******************                         ******************

Atwood said he was not often arrested, although he knew police were looking for him. "Often after we would visit a home, a local minister would be called who then called the police. "We made no attempt to elude the police, but we worked for six months in one area without being caught. We were always a step ahead of them."

 

Of their harassment, both men said "We were hated, just as Jesus was, for telling the truth."

"ASSAULT CASES:  It is strange that the brethren get it in their mind that they have to stand up and be kicked by somebody. If some of them would show a little fight and peel someone's head for him it might help a little."

 

******************

McKEE v. STATE was a 1942 Oklahoma criminal appellate court case which documents the fact that by that point in time at least some of Jehovah's Witnesses were obeying Rutherford's admonition. In fact, some JWs not only intentionally sought out a good fight, but they went into such aptly prepared. In this instance, this group of Jehovah's Witnesses even won this street brawl.

This criminal case involved five Jehovah's Witnesses -- George L. McKee, Mr. Toots Wilson, Mrs. Toots Wilson, Mr. Weldon Simmons, and Mrs. Weldon Simmons, (a sixth JW was evidently not charged), who all got into a street brawl with several citizens of Drumright, Oklahoma, on December 23, 1940.  All five JWs were initially convicted of "breach of the peace" by a Justice of the Peace. On appeal, Mrs. Toots Wilson, Mr. Weldon Simmons, and Mrs. Weldon Simmons were acquitted in a jury trial. George L. McKee and Toots Wilson again appealed this decision.

This December 1940 fight was the third incident in an ongoing battle between the citizens of Drumright and the Jehovah's Witnesses. Sometime in late 1939, the Mayor of Drumright had refused a request by a group of Jehovah's Witnesses to broadcast throughout Drumright via loud-speakers a speech by WatchTower President, Judge Rutherford.  Then, in June 1940, there was a second confrontation in Drumright, when a group of Jehovah's Witnesses were selling literature on the streets of Drumright.

The specifics of the December 23, 1940, brawl were much disputed by all parties involved -- each side blaming the other for strating the brawl.  Prior to trial, George L. McKee had written a letter to the WatchTower Society regarding such, and because such was admitted at trial, certain excerpts are included in this appellate decision. Bearing in mind that McKee obviously "spun" the details to suit his own best interests, still note some of McKee's own incriminating and enlightening remarks:

"After prayerfully studying the instructions of the said INFORMANT (corrected to reflect name of WatchTower publication which was used to educate JWs regarding recruiting activities, and legal issues revolving around such), we decided that the days preceding Christmas would be the best, since a large number of people would be on the streets, doing their shopping".

"The following week we (four Bros. & two Srs.) planned to work Monday 23th and Sat 28th. So taking all precautions we thought that would be necessary; the men had canes on their arms, while the women had their purses with heavy cold cream jars in them. We worked until our time set to stop at 12:00 o'clock."

"As we were going to our cars to leave town we were surrounded by the same mob only this time they had increased to about fifty and without say a word, Art Glaser an American Legion started cutting one of the Bro. magazine bags off, and I politely ask him to stop, without giving heed he and four other men grabbed him and started beating him, so not wishing to see the Lord's literature torn up or His servants hurt, I let go with my cane, knocking two fellows out, and the fight began, which lasted about thirty minutes".   [Commentary: I would have thought that the "fight began" when the four men supposedly first started beating the other JW???]

"During the fight, the enemies mind was either so confused, that they began fighting one another, or either there were some people of good will who were fighting for us, because at one time there were at least ten men knocked out, lying on the sidewalks, (none of these were the witnesses).    [Commentary: Reread that last sentence until you fully understand that McKee is actually boasting -- all 10 men surely were NOT knocked unconscious by little 'ol us!!!]    While the Bros. were using canes and fists the Srs. were using their purses which proved very useful, in saving two of the witnesses life. All the witnesses both Bros. and Srs. knew they were fighting for a righteous cause and never at one time let up until most of the enemy were carried off or left to escape more just treatment". 

