken personally on 12 June 2018 was the final straw.

The Court accepts the evidence of Aiken that the operative reasons for the termination of [GIBBONS] employment on 12 June 2018 were [GIBBONS] poor work performance, his unpreparedness to follow instructions which gave rise to on-site safety concerns, and his verbally aggressive and abusive conduct, both to Aiken and to C&M's other employees, during the course of his employment. The concession on the part of Aiken that the applicant made two (2) complaints to him -- namely the complaint in relation to toilet breaks, and the complaint about Nicholls's attitude to the applicant -- was a reflection of how Aiken was honest in giving answers asked of him. The Court finds that the making of those two complaints did not motivate Aiken to terminate the applicant's employment. Those complaints were made prior to the particularly egregious and unacceptable conduct of the applicant on 11 and 12 June 2018.

Findings: The Court finds that the respondents did not discriminate against the applicant in contravention of the provisions of s. 351 of the FWA. The Court finds that the respondents have discharged their onus and have rebutted the presumption in s. 361 of the FWA that the applicant's termination of employment was adverse action for a prohibited reason. The applicant's claims as pleaded in the ASOC are dismissed.


SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION v. STEVEN JONES is an ongoing 2002-20 Pennsylvania federal social security disability case which involves a Jehovah's Witness Minister living in the Philadelphia area. Steven Jones worked as a maintenance custodian for the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). In September 2001, Jones fell about 10 feet through an open grate and sustained multiple injuries described in an approved stipulation as sprain/strains of the right ankle and cervical spine region, low back pain, and discomfort in both shoulders.

In a February 2006 decision, the WCJ determined that all work-related disability of the right ankle, right knee, and low back ceased as of November 2004. However, it also determined that Jones remained totally disabled from symptoms related to his cervical spine and shoulder conditions.

In a November 2011 decision, the WCJ modified Jones' benefits to a 500-week period of partial disability based on an impairment rating evaluation of 35%.

In April 2015, the WCJ issued a decision denying Employer's termination, suspension and modification petitions based on a finding that Jones' symptoms related to cervical spine and shoulders continued and prevented him from returning to work in more than a light-duty capacity.

In May 2017, Employer filed a new termination petition alleging Steven Jones had fully recovered from his work-related injuries as of March 2, 2017, based on an independent medical examination. Ultimately, the IME Physician executed an affidavit of full recovery.

In July 2017, Jones filed a reinstatement petition seeking to modify his benefits from partial disability to ongoing total disability.Employer submitted into evidence a surveillance summary and video of surveillance conducted in July 2017. Surveillance observed Jones lifting and carrying recycling and trash cans to his neighbor's porch and side yard. A photo showed Jones lifting the recycling bin over his head with his left arm. Later in July 2017, Investigator observed Jones, a Jehovah's Witness, standing on a corner talking to others before entering a vehicle with others and returning to Kingdom Hall, their place of worship. Investigator also observed Jones pulling a large suitcase and setting up what appeared to be a portable display of pamphlets. Jones moved without restriction and gestured using his hands and arms.

Regarding the surveillance evidence, Steven Jones acknowledged lifting a recycling bin weighing 5 to 10 pounds. Jones also admitted that he drives his brother's car. As a Jehovah's Witness, Jones participates in activities three to four times a week. His duties also include pulling a briefcase or cart. Sometimes, Jones carries a shoulder bag with pamphlets and a tablet. Ultimately, the WCJ found credible Jones' testimony regarding his participation in weekly activities as a Jehovah's Witness.

However, based on IME Physician's testimony, the WCJ rejected Jones' testimony concerning his ongoing symptomatology and its impact on his ability to return to work. The WCJ rejected Jones' Physician's testimony that Claimant's condition remained unchanged despite over a decade of treatment. To the contrary, the WCJ found that Jones' Physician's lack of findings undermined his opinions and that Jones' complaints of a lack of range of motion and pain were purely subjective. In short, the WCJ found Jones' Physician's testimony "less than compelling" because his disagreement with IME Physician's testimony was based on Jones continued subjective complaints of pain.

The WCJ further found that IME Physician thoroughly examined Jones and reviewed his medical records for the last 10 years. The WCJ found particularly significant the lack of any objective findings on either examination or tests performed that would support a finding of ongoing disability. The WCJ also noted IME Physician's compelling testimony that Jones was not in need of a step-down program to wean him off Tramadol, an opioid medication. Therefore, the WCJ concluded that drug rehabilitation was unnecessary.

Summarizing, the WCJ found that IME Physician's opinions of full recovery and ability to return to work were supported by the objectively normal results of Jones physical examination. The WCJ also credited IME Physician's testimony that Jones did not exhibit spasm upon examination of the cervical spine as he had in the past. Accordingly, the WCJ granted Employer's termination petition effective March 2, 2017. The WCJ also denied Jones' two UR review petitions on the basis that all medical treatment subject to UR review, rendered after Jones' full recovery in March 2017, post-dated his full recovery, thereby rendering the UR review petitions moot.

On appeal, the Workers Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. The Board noted that IME Physician's testimony of full recovery provided substantial, competent evidence to support the WCJ's grant of Employer's termination petition. On further appeal, in 2019, the Board's decision was affirmed in Pennsylvania state court.


EDWARD ANTHONY ALBERES v. B.F. GOODRICH CORPORATION ET AL was a 2008-14 Louisiana workers compensation related lawsuit filed by a 70 year-old Jehovah's Witness Minister named Edward A. Alberes, who allegedly had contracted asbestosis during his lifetime of working multiple different construction jobs for several different employers from the time that he was 15 years old until he was 68 years old. Looking for any defendant with deep pockets to compensate him for his alleged asbestosis, B.F. GOODRICH CORPORATION ended up being one of such defendants named in this lawsuit, despite the fact that Ed Alberes apparently was never employed by B.F. GOODRICH CORPORATION.

Instead, Edward Alberes claimed that he had been employed by Anco Insulations, Inc., whom GOODRICH had hired to install insulation at one of GOODRICH's facilities in Louisiana. Although Alberes claimed that he had worked as a pipefitter's helper for ANCO at the GOODRICH plant for FIVE DAYS, Alberes could not even remember when such had occurred. Alberes ballparked the date as "in the late 1970's or early 1980's".

Alberes further claimed that he specifically could remember his duties, including the removal of old and installation of new GARLOCK brand gaskets on certain machinery -- which were alleged to contain asbestos. Alberes also claimed that his job duties during that FIVE DAY job included the cleaning up of old insulation (no claim that such contained asbestos) removed by other employees of ANCO.

Edward Alberes lawsuit also alleged that GOODRICH assigned one or more of its own employees to oversee ANCO's installation work, and due to such, GOODRICH had a duty to advise Alberes and other ANCO employees that they needed to wear proper PPE, and that GOODRICH even had a duty to provide such PPE.

The Louisiana trial court granted Goodrich's motion for summary dismissal given that Alberes' alleged exposure to asbestos at the GOODRICH plant was for a mere FIVE DAYS out of a claimed 53 years of working multiple different jobs for multiple different construction employers, and thus could not have constituted the required "substantial contributing factor" to the development of Alberes' alleged asbestosis. However, the Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed that decision stating that such was a matter to be determined by a trier of fact. Outcome unknown, but what this decision probably meant was that GOODRICH likely was forced to "settle" with Alberes. Edward Alberes, of Belle Rose, Louisiana, died "prematurely" in 2017, at the age of 79.


TINA R. CONCEPCION v. CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL was a 2015-16 New York federal employment discrimination lawsuit filed by a female African-American Jehovah's Witness named Tina Concepcion, age 49, who currently is a Level I Procurement Analyst with the NYC Department of Transportation, since 2008. Concepcion alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of her African-American race, gender, national origin, age, color, Jehovah's Witness religion, and disability, and that she was retaliated against for her complaints, in violation of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. Concepcion filed an EEO complaint with NYCDOT in June 2014, filed a federal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in November 2014, and filed this federal lawsuit in March 2015.

In January 2016, the USDC summarily dismissed with prejudice ALL of Concepcion's federal claims, but dismissed without prejudice her state claims given that state court is the more appropriate forum. The USDC opinion was lengthy, but we are including some scattered excerpts which seem to highlight this case:

"Concepcion alleges that she has been denied a promotion, training, performance evaluations, the opportunity to work overtime hours, Family Medical Leave Act ... time, a workers' compensation grant, and reasonable accommodation for her disabilities. ... Concepcion has never heard any disparaging comments about her race, ethnicity, gender, age, disability or religion at work. ... Her only proof of discrimination is that she was not promoted or given training.

"Concepcion's alleged disabilities are to her back, neck, right hip, legs, hands and right arm. ... Concepcion's EEOC complaint identifies her disability as 'limited mobility-back, walking, lifting.' ... Beyond the bare allegations in her complaint, and testimony that her various disabilities cause pain ..., Concepcion has presented little evidence as to what her impairment is, or how it substantially limits a major life activity. Notes from Concepcion's doctor, Dr. Patel, indicate that Concepcion's disability 'requires' use of 'a private automobile for transportation.' ... Dr. Patel indicated that Concepcion has 'painful ambulation' and could walk for only five minutes before she would require a rest. ... Dr. Patel noted that Concepcion 'cannot stand or walk for periods of time deemed "normal."' ... Concepcion's [own] testimony, however, contradicts Dr. Patel's findings. ... (to relieve her hip pain Concepcion gets 'up to walk'); ... (Concepcion does not need her cane every day to assist with walking); ... (Concepcion walks twenty blocks to and from her parking space each day). ... .

"The City further asserts that under the Rules of the City of New York, Concepcion is not eligible for a disability parking permit because her ailments do not 'qualify under any of the categories of conditions which constitute "a permanent disability seriously impairing mobility."' ... the DOHMH doctor who assessed Concepcion's eligibility determined on July 30, 2014 that Concepcion was not eligible for a disability parking permit for that very reason.

"Concepcion asserts that a March 24, 2015 fine imposed for her failure to timely report a June 19, 2013 arrest to the DOT ... also was retaliatory ... .

"Concepcion similarly asserts that the 'agency reported to Advocate office various unjust complaints, tried numerous times to terminate [her].' ... Concepcion's own submissions are replete with examples of occasions on which she was reprimanded by her supervisor. ... (8/15/12 reprimand for failure to follow time sheet protocol); ... (10/3/13 reprimand for 'perpetual lateness'); ... (8/7/13 reprimand for 'harsh and unprofessional verbal insult'). ... Concepcion asserts that this 'work place harassment and retaliation' ... is due to the fact that she signed her 2013 performance evaluation 'in protest' ... ."