"We did not go on the street corners with the intentions of fighting, but to enable the people of good will an opportunity to the Kingdom Message, but after the enemies deliberately started to destroy our literature, after seeing us going to leave town and being told not to destroy it, it was more than the witnesses could bear, and being instructed to fight for the kingdom interests and our Brethren, we used just what force we thought necessary and no more, because after they stopped fighting and began leaving we also went on our way". [Commentary: McKee here acknowledges that the JWs had been "instructed to fight".  There is only one entity that instructs JWs about anything -- the WatchTower Society.]

 

Readers not familiar with such should be aware that male JWs frequently carried "canes" as weapons in the 1930s and 1940s. Walking canes were items commonly carried by some people to help them get around, as fashion accessories, etc. Thus, unless a person looked closely, most observers would not understand that a JW was carrying a weapon. Some canes were actually canes that had been hand-selected for their suitability as a weapon, but some were actually homemade clubs made to resemble a cane.

As for the female JWs, who carried purses specially "loaded" with heavy 1940s glass jars filled with cold cream, does anyone believe that these JW females came up with such on their own? Or, does anyone actually believe that they were able to win this street fight using loaded purses as weapons without the benefit of having first trained to some extent in the use of such?

In the end, this appellate court remarked that all parties who participated in the street brawl were guilty of "breach of the peace", and "suspecting" that only the JWs had been charged, this court modified the sentence by deleting the 30-days jail time, but affirming the $25.00 fine and $74.80 court costs.

Stillwater citizen, Mert Poole, complained that on a Saturday afternoon as he walked past Walrod, who was attempting to pass out WatchTower literature on the sidewalk in front of a Stillwater Bank, that Walrod thrust some of the WatchTower literature up under Poole's nose, and that Poole knocked it away, and started on up the sidewalk. Poole alleged that he had taken three or four steps away, when Walrod ran up behind him, jumped on his back, knocked him down, and struck him several blows on his face. There were no eyewitnesses to the start of the fight, except Poole and Walrod, who each accused the other of starting such.  However, the prosecution used two eyewitnesses who testified that they did see Walrod on top of Poole and striking him repeatedly. Poole acknowledged during the jury trial that he had testified against Walrod on two previous occasions when Walrod had been charged in Stillwater with certain alleged breaches of the peace, and that he had told Walrod never to offer him any WatchTower literature, nor bring it to his house.

This appellate court affirmed the jury's decision, but modified the sentence, stating in part:

We have come to the conclusion, after an examination of this record, that the complainant Poole is not altogether without fault in this altercation. Both he and the defendant should have been taken before the police judge of the city of Stillwater and fined for fighting. Poole's testimony discloses that he felt bitter towards the defendant and thought that he was not a patriotic American citizen because of certain religious practices of the organization to which the accused belonged. The defendant lost his temper or the fighting would not have occurred. Under the record, the verdict of the jury must be sustained. However, the severity of the punishment is not merited by the record. Justice requires a modification. The minimum fine of $5 and costs is a sufficient punishment.

 

******************

"No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation."

In April 1940, Walter Chaplinsky and several other JWs were parading (see case below) and distributing WatchTower propaganda on the sidewalks of Rochester, New Hampshire, on a busy Saturday afternoon.  Local citizens complained to a city police officer that Chaplinsky was denouncing all religion as a "racket."  The police officer inform them that Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged, but also warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless. Some time later, a fight broke out between Chaplinski and several irritated citizens. A second traffic officer on duty at the nearby busy intersection rescued Chaplinski from the crowd, took him into protective custody, and started with Chaplinsky to the police station. The officer did not inform Chaplinsky that he was under arrest, nor that he was going to be arrested.

On the way, they encountered the first police officer, who by then had been advised that a riot was under way, and was therefore hurrying to the scene.  The first police officer repeated his earlier warning to Chaplinsky, who then cursed the officer, stating something to the effect:

"You are a God damned racketeer," and "a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists."