See also:

TINA R. CONCEPCION v. NYC POLICE DEPARTMENT, NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL is an ongoing 2015-16 New York federal lawsuit. Filings appear to indicate that this lawsuit relates to the arrest of Concepcion's son at Curtis High School in February 2015.

TINA R. CONCEPCION v. JP MORGAN CHASE ET AL is an ongoing 2015-16 New York federal lawsuit. Filings appear to indicate that this lawsuit relates to the financing of Concepcion's Staten Island condominium.


CLARINDA LOUISE JOHNSTON v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION was a 2014-15 California federal court case in which an African-American Jehovah's Witness named Clarinda L. Johnston, age 56, sought reversal of the SSA's denial of her 2005 application for physical disability benefits. (Johnston's application apparently did not include any claim of "mental" disability despite the fact that Clarinda Johnston testified that she had been psychiatrically hospitalized "three or four times" since 1990.) The USDC affirmed the SSA's decision, stating in part:

The [Administrative Law Judge] found plaintiff's subjective complaints less than fully credible. He concluded that plaintiff's subjective complaints of totally disabling neck and back pain, headaches, and anxiety were not fully corroborated by the objective medical evidence. ...

The ALJ also noted that some of plaintiff's admitted daily activities undermined the credibility of her subjective complaints. During the December 2012 hearing, plaintiff testified that she was a Jehovah's Witness. She said that she still attended meetings, although she "missed a lot," that she had been doing door-to-door witnessing regularly (three times a week for about three hours a day) during the alleged disability period and had only stopped doing it regularly about nine months earlier, and currently did phone witnessing when she felt up to it. ... She watched television, went shopping twice a month with her husband, and drove to one of the hearings. ... Although those activities are not necessarily transferable to a work setting, they are "grounds for discrediting [plaintiff's] testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment." ... .


JOSEPH E. DUNCAN v. CIGNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK was a 2010-13 New York federal lawsuit filed pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), alleging that CIGNA failed to pay him long-term disability benefits for a knee injury under an employee welfare benefit plan. CIGNA's motion for summary judgment was granted in December 2011. In a de novo review, the USCA affirmed in January 2013, holding that "there is substantial evidence to support CLICNY's denial of benefits."

In part, Joseph Duncan alleged that CIGNA violated his rights to religious freedom by conducting surveillance on Duncan's ministering activities as a Jehovah's Witness. The USCA held, in part:

"Finally, Duncan alleges that CLICNY violated his religious freedom by "target[ing]" his religious activities. Duncan fails to allege that CLICNY is a state actor, and in any case, conducting surveillance while Duncan performed his pastoral duties as a Jehovah's Witness did not violate his religious freedom. CLICNY's focus was not on Duncan's religious activities, but rather on his ability to walk for prolonged periods, carry items, and drive longer distances. The surveillance videos show far more than the periodic church attendance at issue ... ."


CROWN v. BARTOSZ GAJEWSKI are ongoing 2009-13 Ontario, Canada criminal case and mental capacity proceedings which involves a mentally ill Jehovah's Witness suffering from "persecutory delusion" disorder (surprise, surprise). Bartosz Gajewski is a 42 year-old, unmarried male who immigrated to Canada from Poland, in 1989, when he was 18. In the early 2000s, BG began to exhibit behaviors which resulted in his mother and brother filing for involuntary commitment and assessments at least twice. These events led to an estrangement between BG and his family.

In December 2002, the 31 year-old BG, who had been employed as a cabinet maker for several years, began performing a series of renovations at the home of his employer. It was during these renovations that BG bcame acquainted with the employer's daughter, Katherine Newman. By August 2003, BG had formed the false impression that Katherine Newman was romantically interested in him. As a result of this delusional belief, BG requested that KN arrange for him to speak to her father, without specifying the nature of his concerns. KN's father telephoned BG, who informed father that KN was interested in a romantic relationship with him, but he was not interested in her. Without knowing exactly what KN's father said back to BG, we do know that BG quit his job shortly after that telephone conversation. In September 2003, BG again contacted KN, and demanded that she stop "doing what she was doing". BG was thereafter charged with criminal harassment and threatening death. In November 2003, BG was involuntarily admitted to a psychiatric facility based on testimony from his JW mother and brother. They indicated that BG had begun stalking KN. BG refused treatment.

In March 2004, the September 2003 charges were withdrawn when BG entered into a Peace Bond for one year. BG promised not to have any contact with KN, or her father, or to return to his former place of employment. In September 2004, BG appeared before a Justice of the Peace and unsuccessfully sought to press charges against KN, her father, and 16 other "co-conspirators". BG testified that, in 2002, KN fell in love with him and started a vicious circle of control that she tried to exercise over BG by infiltrating every part of his life -- financial, family, religious, etc. BG claimed that KN started studying the Bible with Jehovah's Witnesses, and had tried to forcefully bring BG back into the "Christian congregation". BG testified that he had written a number of letters to the RCMP, the Crown Attorney's Office, and others, informing them of what happened, and that he had been falsely accused and prosecuted without any reason.

In 2007, BG received notice of garnishment for tax arrears of $22,000,00, plus interest and penalties. BG believed that KN, her father, and others had somehow conspired to trigger the garnishment for taxes, which BG did not believe that he owed. In September 2009, BG began to take action against KN for what he perceived to be her involvement in falsehoods leading to the 2007 tax assessment. BG studied the Criminal Code and decided that his only alternative was to arrest KN himself (BG believed the police were also participants in the conspiracy against him), and to provide the evidence necessary to exonerate him on the tax arrears.

In September 2009, BG went to KN's home, where he waited until she arrived home. BG pulled KN out of her car, and dragged KN and her business partner, who was trying to rescue KN, about 130 feet down the street to his parked car -- all the while proclaiming that he was placing her under "citizen's arrest" pursuant to the Criminal Code and in the name of "Jehovah God". BG was stopped by police who had been called by neighbors. The police later found duct tape, nylon ties, and an Exacto blade when they searched his home -- where BG had planned on detaining KN until he could turn her over to authorities. Interestingly, after his arrest, BG contacted an unknown Jehovah's Witness in an attempt to have them remove certain items from his apartment. During his later assessments, BG also seemed to indicated that he had discussed with a "brother" his plans on making the "citizen's arrest", and had been warned to be careful.

At a January 2011 criminal proceeding, BG pled guilty to assaulting Katherine Newman and attempting to kidnap her with intent to cause her to be imprisoned against her will, and was convicted for such. However, BG's mental capacity was assessed and he was found not criminally responsible for his actions due to mental illness. BG was thereafter held in the minimum security rehabilitation unit at a Toronto psychiatric facility. BG's attending physician also found him incapable to consent to certain treatment. After a 2012 mental capacity hearing, the Ontario Review Board ruled that, "Mr. BG's fixed, false beliefs that Jehovah would intervene to prove the diagnosis of mental disorder false, and that Ms.KN deserved punishment, acted in concert to prevent Mr. BG from either understanding relevant information about treatment, or applying it to his own circumstances. He viewed the world through the lens of his mental disorder, the nature of which prevented him from passing either of the branches of the test for capacity to consent to treatment. ... For the foregoing reasons, I upheld the finding that he was incapable of consenting or refusing consent to treatment with anti-psychotic medications, both orally and by injection." Appeals relating to BG's mental capacity and his treatment continue.

2016 UPDATE: BG has been institutionalized since 2011 at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health. BG has continuously fought such in the courts. For most of his time at CAMH, BG refused to take anti-psychotic medications or participate in rehabilitative programs. BG denied having a mental illness and told doctors he believed he was being held without cause and would eventually be "vindicated" (a common term used by Jehovah's Witnesses who have all been taught that JWs -- both as a group and as individuals -- suffer various forms of persecution which need "vindicating".) In May 2015, BG told a psychiatrist that "the Newmans are hiding stuff ... . In time Jehovah will uncover their wickedness." Despite such, starting in mid-2015, BG has been permitted to spend 8 hours per day outside at his JW Mother's home., and CAMH is even recommending that beginning in mid-2016 that BG be granted full-time supervised release.


PATRICIA BLEDSOE v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH was a 2010 Tennessee federal court case. An African-American female Jehovah's Witness Employee, named Patricia Bledsoe, alleged failure to promote (racial), hostile work environment (including because of her religious beliefs), and retaliation against her state government employer, for whom she worked as a secretary from 2000 until 2009. Pat Bledsoe also alleged additional claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Tennessee law.

The USDC granted Tennessee's motion for Summary Judgment on all federal law claims, and dismissed the associated state law claims. The lengthy USDC opinion notes, in part:

Scott Lindsey ... was assigned by the Tennessee Department of Mental Health to investigate Plaintiff's complaints about unlawful discriminatory practices at MMHI. ... Lindsey is an African-American male. ... According to Lindsey's report, there were four Administrative Assistants 1 appointed or promoted since Ventura and Slate were hired in October 2003 and February 2004 ... . Three of the four were African-Americans like Plaintiff. ... ... ...

... On March 17, 2006, Plaintiff received a written disciplinary warning for breaching employee confidentiality by showing another MMHI employee her employee performance review before the other employee's supervisor had shown it to her. ... Plaintiff initially lied to Slate and claimed that the fellow employee accidentally noticed the review on Plaintiff's desk. ... Slate found Plaintiff's dishonesty regarding the incident to be disturbing. ... Then on September 25, 2008, Plaintiff admitted that she was sleeping while at work and was issued a written warning by her supervisor Lisa A. Daniel. ...

In a separate disciplinary matter, Slate admonished Plaintiff for selling stolen cigarettes off the back dock of MMHI, which Plaintiff admitted and apologized. ... Plaintiff states that she only reported another person who was selling and denies that she was selling the cigarettes. However, Plaintiff later admits that Ventura advised her not to sell cigarettes on MMHI grounds as that was in violation of the "no solicitation" policy of the hospital. In another incident, Slate counseled Plaintiff for selling perfume at work, which she also admitted and apologized. ...

Plaintiff has a history of substance abuse. As of August 2007, Plaintiff had received treatment for alcohol abuse nine times. ... For example, in October 2002, Plaintiff was treated at the Memphis Veterans Administration Medical Center ... for a relapse of alcohol abuse and crack usage after two years of sobriety. ...

Plaintiff also has history of psychiatric problems. Plaintiff was first diagnosed with mental health issues in August 2007. ... During an inpatient admission, Plaintiff was diagnosed with generalized severe anxiety, depression, and substance abuse of alcohol and crack cocaine. ... Plaintiff continued to experience problems in 2008. On October 8, 2008, Plaintiff was admitted to the VAMC after experiencing suicidal thoughts and ingesting ten Tylenol tablets. ... At that time, Plaintiff reported regularly ingesting large amounts of BC powder, drinking a quart or more of beer daily, and smoking crack as often a she could buy it, which was daily by that time. ... Also at that time, Plaintiff was unstable and had been off of her psychiatric medications and had not seen her physicians for six months. ... Plaintiff reported that the source of her stress was dealing with a cancer diagnosis in the family, coping with a death in the family, and job and marriage issues. ... Nursing notes from Plaintiff's October 2008 hospital stay described Plaintiff as "somewhat delusional and paranoid." ... Plaintiff's history, as she reported it during her October 2008 admission, included mental and verbal abuse; an attempted rape while in the Army from 1979 to 1982; alcohol, cocaine and marijuana abuse; workplace conflict; and concern for her two sons. ... Plaintiff believed that this combination of stressors led to her suicide attempt. ... In December 2008 Plaintiff informed her supervisor that her thinking was confused and that she was paranoid and afraid. ... ... ...


DEAN CARYDAKIS v. TRANSPORT ACCIDENT COMMISSION was a 2005 Australia administrative tribunal proceeding which involved a 23 years-old "disabled" Jehovah's Witness named Dean Carydakis. This proceeding related to Carydakis's disability status and inability to return to gainful employment as the result of two auto accidents -- one in November 2000, when he was 18 years-old, and the second in December 2001, when he was 19 years-old.

At this proceeding, Dean Carydakis was appealing two previous Commission decisions. In October 2002, Carydakis was advised that his entitlement to loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity benefits would cease in December 2002, on the basis that the Commission considered that he was fit to return to his pre-accident employment duties. In January 2003, the Commission had informed Carydakis that his entitlement to physiotherapy, chiropractic or osteopathic treatments would cease in January 2003. In April 2005, the Tribunal remanded the Commission's 2002 decision for re-consideration, but affirmed the 2003 decision.

In making these decisions, the Tribunal documented several "interesting" facts and observations. One was that while Carydakis had made no attempt to return to employment, Carydakis had gotten married and had managed to father three children since April 2002. Additionally, Carydakis still managed to regularly attend his local Kingdom Hall, as well as perform door-to-door visitations. In fact, Carydakis was video surveilled on two days in November 2002. However, Carydakis spotted the investigator, and even waved to him. That November 2002 footage showed Carydakis "limping and hip-clutching". Followup video surveillance was conducted 18 months later in May and June 2004. That footage showed Carydakis "walking normally, getting in and out of cars, and by the time of his visit to the Kingdom Hall on 13 June 2004, he was positively sprightly."


ELLIS LEATON v. NAVAJO REFINERY is a still ongoing 2010 New Mexico federal court case in which the defendant's motion for Summary Judgment was denied. Ellis Leaton, a Hispanic Jehovah's Witness, was employed by defendant as a refinery worker from 1998 until November 2007, when Leaton was terminated.

During his nine years of employment with Navajo Refining, Plaintiff progressed from an entry level position to manning one of the refinery's control boards as a "B Operator". Plaintiff was diagnosed with diabetes in 2001, which affected his ability to work, sleep and walk. In 2003 and 2004, during his time as a "C Operator", Plaintiff was counseled for several incidents involving over-pressuring and flaring. In response to these incidents, Defendant offered Plaintiff counseling and medical evaluation and, in 2005, Plaintiff took three months of paid medical leave for treatment of his diabetes. After returning from leave, Plaintiff began training for a promotion to B Operator, which he completed in August 2005. However, because of an incident involving the improper opening of a valve, which constituted a safety violation, he was placed on probation for six months.

In November 2006, Plaintiff was promoted to B Operator. Soon thereafter, on December 28, 2006, Plaintiff received a written reprimand for sleeping on the job. Plaintiff provided medical documentation to support that his medical condition and medicine was a contributing factor, and that he was required to work a sixteen hour shift on that day. On February 28, 2007, Plaintiff received a ten-day suspension for sleeping on the job, and other performance issues involving carelessness, unsatisfactory work quality, and rudeness to other employees. As a result of these issues, Plaintiff received a last and final warning.

On May 22, 2007, as a result of mediation of his grievance over that disciplinary action, Defendant agreed to remove the disciplinary action from his record as long as he did not violate any other work rules in the next two years. In June and July 2007, Plaintiff took paid leave to undergo stomach bypass surgery, which he felt would improve his health and work performance, including making sleeping on the job less likely.

Plaintiff returned to work as a B Operator in August 2007. On October 8, 2007, while Plaintiff was operating the control board, a tower became over-pressured and released a flare. Although alarms were sounding to indicate the unsafe condition, Plaintiff made no adjustments, and an A Operator had to take over the control board and reduce the pressure. Soon thereafter, on October 20, 2007, another over-pressure incident occurred in which Plaintiff allegedly failed to respond with corrective action. Then, on October 24, 2007, another flaring incident occurred. In this instance, alarms warning of over-pressure had sounded for more than thirty minutes before the flare occurred. Plaintiff was on duty that day, and had relieved another B Operator during the approximate time period that the flaring incident occurred. Plaintiff claims that he was not responsible for this incident, and those responsible were never disciplined. Ostensibly as a result of the three tower flares on October 8, 20, and 24, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave on October 30, 2007, pending review of the incidents. While on administrative leave, Plaintiff made a report of discrimination to Defendant's attorney. Plaintiff claims that immediately thereafter Defendant initiated a "frivolous" investigation against Plaintiff.

On November 20, 2007, while still on administrative leave pending investigation into Plaintiff's response to the three flaring incidents, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with EEOC and the New Mexico Human Rights Bureau based on his national origin (Hispanic), disability (diabetes), and religion (Jehovah Witness).

Ten days after Leaton filed his charge of discrimination, Plaintiff's employment was terminated. Navajo Refining and the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local # 351 had previously executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement covering the terms and conditions of employment for the bargaining unit members. Plaintiff was a member of the bargaining unit. On December 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed a termination grievance with the Union, which was denied on December 10, 2007. Plaintiff appealed this denial, and requested binding arbitration, which was conducted through the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service on September 11, 2009.

While Leaton's appeal was pending, he filed a suit in state court, again alleging discrimination based on national origin, disability, and religion. His state court complaint stated claims for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the New Mexico Human Rights Act, claims for religious discrimination under the NMHRA and Title VII, and national origin discrimination under the NMHRA and Title VII.

Prior to filing his complaint in state court, on June 24, 2008, Plaintiff filed another charge with the EEOC and NMHRB, this time alleging retaliation for filing his earlier charge as well as discrimination based on age. On January 20, 2009, Plaintiff received a Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC based on this second charge. On April 20, 2009, Plaintiff filed his underlying complaint in this action, claiming retaliation and age discrimination.

On September 17, 2009, the state court stayed proceedings in its case pending the arbitrator's decision. On December 2, 2009, the arbitrator issued a decision denying Plaintiff's termination grievance. Specifically, the arbitrator found: (1) no evidence that Defendant's disciplinary action against Plaintiff was based on race, religion, or disability, in part because Plaintiff admittedly presented no evidence of any such discrimination; and (2) that Defendant's "use of progressive discipline in attempts to correct [Plaintiff's] performance deficiencies provided just cause for his termination." On July 9, 2010, the state court granted summary judgment to Defendant, finding that the arbitrator's decision on the race, disability, and religion claims is binding on the parties in state court.


IN RE UNIDENTIFIED CANADIAN JW EMPLOYEE was a 1989-2001 (probably still ongoing) Ontario, Canada worker's compensation administrative proceeding. JW, who had attended school for only about 3-4 years, immigrated from Portugal to Canada in 1986, when he was 27 years-old. In April 1989, JW worked for Employer for all of two months before suffering a lower back strain, which JW claimed was caused by a co-worker. JW never returned to work, and has not been employed since.

JW was awarded a provisional 15% pension for "chronic pain disability" in April 1991, despite the fact that the examining physician described his interview with JW, during which he was able to walk, bend, and squat with little effort, as "colourful", "dramatic", and that JW "was presenting with quite pronounced histrionic features, magnification, overreaction and with pain behaviour". That 15% award was confirmed in 1993, and made permanent in January 1996. In 2000, JW failed in his effort to have his pension increased. In 2001, that decision was upheld on appeal.

At the 2000 hearing, JW claimed that he suffered constant pain of varying intensity. Some days, JW could manage to walk for over an hour, while on other days, he was unable to walk for more than five minutes. JW said that he had become an angry person, and that he has fits of rage with his wife and young children. (Notably, JW somehow managed to father three daughters between 1988 and 1990.) In addition, JW said that he suffered from both anxiety and depression. Daily living activities were somewhat restricted, but JW managed to assist with household chores and meals while his wife worked at her part-time housecleaning job. JW was described as a devout Jehovah's Witness who spent much time reading WatchTower literature, and who regularly attended all three weekly meetings at his local Kingdom Hall. JW even somehow managed to go out in field service once per week.


STATE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS v. EDWARDS was a 1998-2000 case before Missouri's Administrative Hearing Commission. The State Board of Chiropractic Examiners filed a complaint on May 26, 1998, seeking the Commission's determination that Gary F. Edwards' license to practice chiropractic be subject to discipline as a result of Edwards treatment of a patient named Duane Troyer. The Board's allegations included incompetency, gross negligence, misconduct, and practicing medicine.

Gary F. Edwards, was a Jehovah's Witness Chiropractor, who did business in Independence, Missouri, as Edwards Back & Neck Care Center. This case arose out of Gary Edwards' treatment of a Mennonite farmer, named Duane Troyer, starting in April 1990. Apparently, this Jehovah's Witness Chiropractor had developed a relationship of trust with many members of Missouri's Mennonite and Amish communities. Duane Troyer's parents and a grandmother had been patients of Edwards, and they referred Duane to Edwards. In October 1996, The Kansas City Star published an article which explained why many Mennonites and Amish sought out Gary Edwards:

"Medical science has produced many wondrous machines, but none was more alluring to the region's Mennonite or Amish communities than the one in Gary Edwards' Independence chiropractic office. Typically, the patient was ushered into an examining room where the chiropractor talked over any symptoms and then switched on what patients say he called "the Interro" or "the nutrition machine." Several independent accounts produce the same description: a computer screen and keyboard attached by wire to a stubby pencil-shaped probe.

But the machine wasn't used on just anybody. "If a doctor or anybody but the Mennonite families asked about it," said Michelle Moore, who worked briefly for Edwards as a file clerk, "I was to say that it didn't exist." It was a special machine, she said, for special people.

Edwards would touch the probe to points on a patient's hand, acupuncture-style, Amish patients said. Supposedly the Interro detected the body's electrical impulses. The computer software, in theory, measured those impulses to see how well various organs in the body worked. The diagnosis was instant. And completely worthless. The Interro does not work. It can treat nothing. It can make no valid diagnosis."