SCOTUS affirmed the conviction, stating in part:

"Appellant assails the statute as a violation of all three freedoms, speech, press and worship, but only an attack on the basis of free speech is warranted. The spoken, not the written, word is involved. And we cannot conceive that cursing a public officer is the exercise of religion in any sense of the term. But even if the activities of the appellant which preceded the incident could be viewed as religious in character, and therefore entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would not cloak him with immunity from the legal consequences for concomitant acts committed in violation of a valid criminal statute. We turn, therefore, to an examination of the statute itself.

"Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words--those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 'Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.' Cantwell v. Connecticut, ... .

"The state statute here challenged comes to us authoritatively construed by the highest court of New Hampshire. It has two provisions -- the first relates to words or names addressed to another in a public place; the second refers to noises and exclamations. The court said: 'The two provisions are distinct. One may stand separately from the other. Assuming, without holding, that the second were unconstitutional, the first could stand if constitutional.'  We accept that construction of severability and limit our consideration to the first provision of the statute.

"On the authority of its earlier decisions, the state court declared that the statute's purpose was to preserve the public peace, no words being 'forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.' It was further said: 'The word "'offensive'" is not to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks.  . . . The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight.  . . . The English language has a number of words and expressions which by general consent are 'fighting words' when said without a disarming smile.  . . . Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight. So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings. Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace. . . . The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace by the speaker--including "'classical fighting words'", words in current use less "'classical'" but equally likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats.'

"We are unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus construed contravenes the Constitutional right of free expression. It is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, ... ; Thornhill v. Alabama, ... . This conclusion necessarily disposes of appellant's contention that the statute is so vague and indefinite as to render a conviction thereunder a violation of due process. A statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as not unduly to impair liberty of expression, is not too vague for a criminal law. Cf. Fox v. Washington,... .

"Nor can we say that the application of the statute to the facts disclosed by the record substantially or unreasonably impinges upon the privilege of free speech. Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations 'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.

"The refusal of the state court to admit evidence of provocation and evidence bearing on the truth or falsity of the utterances, is open to no Constitutional objection. Whether the facts sought to be proved by such evidence constitute a defense to the charge, or may be shown in mitigation, are questions for the state court to determine. Our function is fulfilled by a determination that the challenged statute, on its face and as applied, does not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment."

 

One interesting tidbit is that one of the police officers also alleged that Walter Chaplinsky had been "drinking". Chaplinski was not charged with such, which means that such was either not true, or possibly that Chaplinski was simply not intoxicated. That certainly would not have been the first time that a JW took a nip before going recruiting in order to stiffen their nerve.

Also, Chaplinsky was initially sentenced to only 12 days in jail, but during the appeal at the Superior Court level, Chaplinski was sentenced to 6 months in jail, which he served after SCOTUS ruled against him.

Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the ihterest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. One would not. be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions. As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional exercise of control by local government, the question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public places.

 

...

 

The argument as to freedom of worship is also beside the point. No interference with religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense is shown, but only the exer cise of local control over the use of streets for parades and processions.

It would appear, from the general discussion of civil liberties, that freedom is a one-way street. For instance, no one speaks of freedom from molestation. The other day, in a matter of four or five city streets, I was accosted by perhaps 100 or 150 Jehovah's Witnesses who insisted upon making me a depository for their literature. I regarded this as a molestation. Should I call a policeman and demand, as a citizen, my right to walk the city streets without let or hindrance, or must I duck along, hoping sooner or later that the nuisance might end? Or, should I, as a man, push aside, with more or less vigor, those who, exercising their right of freedom of expression, deny me the right of freedom of molestation?

"Jehovah's Witnesses cannot give allegiance to the Kingdom of the Devil."

"Through ignorance I once broke the covenant of Jehovah when I served with the Fifth Regiment of Marines at Soisson, France, during the World War [ I ], but I will never break his covenant again by taking up the sword against any man for any cause. ... I would never go to war again, not even if Hitler invaded the United States. No, sir. I would never again lift my hand to kill another man."

 

"In Weymouth high school [Jehovah's] Witnesses Charles & Harold Newcomb, who claim to be descendants of Betsy Ross, staged a sympathy strike against [the Pledge of Allegiance]." --TIME magazine, November 18, 1935.

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