[Readers interested in the use of "quack" medical devices by Jehovah's Witnesses at WatchTower Society world headquarters, should click HERE.]

Duane Troyer was a hemophiliac who had contracted AIDS from contaminated blood in 1984. When Troyer learned that he was HIV positive, in April 1989, Duane was engaged to be married to fellow Mennonite, Regina Hershberger. Duane and Regina Troyer were married on September 15, 1989. During the period of preparation for their Mennonite wedding, their religious leaders conducted an anointing ceremony, and prayed for Duane to be healed. Although the couple believed that God could heal Duane, they followed all precautions as recommended by Duane's medical doctor. Duane and Regina understood that they must use a condom and contraceptive foam during sex, in order to guard against transmitting the virus to Regina, and that they must take precautions with regard to Duane's blood, and that they would NOT be able to have children.

Duane and Regina Troyer first visited Gary Edwards on April 3, 1990. Duane informed Edwards that he was HIV positive and wanted to know if there was anything that Edwards could do to help him. During that first visit, Edwards did not conduct any physical examination or chiropractic evaluation of Duane, other than the following. Although Edwards had never treated an HIV patient before, Edwards explained the use of his "Interro machine", which was a version of an Electro-Accupuncture According to Voll (EAV) machine, named after Reinhard Voll, the man who pioneered the use of such techniques. Edwards attached a probe to Duane's fingers and toes. The probe was connected to a computer, which measured the electrical energy levels of certain body organ systems. Edwards' version of the Interro was an advanced model that not only diagnosed a patient's problems, but also assisted in the preparation of a homeopathic remedy. Edwards placed a bottle on top of the Interro while operating the machine. The bottle contained distilled water and gin. According to EAV theory, the machine places an electrical charge in the water, and the alcohol is necessary to hold the charge. The charge is meant to correct an electrical imbalance in the body. Edwards gave the bottle to Duane and told him to place 10 drops under his tongue three times per day, after slapping the bottle on the palm of his hand. Based on the Interro's readings, the computer printed a list of suggested vitamin, mineral, and herb supplements, which Edwards also gave to Troyer. Edwards represented to Duane and Regina that the object of his treatment was to bring the body's systems into balance, and allegedly, that his treatment could eradicate the HIV from Duane's body, which Edwards later denied saying.

On May 1, 1990, Duane again visited Edwards' office. Edwards again used the Interro, which indicated improvement, to formulate additional drops and suggest additional supplements. Duane visited Edwards' office again on August 7, 1990. His condition was better than at the previous visit. Duane reported stiffness in his neck and back. Edwards performed a chiropractic adjustment on Duane, used the Interro machine, and gave Duane more drops and supplements. Edwards allegedly stated that he would be able to eradicate the HIV. Regina allegedly asked if she and Duane could have children when Duane's body eradicated the HIV, and if Edwards and his wife would have children if they were in Duane and Regina's position. Edwards allegedly replied that he would proceed to have children if he were in their position because Duane's body had gotten rid of the virus and it was not transmittable to anyone, which Edwards later denied saying.

Duane visited Edwards' office on September 25, 1990. Duane and Regina were moving to Montana at that time. Edwards used the Interro, which indicated that Troyer's body's systems were close to balance, but gave Duane more drops and more supplements. On November 12, 1990, Duane visited Edwards office while he was in Missouri for a short visit to tend his farm. Edwards drew blood for an HIV test and sent it to a lab. Duane returned to Montana. The test showed that Duane remained HIV positive.

Edwards called and reported the test results to Regina Troyer on November 20, 1990, because Duane was en route back to Montana at the time with Regina's parents. Allegedly, Edwards told Regina that the HIV test was negative, and that the HIV could not be transmitted to her. When Duane and Regina's parents arrived in Montana, Regina told them about her conversation with Edwards. Elizabeth Hershberger was skeptical that Duane's HIV had been eradicated. She called Edwards when she returned home to Missouri the first week of December. Edwards allegedly told Elizabeth Hershberger that he was absolutely certain that Duane's HIV had been eradicated, and that Duane could not transmit HIV to Regina, and that if Duane and Regina had a child, the child would be healthy. Allegedly, Edwards also placed a call to Duane's parents' home on November 21, 1990. Duane and Regina never had unprotected sexual relations prior to November 20, 1990. However, based on Edwards telephone calls, the couple believed that it was no longer necessary to practice safe sex.

On August 29, 1991, Duane visited Edwards' office. Edwards used the Interro, which indicated that Troyer's body was nearly in balance, but gave more drops and more supplements. Edwards allegedly stated that the HIV was eradicated. Edwards indicated that Duane should return in 12 months.

Regina Troyer's mother, Elizabeth Hershberger, made two telephone calls to Edwards' office on November 2, 1991. Elizabeth had learned that Regina was pregnant and wanted to find out if Regina would be OK. Edwards made an 11-minute collect call to the Hershberger residence on November 5, 1991. Allegedly, Edwards assured Hershberger that there was no risk to Regina. In her Christmas letter in 1991, Elizabeth announced that Regina was pregnant and that the couple's "homeopathic doctor" said there was no risk from HIV.

Regina Troyer gave birth to a daughter on May 20, 1992. Duane and Regina had moved back to Missouri by that time. Both Regina and the baby tested HIV positive. After the birth of his daughter, Duane's health rapidly deteriorated. At the urging of his parents and grandmother, Duane again visited Edwards' office on July 31, 1992. Edwards drew blood and took a hair sample, and sent them to a lab for analysis. Edwards also did an chiropractic adjustment and diathermy, and gave Duane a supplement. Regina later alleged that she overheard Edwards tell Duane that his illness and symptoms had nothing to do with AIDS.

On August 12, 1992, Duane was admitted to Audrain Medical Center in Mexico, Missouri, and was diagnosed with pneumonia and AIDS. At Duane's request, the hospital released him to go home on August 15, 1992. Later in August 1992, Duane was taken to the hospital in Brookfield, and was then transferred to Columbia. Doctors diagnosed meningitis and a possible tumor in his brain, which were complications of AIDS. Because no treatment would be effective, the doctors sent Duane home to die. Duane Troyer died on September 5, 1992. Regina Troyer and her daughter were still alive as of late 1999, and were receiving medical treatment for their HIV conditions.

Quite interestingly, Duane Troyer's Mennonite father, David Troyer, who had been, and possibly still was, a patient of Gary Edwards, testified in 1999 to his recollection of events back in 1990-1. David Troyer stated that he accompanied Duane and Regina on visits to Edwards' office couple of times. David Troyer stated that he never heard Edwards state that he could cure HIV, and that Edwards stated that he couldn't cure anybody, but he could make their life more pleasant.

The Commission made findings of fact that Gary Edwards represented that: (1) Edwards' treatment could cure HIV/AIDS, (2) Duane Troyer had been cured, and, (3) Duane Troyer's later symptoms had nothing to do with AIDS.

With regard to the Board's charge of "incompetency", the Commission ruled, in part: "By attempting to cure HIV/AIDS, representing that Duane was cured, and failing to recognize that chiropractic was an inadequate and ineffective means for treatment of HIV/AIDS, Edwards demonstrated incompetence."

With regard to the Board's charge of "misconduct", the Commission ruled, in part: "By representing that he could cure HIV/AIDS and that the condition was cured, Edwards committed misconduct." 

With regard to the Board's charge of "gross negligence", the Commission ruled, in part: "Because we have concluded that Edwards acted with wrongful intent rather than with mere recklessness, he is not subject to discipline for gross negligence."

With regard to the Board's charge of "fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonesty", the Commission ruled, in part: "Edwards made false statements in order to make Duane and Regina pay him for the Interro treatments and drops. Further, he did not tell Duane and Regina that the brown bottles contained nothing but gin and water. Therefore, he is subject to discipline for fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonesty."

With regard to the Board's charge of "practicing medicine", the Commission ruled, in part: "... Edwards went beyond providing nutrition by prescribing or administering a medicine and attempting to practice medicine ... ."

In February 2000, Missouri's Administrative Hearing Commissionruled that Gary Edwards could be disciplined by Missouri's State Board of Chiropractic Examiners. In May 2000, the Board revoked Edwards' license to practice chiropractic, with imposition of revocation stayed pending Edwards' successful completion of a two-year suspension and a subsequent five-year probationary period.

However, in April 2002, on appeal from Gary Edwards, the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled that the Board's fact-finding body had erred by not allowing Edwards to have access to certain evidence during the discovery process, and reversed the Commission's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. DECISION. The Board subsequently withdrew its complaint against Edwards when Missouri's Supreme Court refused to hear their appeal on the reverse and remand.


EDWARDS v. GERSTEIN ET AL. Thereafter, Edwards filed a new lawsuit alleging that members of the Missouri Board of Chiropractic Examiners acted with gross negligence during the board's disciplinary proceedings against him, and alleging that a board employee engaged in malicious prosecution during her investigation of claims against Edwards. After venue in the case was moved from Jackson County to Cole County, the circuit court ultimately dismissed Edwards' suit, finding the board members were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and that the board employee was immune from suit under the official immunity and public duty doctrines. Edwards appealed, but lost at the Court of Appeals level in December 2006. However, in October 2007, Missouri's Supreme Court reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on Edwards' charge of "gross negligence", from which the court ruled that the Commission members and employee were not immune (did not mean they were -- just that the charge could be heard). Outcome of any 2008 proceedings unknown.

In August 2010, a Cole County jury ruled in Edward's favor and awarded Edwards $6,284,759.00 against the individual board members. In January 2012, on appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, the the lower court's decision and award was affirmed. Unknown if appealed to Supreme Court of Missouri.


TARR ET AL v. EDWARDS was a 1999 Missouri civil court case. Incomplete details. In May 1999, three females filed a civil lawsuit against the Jehovah's Witness Chiropractor, Gary F. Edwards, alleging inappropriate sexual behavior. Sandra Tarr, a former employee, claimed that Edwards sexually harassed her by touching her, hugging her, kissing her, and rubbing up against her body. Leslie Tuttle and Michelle Brown, both patients of Gary Edwards, alleged that objectionable behavior occurred while they were being treated at Edward's Independence, Missouri chiropractic office. Edwards denied the allegations. Outcome of this civil lawsuit is unknown. Unknown if criminal charges were pursued.


Per the Fall 1997 issue of DME MEDICARE NEWS, a Montgomery County, Pennsylvania Chiropractor, named James N. Roebuck, then age 45, had been "indefinitely" suspended by the federal government from participating in the federal Medicare Insurance Program, effective February 1997. James N. Roebuck, Jr. is the son of well known Jehovah's Witness Chiropractor, James N. Roebuck, Sr., who not only treated JWs throughout the greater Philadelphia area for 40 years, but reportedly was "Chiropractor-to-the-stars" at the International HQs of the WatchTower Bible and Tract Society. Dr. James Roebuck, Sr., died in 1995, while performing services at the WatchTower Society's large Patterson, New York complex. James N. Roebuck, Sr. also traveled for years on behalf of the WatchTower Society, serving as "Chairman's Assistant" and "Purchasing Supervisor" at numerous WatchTower Conventions around the United States. Curiously, when doing PR media interviews at these conventions, Roebuck would "profession-drop" that he was a Chiropractor, but he would then indicate that he was performing various non-medical services at that convention.


On October 26, 2005, an Iranian Jehovah's Witness, named Shokrollah Shafiee, 55, of Naples, Florida, was crushed and died in a construction accident at the Naples Heritage Golf and Country Club, while the 55 year-old man was working as an hourly laborer for a construction firm hired to repair a retaining wall damaged by Hurricane Wilma.

Shokrollah Shafiee, reportedly an Iranian citizen, relocated from Miami to Naples in the mid-1990s, after he supposedly either separated or divorced from his wife, Joyce Shafiee. It is unclear at what point in time that Shokrollah Shafiee became a Jehovah's Witness, but John Waight, a Congregation Elder at the East Naples Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses characterized the hourly construction laborer as "one of our learned individuals", who reportedly had at some point spent one full year as an "Auxiliary Pioneer" doing door-to-door recruiting for the JWs. The hourly construction laborer also was known to be a regular monthly financial supporter of the JWs.

Elder John Waight also reported that Shokrollah Shafiee "kept to himself": "He wasn't a social person. You had to twist his arm to come to dinner." In fact, rather than attending an English-speaking congregation, Shafiee attended one of Naples Spanish-speaking Congregations of Jehovah's Witnesses. At the time of the accident, Shokrollah Shafiee was also attending full-time night classes at a local vocational school, where he studied "Patient Care Technology". Interestingly, the hourly construction laborer was a "straight A student", whom his classmates referred to as "The Professor". Shokrollah Shafiee reportedly had no children, but reportedly did have a brother and possibly other relatives living along Florida's eastern Gold Coast.


PARKER v. VERIZON was a 2007 Pennsylvania federal court decision. In 2007, a Jehovah's Witness Employee, named Raymond Parker, sued his employer, Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc., alleging employment discrimination, in that Verizon discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), by terminating him for exercising his rights under the ADA and the FMLA. Raymond Parker, and his wife, Caulette Parker, also brought a state law claim of "trespass" against Verizon employee Kimberly Onesko, and her husband, George Onesko, for allegedly entering upon Parker's property unlawfully and without consent in September 2006.
Ray Parker was hired as a call center employee in November 2003. In August 2004, Parker was diagnosed with Sarcoidosis, an autoimmune disease that causes inflammation of the lungs, and he was also diagnosed with Pulmonary Fibrosis (formation of scar tissue in the lungs). Parker began his first (of three) short-term disability leaves. In December 2004, Parker returned to the same job at the same number of hours and the same rate of pay. A few days after returning from his first leave, plaintiff began his second short-term disability leave. Prior to plaintiff's return to work in February 2005, Parker's primary care physician sent a letter to Verizon recommending that: (1) Parker be permitted to work a shorter work week and work day; (2) that Parker be assigned work that did not involve talking on the telephone; (3) that Parker's commute be shortened by assignment to a location closer to his home; and (4) that Parker initially work three days per week with one day off in between each day.
In an effort to accommodate Parker, Verizon transferred Parker to a "non-talking" position at the same location, with reduced hours per day. In Spring 2005, Parker requested a transfer to a less physically demanding job, despite the fact that he later testified that the off-line position was not physically demanding. In May 2005, Parker learned that positions in the Greensburg office (location to which he wanted transferred) would be available for those with restrictions that still allowed customer contact, but no sales. Parker's primary care physician thereafter changed Parker's restrictions to allow customer contact with no sales. However, Parker did not receive a transfer. In December 2005, Parker began his third leave of absence and returned to work in February 2006, with restrictions of "no talking" on the telephone, and "no customer contact". Parker and other employees were later transferred to Verizon's Washington, Pennsylvania facility, which was closer to plaintiff's home, for no reasons having to do with Parker.
Beginning in July-August 2006, the Parkers decided to purchase a ranch style modular home, because Parker was allegedly having difficulty climbing stairs in the former residence. While the home was being built, the Parkers resided with their aunt, approximately three blocks from the construction site, where the new residence was being built. On September 14, 2006, Ray Parker called off work at approximately 7:45 a.m. by leaving a message for a Verizon Absence Administrator stating that he was taking an FMLA day, because "he wasn't feeling well". Parker then went to the construction site of the new home. Caulette Parker also took off a half-day of work that same day. On the morning of September 14, 2006, the husband of Ray Parker's manager called his wife at Verizon and told her that he had seen Parker unloading shingles from a van at the construction site. Parker's manager then called an Absence Administrator and told her about what her husband had seen. It was decided that Absence Administrator Kimberly Onesko should perform a home visit.
Onesko drove by the construction site sometime past the noon hour, but she did not see Parker. Onesko then drove to her home to get a camera, where she asked her husband, who was not a Verizon employee, to accompany her on the home visit. The Oneskos returned to the construction site, which was marked with "No Trespassing" signs, and observed Parker inside the garage. After conferring with Verizon Labor Relations Manager Cindy Marinari, Onesko decided to approach Parker. At approximately 5:30 PM,Onesko walked onto the driveway to the Parkers' garage door, which was open. Onesko later prepared notes of her home visit, which stated in part:
"I approached the open garage door area - heard an electric saw being used in the basement area. I called out Ray's name, remaining outside the garage. Ray entered the garage from the basement area. Ray was perspiring and wiping his hands on a rag. At this point the saw stopped running. I told Ray I was aware he had reported off sick using his FMLA certification this morning, and asked him to explain how his absence for his precertified illness related to his performance of construction work on his new home. Ray said he had been sick that morning. At this point his wife entered the garage area from the street. She added that he had diarrhea in the morning. I told Ray that since he was no longer ill, he would be expected to report to work for the remainder of his tour. Verizon's expectation is that when you are too ill to work, you should remain at home, but once you are well, you would report to work. Ray asked what he should do and I advised him it was his decision but that he could choose to report to his work location for the balance of his tour. I also advised Ray that at this point he would not be paid for today's absence, and an investigation will ensue. Ray asked what would happen - I told him this would be investigated under the Code of Conduct. His wife said that he would be contacting the union; she also said Verizon, and me in particular, had been rude to her husband, as well as his doctor's office. She explained this was in reference to a conversation in the past between me and a nurse at his dr. office concerning the wording of his medical restriction. At that point I told Ray that I had nothing further to add today, and I departed."
Mr. Onesko did not get out of the van during the conversation between Onesko and Parker. Neither were ever asked to leave the premises. Parker also alleged that he observed Mr. Onesko on his property with a camera earlier that same day. Parker denied that he performed any work on his new house on September 14, 2006.
On September 15, 2006, Parker was suspended from his employment at Verizon. On September 26, 2006, Parker was discharged from Verizon on the basis that he misrepresented his health condition in violation of Verizon's Code of Business Conduct. In addition to the above events, Parker also alleged that a Verizon manager yelled at him in front of his co-workers when she learned that he had restrictions that prevented him from working on the telephone, in February 2006, and she allegedly tried to force him to resign. Parker also testified that he was denied a scheduled pay raise, and that he was forced to file a grievance in order to receive his pay raise. Parker also alleged that Onesko had sent an email to other decision-makers at Verizon, stating that, "I really hate to send him to the Washington office, because he lives in Bentleyville." (shorter commute for Parker). In November 2007, the USDC granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the ADA and FMLA claims, and the remaining state law "trespassing" claim was dismissed without prejudice. The USDC stated in part:
"Plaintiff has presented no evidence to create a material issue of fact that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination. An adverse employment decision includes an employer's failure to accommodate, reasonably, the employee's disability. ... An employer also has a duty to engage, in good faith, in the 'interactive process', with the employee. ... the evidence presented demonstrates that based upon the letter from plaintiff's treating physician, ... Verizon made several accommodations to plaintiff's schedule and manner of work. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show that defendant failed to engage in 'the interactive process'. In fact, the evidence of the accommodations afforded to plaintiff supports the contrary. ... ... ...
"As to the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas standard, the burden then shifts to Verizon to produce evidence that the plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. ... Given the fact that plaintiff claimed FMLA benefits on the day the investigation ensued and the investigation allegedly revealed that plaintiff was actually working on his new home, the Court finds that Verizon easily met its burden to demonstrate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination - - that is, for violating Verizon's Code of Business Conduct by 'misrepresent[ing] [his] health status'. ... ... ...
"Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his participation in the protected activity (using his FMLA leave) and his termination. In fact, as stated above, there is no dispute that defendant had been accommodating plaintiff's alleged disabilities for approximately two years prior to his termination. Verizon's stated reason for plaintiff's termination was misrepresentation of his health status and plaintiff has failed to point to any credible evidence that exercise of his FMLA rights had any casual connection whatsoever to his discharge. Therefore, plaintiff's claim for retaliation must fail. ...
"... this Court does not find that Verizon in any way interfered with plaintiff's exercise of his benefits under the FMLA. To the contrary, the Court finds that Verizon was more than reasonable in its accommodation of plaintiff's conditions. Plaintiff's claim for FMLA interference necessarily fails."
EDWARDS v. CREOKS MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES was a 2007 Oklahoma federal court decision In August 2005, a Jehovah's Witness, named Dorothy L. Edwards filed a federal lawsuit against her former employer, Creoks Mental Health Services, Inc. Dorothy Edwards alleged that CMHS discriminated against her on the basis of her WatchTower religion, and disability, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Edwards also alleged that CMHS fostered a hostile work environment and retaliated against her after she filed for unemployment benefits. In addition to her federal claims, Edwards also alleged that CMHS was liable for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract.
CMHS is a non-profit corporation that provides mental health services to low-income individuals throughout Northeastern Oklahoma. In April 2004, Edwards entered into a contract with Creoks entitled, "Subcontractor Agreement", which stated that Edwards would provide individual rehabilitation or case management services as an "independent contractor". Edwards had an advanced degree and had performed some prior work in rehabilitation services. The dates and time of services were to be determined based on client need. The "Subcontractor Agreement" further stated that the "services will be delivered and documented in conformance with Creoks policies, procedures, and protocols." Edwards also signed a document entitled "Verification of Creoks Personnel Policies". CMHS also had in place a dispute resolution/grievance procedure. According to this policy, if an employee had a grievance, including alleged discrimination based on religion or disability, the employee should present a written request for formal review by the employee's supervisor. Edwards never filed a written complaint pursuant to this policy.
Edwards performed individual rehabilitation services at CMHS's clients' homes. Edwards wrote her own treatment plans and had control over the methods used to provide the services. She submitted her treatment plans to the CEO for approval. While she was supposed to seek such approval only in the beginning of her employment to "get the swing of things", Edwards claimed that she continued seeking his approval beyond the first few weeks with CMHS. CMHS provided Edwards with paperwork and supplies, but she conducted her treatment work at clients' homes, and completed paperwork at her own home.
Edwards did not disclose to CMHS that she suffers from a "generalized anxiety disorder". According to Edwards, "There was no need to [tell management about my disability]. I needed no accommodations. ... I can do my job, and I can do it well. I have problems within myself, and I have problems when I'm being pressured or whatever." Edwards did disclosed such to another CMHS employee, named Audrey Milton. According to Edwards, Milton then supposedly told other undisclosed CMHS employees that Edwards could not perform her job responsibilities because of her anxiety disorder. Milton supposedly also asked Edwards if she was schizophrenic, and supposedly told Edwards that she thought Edwards had a learning disability.
Edwards also claimed that an "undisclosed person", who Edwards refers to as her "slanderer", called CMHS and made negative comments about her. Edwards does not have any evidence that anyone made such a call; however, she "believes within my heart and soul some ... the information got to [Creoks employees] some kind of way". According to Edwards, the other Creoks' employees turned against her after they heard these allegedly slanderous comments. She argues that, due to the comments by this "slanderer", other CMHS employees stopped assigning clients to Edwards. Edwards later testified, "[The LPCs] didn't choose for me to work with them anymore after hearing all the gossip and the slander that was called in by my slanderers to Creoks." Prior to her termination, Edwards filed a complaint to the licensure board on the ground that the LPCs decision to take her off of their treatment plans was "unprofessional".
Edwards complained that some of her co-employees made disparaging comments about her. Edwards also claimed that "a big issue was made over the fact that I was a Jehovah's Witness." Milton supposedly told Edwards that she was shocked that Edwards was a Jehovah's Witness. Edwards later testified, "I feel it was discriminative [sic] when they even talked about [my religion] negatively".
CMHS claimed that Edwards struggled to perform her duties in accordance with CMHS policies and procedures. In particular, CMHS claimed that Edwards impermissibly taught religion to her clients. Edwards had one client who "was terrified of going to hell, because of the religious teachings she had". Edwards met with CMHS's client and supposedly wrote a treatment plan which involved the client learning what the Bible had to say about "hellfire". Edwards responded that teaching the client how to go to the Bible and form her own opinions about what was true and what was false about "hellfire" did not constitute religious "witnessing". In addition to holding a "Bible study" with CMHS's client, Edwards also took the client with her to meetings at the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. Edwards claimed that, at the time, she did not know it was improper to take a client to a religious meeting.
In November 2004, CMHS's CEO met with Edwards to discuss her alleged infractions of policies and procedures. A written memorandum was given Edwards which set forth specific directives that Edwards was to follow without exception:

(1) You are never to initiate or discuss issues relating to religion with clients.
(2) You are never to transport a client anywhere for any reason, no exception.
(3) You are only to do services of individual rehab with Medicaid clients.
(4) You are not to do any case management services at all ... indefinitely.
(5) No other services but individual rehab Medicaid will be paid to you.
(6) You are not to do any services at the Sapulpa office at all.
(7) You are not to have any contact with [CLIENT] at all.
(8) You are to turn in Medicaid goals/objectives for individual rehab to clinical coordinator for approval before providing any services. Not doing so will prevent you from being paid until they have been approved.
(9) All Medicaid clients that you see must already have a mental health assessment and treatment plan done by a therapist first.
(10) You are never allowed to remove a chart from the office.
(11) You may look through open Medicaid charts to find clients who need individual rehab to build up your client load.
In February 2005, Edwards filed a claim for "unemployment compensation", because after some LPCs had taken her off of their treatment plans, she had only three or four clients. On March 14, 2005, CMHS terminated its "Subcontractor Agreement" with Edwards. Edwards was told that she was terminated because "she violated Creoks policies; had too many issues with her co-workers; and caused Creoks to lose money"
Thereafter, Edwards filed a claim for unpaid wages with the Oklahoma Department of Labor, which was ultimately settled (outcome unknown). Edwards' claim for "unemployment compensation" was also approved under Oklahoma UC law.
Edwards also filed a employment discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in which Edwards alleged, " ... I have been discriminated against because of my religion ... . I also believe I have been discriminated against because of my Disability, ... . I further believe that I have been retaliated against for having filed an unemployment claim with the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission". EEOC dismissed Edwards' claims, but Edwards still filed this federal lawsuit.
The USDC ruled that CMHS was entitled to summary judgment on all of Edward's claims, stating in part:
"Defendant terminated plaintiff because of her inability to follow Creoks' policies, her conflicts with co-employees, and because she was causing Creoks to lose money. None of these proffered reasons are related to plaintiff's religion. Plaintiff submitted no evidence from which a reasonable person could infer that defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiff were mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. Plaintiff's primary evidence of religious discrimination is that her co-employee, Milton, said that she was 'shocked' that plaintiff was a Jehovah's Witness. This isolated comment about plaintiff's religion does not raise an inference of religious discrimination. On the contrary, Milton's statement occurred in a private phone conversation between plaintiff and Milton outside of work hours. ... Given this context, a reasonable trier of fact could not interpret Milton's comment to raise an inference of religious discrimination on the part of defendant.
"Further, the fact that plaintiff was reprimanded for teaching religion to clients does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the alleged religious discrimination. Plaintiff agrees that it was inappropriate to teach religion to clients; she merely maintains that her teaching a client how to read and study the Bible did not constitute religious "witnessing". This disagreement about what constitutes impermissible religious teaching is not relevant to the religious discrimination inquiry. Plaintiff cannot point to any other evidence of religious discrimination. ... plaintiff's allegation of religious discrimination rests on her own conclusory statements, which are unsupported by facts in the summary judgment record. Mere conjecture and subjective beliefs about an employer's motive do not create a genuine issue of material fact. ... ... ...
"... plaintiff's alleged disability is a generalized anxiety disorder. Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that this impairment substantially limits any major life activity On the contrary, she maintains that she was capable of performing her work adequately, but had problems dealing with pressure. While plaintiff cannot manage high levels of stress, she has not shown that she is 'significantly restricted' in performing a major life activity ... ... ...
"With respect to the statement made by Milton, the Court also finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the alleged defamation. Even assuming arguendo that Milton's statements that plaintiff had a learning disability or was schizophrenic were false and defamatory in nature, there is no evidence that these statements were published. To the extent that Milton made such statements to other Creoks employees, such communication is not evidence of publication. 'Communication inside a corporation, between its officers, employees, and agents, is never publication for the purposes of actions for defamation'. ... ."
DORIS D. CRAWFORD v. LUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER (also see next lawsuit by same JW plaintiff) was a 2008-11 New York court case. In 2008, Doris Crawford, an African-American Jehovah's Witness, who allegedly was already employed by LMC, was hired as an Administrative Assistant in LMC's Executive Offices, in February 2008. Crawford was terminated after only five weeks at that position. Crawford thereafter filed a pro se lawsuit against LMC alleging racial discrimination and retaliation.
The USDC had some difficulty extracting Crawford's multiple allegation from her pro se complaint, but, in March 2011, summarily dismissed all but the "retaliation" portion of her case, stating, "Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible claim to relief on her disparate treatment and hostile work environment claims. Moreover, the factual contentions underlying those claims are clearly baseless."
What are the adjudged "clearly baseless factual contentions?" Doris Crawford apparently believed that two fellow Jehovah's Witnesses -- a Rodney Jones, and a female named Dwani Bush -- started conspiring against her along with Crawford's co-workers at LMC, even though Jones and Bush did not work at LMC, and were not known to Crawford's co-workers. Crawford alleged that the conspiracy was trying to stop her from marrying her "alleged fiance" -- apparently another Jehovah's Witness, named Kevin Bush, who was Dwani Bush's ex-husband -- because Dwani Bush was Hispanic, and Crawford's LMC co-workers liked Hispanics, but did not like African-Americans. The only contact that African-American Kevin Bush had with LMC was a telephone call that he made to LMC complaining of receiving harassing telephone calls from Crawford, while she was at work at LMC. The USDC remarked, "Plaintiff's own Complaint contains troubling indications that her allegations as to the existence of a conspiracy against her are Plaintiff's own delusional beliefs with no basis in fact or reality."
DORIS D. CRAWFORD v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY was a 2006 New York federal court decision. In 2004, an African-American Jehovah's Witness, named Doris D. Crawford, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against her former employer, New York Life Insurance Company, including supervisory personnel. Doris Crawford was first employed by New York Life in November 2000, on a temporary basis, as a secretary in the Office of General Counsel. Crawford's employment became fulltime in February 2001. Crawford's lawsuit alleged discrimination violations under both Title VII (religious and gender) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
At some point early in her employment, "overtime" and Crawford's WatchTower religion evidently became an issue, because Crawford sought and was granted an "accommodation" to get off work every Tuesday and Thursday exactly at 5:00 PM, so that she could attend her regular weekly "meetings" at her Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses.
Doris Crawford also suffered from irritable bowel syndrome, which Crawford alleged caused her to feel embarrassed and socially isolated, because her work area smelled bad from her flatus. With regard to such, the USDC opinion relates:
"Crawford testified that while she worked at New York Life, she had "[d]iarrhea ... throughout the day in early stage, besides that I had the rashes, I had headaches, I had palpitations, I had breathlessness, I had panic . . . . If I was at work, I was in the bathroom a lot." She testified regarding how IBS impacted her ability to work at New York Life as "detain[ing me] in the bathroom, it would limit where I was, but ... I could do what I needed to do. It would just take me longer to do things and I just wasn't as available." ... She also testified that while at New York Life, "it was stressful to be around people[.]" ...
"Crawford testified that her symptoms have improved over time, including diarrhea once a month, constipation three times a month, [stomach cramps] one to two days per week, with daily flatulence. ... When asked how IBS affects her now on a daily basis, Crawford testified:
'It's more mental and emotional . ... The constant awareness of it and being in the presence of others. So more of a social isolation, I guess. So that I have to carry certain things to feel at least that I am not as offensive to be around. Carrying personal sprays and things of that nature and I use them frequently. ... There are places or people that I tend not to want to be around because if it's somebody new, I tend to not want to be in that environment. And I have to limit pretty much my time socially.'

"... Crawford takes no medicine and follows no special diet or other regimen to control her IBS. ...
"During her employment at New York Life, Crawford brought to the attention of LaDonna Carr ... , her supervisor, a number of grievances. In March 2001, Crawford complained that she was earning $500 less per annum than what the employment packet indicated she would earn. ... She also complained to Carr regarding the treatment of her by employees and supervisors at New York Life. She first complained about 'gossip' that co-employees spread about her using electronic mail. ... She said that two other secretaries, 'Janet', and 'Anesta', talked about her using the pronoun 'he' to disguise their intentions. ... When she asked technical support for an electronic mail account to communicate with the attorneys she supported, the technical support employee was very smug, and responded '[y]ou will get it when I give it to you.' ... On another occasion, a male employee walked past her, looked at her, and made a comment to another male employee about 'bra size', and laughed. ... Plaintiff also overheard the same employee state about female Jehovah's Witness members who live in his neighborhood that they 'let themselves go', to a group with other people in the lunchroom. ... In another instance, she suggested celebrating New York Life's hiring her with co-workers with 'bubbly', and she overheard a coworker state that 'this place is going to the dogs.' ... She also complained that her coworker 'Anesta' commented that she (Anesta) 'looked good in her clothes and referring to her weight and size', from which Plaintiff inferred that Anesta was insinuating 'that my clothes were tight and I needed to lose weight'. ...
"Crawford also informed Carr about her IBS, and complained about comments and gestures made by co-workers regarding Plaintiff's IBS symptoms. During her tenure at New York Life, co-workers publicly commented on smells emanating from Plaintiff's area due to IBS-caused flatus. One co-worker would hold her nose and say 'it stinks' as she walked past Plaintiff's area ... ; others would make similar comments, and a maintenance employee told her that her work area was moved close to the restroom 'because you stink'. She also stated that employees would use other bathrooms because of the smells she produced because of IBS. (Id. at 199.) Plaintiff acknowledged that the area smelled of flatus because 'I had gas 24/7'. ... ."
New York Life's sick policy allowed only seven daily absences per year. Beginning in April 2001, Crawford had numerous doctors appointments that led her to take time away from the office. In May/June 2001, a supervisor warned Crawford that continued time away from work during work hours could result in dismissal. On July 23, 2001, Crawford failed to call ahead of time before reporting late to work. On August 13, 2001, Crawford was provided a written 'final warning' informing her that she was over the acceptable number of absences, and that further absences would result in her dismissal. On September 5, 2001, Crawford again arrived late without previously informing the employer. On September 14, 17, and 18, 2001, Crawford again took sick leave because 'instead of things improving, people were acting the same. ... it was still a hostile work environment under the circumstances'. Crawford was terminated on September 18, 2001 for absences and latenesses in violation of New York Life's absence policy.
In November 2001, Crawford filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights. In February 2004, Crawford received a Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and she thereafter filed her own federal lawsuit. Her complaint alleged violations of Title VII and the ADA, and included as defendants both New York Life and individual supervisors. In October 2004, Crawford's complaint as to the individual supervisors was dismissed, since individual employees are not "employers" under Title VII and the ADA. The USDC also found that Crawford's complaint failed to allege sufficient facts regarding her IBS to conclude that she suffered a "substantial impairment" on a "major life activity" that would permit suit under the ADA. Crawford was granted "leave to amend", which she did in November 2004. The amended complaint alleged workplace harassment, retaliation, and discrimination based on her gender and IBS in violation of Title VII and the ADA. In granting NYLIC's motion for summary judgment on the remaining Title VII and ADA claims, the USDC stated in part:
"... [Crawford's] IBS-related symptoms do not 'substantially limit' any major life activity. ADA regulations define major life activities as including such functions 'as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working'. ... This is a non-exhaustive list, and Plaintiff's claimed impairments, i.e. that IBS has limited her ability to interact with others, to eliminate waste, and to work ... have been previously held by the Second Circuit to constitute major life activities. ...
"However, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient competent evidence that IBS has substantially limited these activities. ADA regulations counsel that in deciding whether a condition substantially limits a major life activity, a court should consider '(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment'. The first factor, the nature and severity of the impairment, weighs against a finding of a substantial limitation. In her deposition testimony, Plaintiff stated that IBS detained her in the bathroom frequently and caused her work area to smell of flatus. Plaintiff did not testify that IBS caused problems controlling the elimination of waste, beyond needing frequent trips to the bathroom. Because Plaintiff's work area adjoined the restroom, it is uncontested that she had access to a bathroom, and Plaintiff does not allege that her IBS ever caused extreme symptoms, such as requiring her to run to the bathroom without notice, or soiling herself. ... Therefore, Plaintiff's IBS symptoms did not limit her ability to control waste.
"Further, Plaintiff's symptoms did not substantially limit her ability to work, as Plaintiff conceded that IBS did not prevent her from completing any work assignment or otherwise limit her life activities beyond requiring frequent trips to the bathroom. To the extent that Plaintiff claims that IBS symptoms required frequent absences to attend doctor's appointments that resulted in her termination ..., I reject Plaintiff's Affidavit as selfserving and contradicted by her previous deposition testimony. The credible evidence shows that the specific instances that led to Plaintiff's termination, i.e., her absences on September 14, 17, and 18, 2001, were not caused by her need to attend medical appointments, but rather were precipitated by Plaintiff's unhappiness at how her co-workers treated her. ... Plaintiff does not submit any evidence, such as copies of doctor's notices, electronic mail, or other documentary evidence that might rebut her own deposition testimony. Moreover, assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has shown that her IBS symptoms resulted in her termination at New York Life, Plaintiff has not shown that these impairments would substantially limit her ability to perform any other job. An inability to perform 'a single, particular job' is not a substantial limitation upon working. While Plaintiff's frequent trips to the bathroom limited her availability and her resentment at how co-employees treated her may have caused her anxiety, they did not substantially limit her ability to work within the meaning of the ADA.
"The limitations created by IBS on Plaintiff's ability to communicate with others, while credible and significant, do not constitute a substantial limitation. The Second Circuit instructs that '[t]his standard is satisfied when the impairment severely limits the plaintiff's ability to connect with others, i.e., to initiate contact with other people and respond to them, or to go among other people -- at the most basic level of these activities'. ... Plaintiff testified that in response to her flatus, her New York Life co-workers made remarks and gestures that embarrassed her. Plaintiff further testified that her embarrassment resulted in stress-related symptoms, including headaches, heart palpitations, breathlessness, and panic. An anxiety disorder can be considered by a court to be a disability if it substantially limits the disabled individual's ability to communicate with others. ... However, Plaintiff testified that she was able to communicate with her superiors and coworkers effectively enough to complete her work. Furthermore, she testified that she is an extremely active Jehovah's Witness, participating in religious activities with other adherents several times per week. (FOOTNOTE: 'I reject Plaintiff's subsequent self-serving statement in her Affidavit that she 'drastically' reduced her hours of religious participation because of IBS symptoms as contradicted by her credible deposition testimony that IBS has not impacted her daily religious activities.') Accordingly, Plaintiff's testimony demonstrates that while her flatus has caused considerable embarrassment to her and has limited her social engagements, that it has not substantially limited her ability to communicate with others. ...
"The second factor, duration of the impairment, also militates against the finding of a substantial limitation to a major life activity. Plaintiff first exhibited IBS symptoms in 2001, and Plaintiff concedes that her IBS-related symptoms have diminished over time, and now cause only occasional cramping, diarrhea, and constipation. While Plaintiff's condition appears to have no cure, it also appears to be controlled.
"The third factor, the permanent or long-term impact of the resulting impairment, also weighs against a substantial limitation. Plaintiff's testimony shows that while medication has not been effective, her exercise and diet regimen appear to have substantially reduced her IBS-related symptoms. Furthermore, Plaintiff's testimony that she is not now physically limited from performing any activity supports the conclusion that IBS does not substantially limit any of Plaintiff's major life activities. Thus, I conclude that Crawford fails to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether her IBS symptoms substantially limit a major life activity. ... ... ...
"Plaintiff claims that New York Life dismissed her because of her complaints about statements and gestures by co-workers indicating that her IBS-related symptoms created noxious odors in her workspace and in the women's restroom. This claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to establish a causal connection between her complaints and her termination. It is uncontested that Plaintiff was late twice in July and September 2001 without previously notifying her employer that she would be late, contrary to the employer's policy, and that her last absences in September 2001, after she received a final warning notice for latenesses, put her over the policy limit. Plaintiff's dismissal pursuant to a clear absence policy after a final warning that future latenesses would result in her dismissal, and the absence of any evidence suggesting that her dismissal was related to her previous complaints, shows a lack of any genuine issue of fact as to whether there was a causal relationship between her complaints and her termination. ... ... ...
"Plaintiff's claims that she was subjected to a hostile workplace environment because of her gender. [FOOTNOTE: 'I note that although Plaintiff claims to have been discriminated against because of her religion, Plaintiff alleges no specific instance of religious discrimination, beyond her argument that her termination was in part based on her activities as a Jehovah's Witness. However, inasmuch as Plaintiff acknowledges that New York Life accommodated her ministry practices and offers no evidence that religion played any role whatsoever in her hostile workplace environment allegations and her dismissal, I dismiss this claim without further discussion.'] ... ... ...
"... To the extent that Plaintiff claims that her termination was the result of gender or religious discrimination, Plaintiff expressly denied in her deposition that she was dismissed because of her gender or religion. ... I reject Plaintiff's subsequent Affidavit that her termination was also motivated by religious and sexual harassment as self-serving and contradicted by her sworn and credible testimony in her deposition. ...
LEONARD B. HILT v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS was a 2007 Tennessee federal court decision. In 2004, Dr. Leonard B. Hilt, an African-American Jehovah's Witness Doctor, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against the Department of Veterans Affairs. Leonard Hilt was employed as a podiatrist at the VA's Tennessee Valley Healthcare System in Nashville, Tennessee, from December 1991 until his voluntary retirement in March 2006. Dr. Hilt's lawsuit contained three counts. Count I was brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and alleged unlawful discrimination on the basis of his disability, identified in his complaint to be leukemia. Count II alleged discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in the form of unlawful retaliation on the basis of Hilt's participation in EEO activities and/or his opposition to his supervisor's discriminatory practices. Count III alleged further discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment.
Leonard Hilt initially enjoyed a pleasant working relationship with the staff and his fellow physicians. However, both his working relationships and his personal health deteriorated over the course of his 14+ years employment. Hilt's problems apparently started sometime around 1997-98. In January 1999, Hilt's supervisor, Dr. Rudolph Cumberbatch, wrote a memo to the Chief of Staff at the VA Hospital expressing concerns about Hilt's mental and physical health, as well as his alleged "inappropriate behavior". In the memo, Cumberbatch requested that an evaluation of Hilt be conducted to determine his fitness for duty. Also, in January 1999, Hilt received his first proficiency rating from Dr. Cumberbatch, covering the period of November 1997 through November 1998, containing ratings of "low satisfactory" in two out of five categories and negative comments.
In May/June 1999, Hilt attended a meeting with Cumberbatch, a Dr Burns, also a VA podiatrist, and Ruth Vickens, the Administrative Officer, during which Hilt and Dr. Burns exchanged words. Hilt and Dr. Burns were at one time friends and roommates, though their relationship deteriorated after Dr. Burns came to work at the VA Hospital. Hilt later testified that Dr. Burns asked several confrontational questions that made Hilt angry, which led Hilt to call Dr. Burns a "snake". Burns replied that Hilt ought to know a "snake", being a Jehovah's Witness. Cumberbatch then said, "Dr. Hilt, I didn't know you were a Christian." In June 1999, as a result of that exchange, Hilt contacted his Union representative. Hilt also filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint of religious discrimination. The complaint was dismissed at the administrative level in August 1999.
In December 1999, Hilt received his second proficiency rating conducted by Dr. Cumberbatch, covering the period from November 12, 1998, to September 3, 1999. In this review, Dr. Cumberbatch reported that Hilt was performing at the level of "low satisfactory" in even more categories than the previous year, and gave him a "low" rating in four out of five areas. In November 1999, Hilt went on medical leave and had three surgeries on the same foot due to osteomyelitis. Hilt returned from medical leave in August 2000. It is unclear whether Hilt voluntarily withdrew himself from surgical duties to allow himself to further heal, or whether Cumberbatch had restricted Hilt's from surgery in May 2000. In late August 2000, Hilt's also had his left big toe amputated. In May 2000, while Hilt still was on medical leave, Cumberbatch amended the second proficiency rating to state that Hilt's "current health problems may have impacted [Hilt's] ability to perform in an operating room setting". In July 2000, Hilt lodged an administrative complaint alleging retaliation in the form of low ratings on the second proficiency report, because of his June 1999 EEO complaint.

In October 2003, due to increasingly frequent absences for medical appointments associated with his health problems, Hilt was required to submit dates and times for all of his personal medical appointments for a three month period. Hilt additionally alleged that his supervisor sent three emails to an individual who was not his supervisor containing information about the plaintiff's medical treatment. Hilt further alleged that he was required to consult with a newly licensed podiatrist before making referrals as a form of punishing him, even though he admits that this policy applied to everyone and not just specifically to him.
In March 2004, Hilt filed another EEO complaint alleging reprisal for prior EEO activity, because his Section Chief required him to submit the times and dates of his personal medical appointments for a three month period, and because his Section Chief sent three emails to a non-supervisor about his personal medical appointments, and because his Section Chief stated that he "was watching" Hilt, and because he was required to consult with an inexperienced, newly licensed podiatrist before making referrals to vascular service.
Sometime thereafter, Hilt filed this federal lawsuit, which was based on the charges presented in the two administrative complaints of discrimination made in July 2000 and March 2004. Hilt withdrew his claims based on the March 2004 events after the defendants filed their answer. Since the June 1999 complaint of religious discrimination was dismissed at the administrative level, it was at issue only insofar as it related to the alleged retaliation. As for Hilt's remaining claims based on the July 2000 administrative complaint, the USDC granted the VA's motion for summary judgment, stating in part:
"In the present case, although the plaintiff disputes the basis for the lowered evaluation scores, he fails to show that the scores had any effect whatsoever beyond bruising his ego. With respect to the alleged suspension of his surgical privileges, the plaintiff was on medical leave at the time of the allegedly retaliatory action, he lost no pay or prestige, and he voluntarily removed himself from surgical service upon his return due to health concerns. ... ... ...
"... Here, the plaintiff received his first lowered performance evaluation score before he filed a charge of discrimination. The plaintiff's first lowered evaluation covered the period from November 12, 1997, to November 12, 1998, and the plaintiff received this report in January 1999, well before he filed his June 1999 EEO complaint, and indeed, well before the incident giving rise to the complaint of discrimination (the June 1999 meeting) had even occurred.
"... The plaintiff's scores were on the decline six months prior to his complaint of discrimination. The fact that they continued to worsen following his charge of discrimination is not as clearly attributable to employer retaliation ... the facts in this case show a preexisting slide in scores that began well before the charge of discrimination was made. Thus, in this case, lowered performance evaluation scores simply do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.
"The plaintiff also claims that he was retaliated against because of an addendum to the 1998-1999 performance evaluation expressing concerns about his fitness for surgery. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Dr. Cumberbatch used concerns about the plaintiff's personal health as a pretext to justify revocation of his surgical privileges. Even taking all of the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is simply no support for this claim in the record.
"The plaintiff admitted that he was on an extended period of sick leave during the time relevant to this portion of his claim, from about November 2, 1999, through August 13, 2000, due to health problems, including multiple surgeries on his foot and the amputation of his left great toe. ... The plaintiff stated in his December 2000 EEO interview that he performed his last surgery in 1999, prior to going on his extended sick leave. He further confirmed that he had voluntarily performed no surgeries in the year 2000 since returning from sick leave. ... The plaintiff stated that the reason he had not performed any surgeries was because he was recovering from his own surgeries and because he had promised Dr. Jones, the Chief of Staff, that he 'would not go into the [operating room] until the foot [was] completely closed and healed'.
"The alleged revocation of the plaintiff's surgical privileges occurred in May 2000 when Dr. Cumberbatch amended the plaintiff's 1998-1999 proficiency report to include his concerns about the plaintiff's health problems and their impact on the plaintiff's ability to 'perform in an operating room setting.' ... It is not entirely clear whether Dr. Cumberbatch ever effectively suspended, revoked, or otherwise put into effect any restriction on the plaintiff's surgical privileges whatsoever. During his interview with the EEO examiner in December 2000, the plaintiff discussed a letter dated November 4, 1999, in which he alleges that Dr. Cumberbatch stated that the plaintiff was prohibited from doing certain types of surgeries unless he had Dr. Burns' supervision. ... The plaintiff also stated that Dr. Jones, Dr. Cumberbatch's superior, replied to Dr. Cumberbatch's letter and told him that the plaintiff did have surgical privileges and that Dr. Cumberbatch could not impose such restrictions on the plaintiff alone without including the rest of the podiatrists on staff. ... Neither Dr. Cumberbatch's letter nor Dr. Jones' response is included anywhere in the record, though these documents may have originally been included as attachments to the plaintiff's EEO testimony.
"Even assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiff's surgical privileges were restricted, any such action cannot be considered an adverse action under the circumstances presented in this case. Even if Dr. Cumberbatch successfully interfered with the plaintiff's surgical privileges on November 4, 1999, or on May 19, 2000, the plaintiff was at that time on medical leave, and would not return until August 2000. Upon his return, the plaintiff admits that he actually did have surgical privileges, but that he was voluntarily keeping himself out of the surgical suite in light of his own recent surgeries and ongoing recovery and healing process. ...
"... The plaintiff was out on a very extended sick leave when the alleged suspension occurred. His privileges were, by his own admission, restored (or remained intact) at the time he returned to work in August 2000. The reason the plaintiff did not return to surgical duties was because of his self-imposed attempt to complete his own healing process, as a result of his recent multiple surgeries and difficult recoveries. The plaintiff suffered no actual loss of pay, prestige, or privilege, nor indeed, any other ill effects whatsoever because of any alleged restriction or revocation of his surgical privileges, because he simply was not present for such detrimental effects to accrue. When he did return to work, the plaintiff prevented himself from performing surgeries, ... Under the totality of these circumstances, the alleged revocation of the plaintiff's surgical privileges simply does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action."

UPTON v. WATCH TOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY is an very interesting ongoing 2006 New York state court case involving a Jehovah's Witness named Brenda Upton and the Jehovah's Witnesses themselves. Upton worked as a chiropractor at the Jehovah's Witnesses main Brooklyn headquarters from 1998 until 2001. Chiropractor Upton alleges that she injured her back around 2000, and that she is entitled to worker's compensation benefits. The Watch Tower Society claims that Upton was not an employee, but merely a volunteer who is not legally entitled to any remedies typically available to employees. An administrative law Judge ruled in Upton's favor earlier this year, but the Watch Tower Society vowed to fight his decision. Results of appeal are unknown.


In August 1994, a Houston, Texas Jehovah's Witness, named Troy Morehead, 25, died during a WatchTower "quick-build" project for the Assembly Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, in Rosenberg, Texas. Morehead fell from the roof area down onto the concrete slab -- a fall that should not have necessarily been fatal. One can only wonder whether Morehead actually died due to refusal to accept a blood transfusion made necessary by internal bleeding.


SIMON v. SCHENECTADY NORTH CONGREGATION OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES was a 1987 New York lawsuit filed by a Jehovah's Witness named Charles Simon against his own Congregation. Simon was injured while "voluntarily" doing some carpentry work on the Kingdom Hall, which had been requested by the "Elders" of Simon's congregation. Simon's congregation refused to cover his injuries, thus resulting in this lawsuit, which Simon lost. Word to the wise, Contractors. Don't set foot on Kingdom Hall property unless you have all the insurance you will ever need. Their General Liability insurance is handled out of Watchtower world headquarters, and you will never get a penny without first spending a dollar.


PURVIS v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION was a 2006 Pennsylvania federal court case which involved a Jehovah's Witness named Rosilyn Purvis. In November 2002, Rosilyn Purvis filed for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income due to two or more employment related injuries. The source opinion does not elaborate on Purvis's employment, nor the incidents in which she was injured. The record simply notes that a second work related injury occurred in February 2002, and that Purvis continued working until November 2002 (when a third incident possibly occurred). In 2004, an ALJ ruled that Purvis was not disabled per SSA definitions despite suffering from depression, obesity, and degenerative disc disease. The ALJ noted that Purvis was a Jehovah's Witness who regularly attended and sit through their five weekly meetings, plus she also occasionally did their required door-to-door recruiting. Purvis also lived alone and perform all necessary functions required by such. The ALJ also noted that Purvis' depression and back pain could be properly controlled if only she would properly take her prescribed medications. It was ruled that Purvis could perform certain light work and was not disabled. The USDC agreed and dismissed Purvis' lawsuit.





Wifely Subjection: Mental Health Issues in Jehovah's Witness Women

Jehovah's Witnesses and the Problem of Mental Illness

The Theocratic War Doctrine: Why Jehovah's Witnesses Lie In Court




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